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This thesis explores the role and significance of ministerial advisers in the 
Keating government (1991-1996). The role of ministerial advisers has changed 
substantially since they emerged in Australia in 1972, yet there is surprisingly 
little research about them. A study of the Keating period is useful as it tracks 
the evolution of the ministerial office over a critical period in its development: 
the Hawke-Keating years (1983-1996). In this period the role of adviser grew, 
developed in new ways and was entrenched as a permanent part of the 
machinery of government in Australia. 
The thesis reports the results of a major qualitative research project undertaken 
in 1995-6, in which 64 ministers, advisers and public servants were interviewed. 
The thesis first maps the different elements of the role, focusing on the 
functions that advisers performed in government. It argues that advisers were 
very important in government because they could perform key roles for the 
executive which went beyond their traditional work of political and personal 
support. These roles were communication, steering policy and coordination. 
The study distinguishes different types of advisers based on their behaviour, 
and identifies what were the areas of, and causes of, variation in their work. 
The thesis then explores several elements of the adviser's role in depth, 
touching on three key themes: how advisers engaged with departments, 
advisers' role in policy making, and their contribution to executive 
coordination. 
The study reveals that advisers in the Keating years were an important part of 
the central machinery of government, located at the heart of decision making 
and policy making in Australia. Their central location, and the major 
development in their role, made them significant players in the structure and 
practice of government at this time. 
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phone rings constantly, often on 
several once. walk briskly into advisers' rooms 
to place more yellow sticky messages onto desks covered with sticky messages, 
and groaning with in overflowing trays. Televisions drone, constantly 
relaying what is in the House or the Senate. Advisers come and go 
spend most their time talking animatedly - on the phone or in meetings 
with lobby groups, public servants or other advisers. The office is stuffy and 
overheated, the air thick with a sense of self-importance and an energy fuelled 
by adrenalin, crisis and intrigue. 
This is the world of the Australian ministerial adviser. What happens in this 
intense world, far from departments, :MPs, journalists and the public, is rarely 
seen or written down but has become very important to the structure and 
practice of government in Australia. 
The issue that underlies this research is the role and significance of ministerial 
advisers in our political system. The thesis explores the role of advisers by 
looking in detail at their role in the Keating government in 1995-96, and 
analyses the significance of advisers' work at this time. The central question 
which guides the research in the thesis is therefore: 'what was the role and 
significance of ministerial advisers in the Keating government?' 
1 
The role of ministerial advisers in Australian government has grown 
enormously since they emerged in 1972, and they have become increasingly 
important players in our political system. This has been a source of unease in 
some quarters, with concern expressed about what it is they do and how 
accountable they are for it, how powerful they are in policy making, and what 
impact they have on political-bureaucratic relationships. But while ministerial 
advisers are a topic of interest amongst the public and within academia, there is 
surprisingly little research about their role. 
A study of the Keating period is useful for several reasons. The Labor period, 
comprising 13 years of government under Hawke (1983-1991) and then Keating 
(1991-1996), was a time of major change in political institutions in Australia. 
There were significant changes to the public service and to the operation of 
cabinet over this period (Campbell and Halligan 1992). This was also a critical 
period in the development of the ministerial office. The role of adviser grew, 
developed in new ways and was entrenched as a permanent part of the 
machinery of government in Australia. 
The most comprehensive study of ministerial advisers in Australia (Walter 
1986) was based on interviews with advisers in 1983, the first year of the Labor 
period. There has been insufficient research tracking how the role developed 
over the following 13 years. This thesis, which is based on empirical research in 
the final years of the Labor period (1995-96), can be set against Walter's stqdyto 
chart the arc of development in the role over that period. 
One minister in this study told his adviser that her job was to 'throw your body 
over exploding bombs'. This is a potent image of the 'bottom line' of the role-
to protect the minister politically, even at the expense of your own interests. 
Yet while its 'bottom line' is clear, the scope and boundaries of the role are 
difficult to articulate. The role has traditionally encompassed political and 
personal support, often disparagingly called 'spin' and 'minding'. It now goes 
far beyond this. 
The role of the ministerial adviser is difficult to capture because it is without a 
legislative or formal definition. The Member of Parliament (Stafj) Act 1984,1 
under which advisers are employed, merely states that 'an office-holder may, 
on behalf of the Commonwealth, employ, under an agreement in writing, a 
person as a member of the office-holder's staff'. This must be done 'in 
accordance with arrangements approved by the Prime Minister' and 'subject to 
1 Hereafter referred to as 'the MOP(S) Act'. 
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are reasons why the research is warranted. is advisers 
have become an important of the central machinery of government, located 
at the heart of decision making and policy making in Australia. An 
understanding the role advisers play is to understanding the operation 
of the political executive today. It is essential to understanding the relationship 
between the political executive and bureaucracy. It is also important that 
advisers' role be understood so that it may be evaluated. Until the role is 
articulated, we cannot begin to debate whether it is an appropriate one, and 
whether those who play it perform their duties adequately. 
Secondly the evolving role of advisers in Australian government represents a 
major gap in political science literature. The gap is both empirical (what is it 
that they do?) and conceptual (how can we understand what they do?). The 
next chapter reviews the literature in the area. It reveals that there have been 
few empirical studies of the role of Australian ministerial advisers since their 
emergence in 1972. The most significant study was based on interviews done in 
1983, at the start of the Hawke-Keating period (Walter 1986). Later studies (eg 
Dunn 1997, Ryan 1995) have not explored the role in its entirety. Nor do we 
have a conceptual framework for understanding what it is that advisers do. 
Apart from these empirical studies, Australian political science literature too 
3 
advisory support 
Minister's office and the Department the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (PM&C)). does not describe the evolution role of ministerial 
advisers in Australian government generally. Defining distinctive character 
of the Australian ministerial office, as it developed over the Labor period, will 
enable more informed comparative analysis. This is particularly relevant at 
moment because recent changes in the UK have caused alarm and much debate 
about the appropriate role for ministerial advisers and about appropriate 
advisory structures within a Westminster-style system. 
The fourth reason why this research is important is because there has been an 
upswing in interest over the last decade in the operation of the executive and in 
the development of political institutions. In 1995 Rhodes lamented the fact 'we 
lack basic accounts of key executive institutions and their role in the policy 
process' (1995:26) and called for more research on the executive 'in action' or 'at 
work' (1995:32). There is now a body of British literature which updates our 
understanding of the executive 'at work' and analyses changes to executive 
structures and executive capacity (Rhodes 2000a, 2000b). In exploring advisers' 
contribution to political control, this thesis goes to the heart of current debates 
about the 'hollowing out ofthe state' (Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes 1997) and the 
4 
are concerns 
Access can a wary 
author's personal were a great advantage in establishing the trust and 
credibility needed to open doors. The interviews produced very rich data. 
use a large sample of in-depth interviews from three different groups 
provides data with depth and context rarely found in previous studies of 
advisers.2 
The study takes an institutional and comparative approach. In recent years 
'New Institutionalism' has revived interest in institutions by suggesting that 
institutions matter to behaviour: 
Individuals are shaped by, and in their collective enterprises act through, 
structures and organisations and institutions. What people want to do, and 
what they can do, depends importantly upon what organisational technology is 
available ... to them (Goodin 1996:13). 
Though their roles are defined individually by the ministers who employ them, 
advisers have an organisational identity in government. Their behaviour is 
governed by an evolving set of expectations, practices and routines. The study 
explores the institution of the ministerial office in operation and in relationship 
2 Dunn's (1997) valuable study is the exception. He interviewed 38 subjects from the three 
groups; but they did not necessarily work together and were across two governments. 
5 
advisers Early studies 
"~"11""" ... ""7'"~" types of advisers on their background and their 
behaviour (Forward 1975, Later studies generalise the work of 
advisers, while the same time noting that they varied their approach to 
job and worked differently different situations (Walter 1986, Ryan 1995). 
Tiris study explores whether advisers played the same role, distinguishes 
different types of advisers based on their behaviour, and identifies what were 
the areas ot and causes ot variation in their work. The thesis describes the 
boundaries of the role in general, but also identifies variations in behaviour 
within the general scope of the role. 
The thesis then explores several elements of the adviser's role in depth, 
touching on three key themes: the impact of advisers on political-bureaucratic 
relations; advisers' role in policy making; and their role in executive 
coordination. 
The relationship between ministerial advisers and departments has become 
very important in Australian government. Their interaction represents the 
meeting of political and administrative forces on the terrain of policy. The 
thesis aims to delve deeply into the relationship between advisers and senior 
public servants. In contrast to other studies which have largely focused on the 
views of senior advisers and departmental secretaries, the subjects chosen in 
6 
The us talked hours about the industry, exchanging 
l:'t><>n1"1•""' ••• I if ever 
concentrated It 
became like a giant crossword We tried to respond to every due. If we 
have answers we sought outside help (Button 1998:296-7). 
"'.....,'"'"""" senior accounts 
policy reform the Labor years reveal critical roles played by some 
advisers in development income support for young people; the child 
support scheme; higher education contribution scheme; and term 
unemployment policy (2001:42, 54, Ministerial advisers have also been 
reported to have been important players in national competition policy 
(Harman foreign affairs policy (Gyngell and Wesley 2000:225) and 
economic policy (Goldfinch 1999) in this period.3 Yet what advisers do in the 
policy process remains elusive. Their policy roles have not yet been explored 
fully. The thesis asks: 'how did advisers engage in policy making in the 
Keating period?' It identifies some distinctive policy roles played by very active 
advisers at this time. 
The thesis also explores in detail the coordinating work advisers did within the 
ministry. Dunn (1997) described this as a possible new development in the 
adviser's role (since it did not appear in Walter's 1986 study), and as one of their 
key responsibilities. For the first time, the thesis explores in depth the informal 
relationships between advisers and their implicit understandings of how they 
3 Though interestingly they are at times misidentified as public servants in analysis (eg 
Goldfinch 1999, C Howard 2001 :60). 
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a 
how a complex to explore it 
of space puts issue 
u.-.. ........ u. However by documenting the 
role of advisers at this the thesis provides important material that can 
inform this as it takes place in academic and forums. 
FRAMEWORK OF THE STUDY 
The thesis has three parts. The first consists of three chapters that provide a 
background to the study and outline its methodology. The second- the main 
body of the thesis - comprises six chapters that report the research and analysis. 
The final chapter and third part of the thesis presents conclusions drawn from 
the research. 
Chapter One provides a brief background to the study. Chapter Two reviews the 
literature relevant to the topic and develops specific research questions. Chapter 
Three outlines the methodology used in the research. 
Chapter Four provides a conceptual framework for analysing the role played by 
ministerial advisers in the Keating government. It argues that advisers 
performed three key roles for ministers in addition to the traditional roles of 
personal and political support. These were communication, steering policy and 
8 
This is warranted 
methods and the questions which guided the research. 
research 
next chapter 
provides some background needed understand the behaviour of advisers 
the Keating years. 
9 
In the Keating 
._._,,.u ..... be classified as 
ministerial on 
5.7 of whom were advisers. represented an average of 7 advisers 
cabinet ministers and advisers for non-cabinet ministers (Maley The 
number and levels of were approved by the Prime Minister 1 based on a 
standard formula for senior junior ministers. Ministers could apply to vary 
the formula due to special needs. Table 1.1 shows some examples of typical 
ministerial office structures the Keating period: 
1 Ministerial Directory, October 1995. The figures include ministerial consultants, principal 
advisers, senior advisers, advisers and assistant advisers. They exclude the staff excluded by 
Walter (1986). These were media staff Uournalists, press secretaries and media advisers); 
clerical staff (personal secretaries, assistant personal secretaries, steno-secretaries, typists, 
telephonists); departmental liaison officers and electorate staff (electorate secretaries and 
electorate assistants). They also exclude staff of parliamentary secretaries. 
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advisers 
not 
counted as 
ministerial 
advisers in 
Adviser 
Adviser 
Adviser 
Assistant Adviser 
Adviser 
Assistant Adviser 
DLO 
Media Adviser 
advisers were very 
r>Tn,<:>rc were more 
senior adviser's job was orchestrate 
manage help to set 
the advisers, to 
amongst 
issues in a were often a sounding the advisers and 
managed the overall relationship with the department. Relationships within a 
ministerial office could be very competitive, despite advisers often being dose 
friends. They were always competing minister's time and attention. 
One adviser described it as a lonely because responsibilities were usually 
divided up amongst staff without any overlap or shared responsibilities. Each 
person often reported directly to the minister. 
The sample of Keating ministerial advisers in this study were mostly male 
(71 %), in their 30s and 40s (90%), and highly educated.3 Their average age was 
38 years and four months. Most were current or former Labor party members 
( 62.5% ). Similar to the pattern in earlier studies, around half were currently 
public servants (56%) (Forward 1975, 1977; Walter 1986). The Keating advisers 
had a wide range of backgrounds and included academics, activists, 
community workers and private sector lawyers and economists. However a 
substantial majority had a public service background (70%). In a strong 
2 Three office heads were known as 'principal adviser'. These advisers headed the offices of 
the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Treasurer. 
3 The following description of the sample group of advisers in this study can be found in more 
detail, with tables, in Appendix 3. 
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was a core 
careers, to 
senior minister 
some ministers oretE~rr<ed 
years' experience 
Optimally you have a tum-over every two or three years ... because there is a 
bum-out and need a freshness and vitality ... and you can't to 
become entrenched in your way.5 
The ministerial office in the Keating period must be seen as the product of a 
process of institutional development which began when the Whltlam 
Labor government came power. Since the history of its development has 
been discussed elsewhere (Walter 1986; Dunn 1997; Campbell and Halligan 
1992; Halligan and Power 1992; Maley 2002a), this section outlines only 
developments in the Hawke-Keating period. 
When the Hawke government was elected in 1983 it made dear from the start 
that it saw advisers as important tool to help ministers gain political control 
over the bureaucracy (Commonwealth of Australia 1983:21-23). In an 
4 The average length of service in a portfolio by Hawke and Keating cabinet ministers was less 
than three years (Dunn 1997:134-5). 
5 There were several other reasons why so many had two or less years' experience. When 
interviews began, in Apri11995, the second Keating government was exactly two years old. 
After the March 1993 election, one-third of ministers had retired or resigned and there had been 
many portfolio changes. There was also reportedly a push at that time from party headquarters 
and the Prime Minister's office to bring in 'fresh blood' and to get rid of staff who were seen as 
not performing. 
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institution political system. It confirmed and 
advisers as an 
explicit the 
partisan character of ministerial office, and made clearer its role 
government. Rather than providing the minister with administrative support 
and liaising with the department (traditional roles to which many Fraser 
staffers had reverted) advisers now had an explicit role in policy making and 
political control. Walter's (1986) study shows that advisers displayed strong 
partisanship and a strong policy focus from the beginning of the Hawke period. 
Thus the partisan policy role that had been so controversial and fiercely resisted 
in the Whltlam period was asserted and legitimised from the outset of the 
Hawke Labor period. 
There were two other developments in the ministerial office over the Labor 
period (1983-1996). First, the number of ministerial advisers grew strongly, by 
63 per cent proportionally (Maley 2000b ). Second, the role became entrenched 
within the machinery of government in Australia. There is evidence of a 
6 Under the MOP(S) Act ministerial consultants were engaged differently from other staff-
under an agreement in writing which stated that the consultant was engaged to perform, under 
the supervision of the minister, such tasks as were specified in the agreement or as were from 
time to time specified by the minister (section These tasks had to be tabled in a report to 
Parliament each year. 
13 
role advisers 
as to 
a responsibility to counter the influence 
of the public service over the frame reference for policy advice 
questions answered. They had an important role in enabling ministers 
their stamp on policy' Thus most senior public servant in 
Keating years acknowledged the legitimacy of advisers' role in contesting 
departmental advice and in reinforcing the authority and capacity of ministers 
to direct government. 
The developing role of advisers during this period must be seen as part of 
critical shifts in the roles and relationships between ministers, advisers and 
public servants, associated with major reforms in the Hawke years and long 
term government (Campbell and Halligan 1992; Halligan and Power 1992). The 
growth and entrenchment of the role of adviser is linked to major changes that 
occurred to the public service and to the operation of cabinet at this time. 
Labor made major administrative changes in the 1980s which forced the public 
service to be more responsive to government and, some have suggested, 
resulted in a weakening of the bureaucracy and a shift in power towards 
ministers and ministerial offices (Campbell and Halligan 1992, Halligan and 
7 One important exception is Fitzgerald (1996) a former departmental secretary. 
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Power 1992). According to Campbell and Halligan (1992) administrative 
reform occurred in two phases: the first phase (1983-1987) laid the foundations 
of managerialism, while the second (1987-1991) institutionalised the changes. 
The second phase involved a radical reorientation of the bureaucracy towards a 
more managerial and politically responsive culture (1992:183). In 1987 
departments were restructured into mega portfolios, with a senior and junior 
minister structure. This was aimed at strengthening cabinet and ministerial 
control (Halligan 1997:54). At this time there was a large cut in the number of 
SES officers. In effect, according to Campbell and Halligan (1992), the 
restructuring forced out those senior public servants who were resistant to the 
new 'can-do' managerialist culture and promoted those who were prepared to 
work within it. Other important changes included altering the tenure of senior 
public servants, increasing opportunities for external entry to the public service, 
reducing the autonomy of senior public servants and increasing their 
managerial work (Halligan 1997:52). These changes created opportunities for 
advisers to increase the scope of their role and developed a culture of 
responsiveness amongst senior public servants. It is interesting that those who 
judged Whitlam's use of advisers as largely unsuccessful (Smith 1976; Wilenski 
1979) felt that ministerial staff were only part of the mechanism needed to 
deliver political control and that they would be ineffective until the public 
service itself was reformed. 
There were also shifts in roles and relationships within the executive in the 
Hawke period because of major changes to the way cabinet operated. These 
reforms, aimed at increasing the effectiveness of cabinet, reduced the amount of 
cabinet business and enabled more decisions to be made outside of cabinet. 
These changes created an important role for ministerial advisers (as will be seen 
in Chapters Eight and Nine). These changes to the way elements of the 
executive operated and related to each other created expectations and 
opportunities for advisers to play important roles in the Keating years. 
Another important factor in the growth and entrenchment of the adviser role 
over the Labor period was long term government. This provided time for 
expectations to be reinforced and for players to become acculturated to new 
ways of operating. By the time the Keating government came to power, the 
major administrative reforms were completed and there was a degree of 
stability in the public service and in political-bureaucratic relations. Senior 
public servants had accommodated or become acculturated to the changes in 
the scope of the role played by advisers at this time. 
15 
THE KEATING YEARS 1991-1996 
Paul Keating became Prime Minister on 20 December 1991 and led his party to 
victory at the federal election on 13 March 1993. The second Keating 
government lasted from this time until its election loss on 11 March 1996. 
When Keating became Prime Minister in 1991 Labor had been in power for 
eight years and was seen as having lost much of its energy as a government. By 
contrast the Opposition had released a very detailed series of policy plans 
called Fightback!. The ministry had been riven by a long running and very bitter 
leadership struggle. The government was barely a year away from an election. 
The Keating government was beset by major economic problems - a recession 
and, when recovery began, high unemployment figures. The government's 
approach was to pursue 'growth with social justice', tying together the themes 
of economic progress and a social safety net (Edwards 1996:516-7; Kelly 
1994:xxi). The problem of long term unemployment was tackled in a major 
cross-portfolio policy initiative entitled Working Nation released in 1994. 
Meredith Edwards' account of the development of the package reveals the 
important role played by advisers, particularly advisers to the Prime Minister 
(2001:137-176). 
Over the two Keating terms there was much policy activity. This was partly to 
do with Keating's own style. He was described by one of his advisers in this 
study as 'like a shark - he had to move to live'. ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty 
described him as someone who liked to 'grab the policy tree and shake it' (in 
Gordon 1996:204). Keating described the period as one of 'feverish policy 
change' (in Gruen and Grattan 1993:xxiii). 
There were a series of major cross-portfolio and portfolio policy statements, 
aimed at promoting a positive policy agenda and countering the image of a 
tired government. These included One Nation (1992);Australia's Environment 
(1992); Investing in the Nation (1993); Working Nation (1994); Creative Nation 
(1994); An Agenda for Families (1995); Innovate Australia (1995); Community and 
Nation (1995); Our Nation (1996) and Our Land (1996) (Walsh 1995:291; Cockfield 
and Prasser 1997). The number of these statements indicates the sophistication 
of the processes for dealing with interdepartmental policy development at this 
time, which used Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) structures and 
protocols. Departments, ministerial staff and ministers were able to work 
effectively together to produce complex cross-portfolio policy documents. 
16 
Finally while ministers in the Keating government varied, some were 
remarkably experienced. There was a core of ministers who had been in 
cabinet for many years. In 1991 when Keating became Prime Minister there 
were five ministers from the original1983 cabinet (Keating, Willis, Dawkins, 
Evans and Button). Keating was one of three ministers who had been 
continuously a member of ERC for eight years. 8 Two others had been in ERC 
for seven years. 9 These experienced ministers had an understanding of 
government processes and expectations about how the ministry would operate. 
The stability of long term government meant that ministers, public servants 
and advisers were operating within well-established routines and structures. 
THE ADVISER'S JOB 
The only profession that I am aware of that is more demented than that of a 
politician is that of a politician's staff .... The staffers work the same hours that 
politicians work but all they get is kicked in the arse all the time and they get 
very few pats on the back. They get no public recognition for what they do ... 
but they work the same hours and the same sorts of pressures are on them. 
Bob Collins, Minister for Transport and Communications, during the 
Senate Inquiry Into Matters Arising From Pay TV Tendering Processes 
(1993) 
Some aspects of the job of adviser need to be understood as they provide an 
important context to analysing advisers' behaviour. First, the job of adviser 
could be extraordinarily demanding. Advisers in the study routinely worked 
very long hours, and most worked six days per week. In some offices advisers 
regularly worked to midnight. In other offices, they left around 7pm, taking 
paperwork home to be looked at after they had seen their families. Often there 
were meetings scheduled at night as it was the only time it was possible to 
catch the minister or other advisers. Many spent Saturdays in the office reading 
reports and more complex material, and writing speeches - tasks which 
required some time and careful thought. They relished the fact they could 
work without the constant interruptions of phone calls and urgent meetings. 
Advisers were 'on call' for the minister at all times. Everything else was 
accepted as secondary. An adviser employed by a 'workaholic' minister, who 
even rang her on Christmas day to talk about work, said 'I lost a lot of my 
8 Except for 6 months when he was on the backbench in 1991, following his second 
unsuccessful leadership challenge. The other two were Willis and Dawkins. 
9 They were Howe and Evans. 
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personal life'. The consequences of the long hours and unrelenting demands 
could be seen in the stories told of sickness, miscarriage, suicide and marriage 
break-up. It was not a healthy environment to work in. After the election loss 
one adviser in the study, who had worked for ministers for eight years, was 
told by his doctor he was experiencing withdrawal from a physical addiction to 
adrenalin. 
The volume of paperwork, while it varied, could be immense. An adviser in 
the education portfolio received around 40 departmental minutes each week. 
An adviser in the health portfolio said she sometimes received 20-25 minutes in 
a day. She sorted the minutes into piles marked 'extremely urgent', 'very 
urgent' and 'urgent'. Each day she would deal with the 'extremely urgent' ones 
and scan and re-sort the others as they progressively moved to higher levels of 
urgency. Paperwork was often not easily dispatched. Each minute might 
generate a series of questions or require conversations with others. The job 
required a great deal of energy. One adviser said her energy had two sources: 
fear and anger. Many advisers were propelled forward by impossible 
workloads, urgencies, and problems which multiplied by neglect. 
Ministers often had very high expectations of their staff. One young adviser 
felt that: 
With my minister it was a blank slate. The more that you could do the more he 
would give you to do. They just load you up. The expectations I felt from the 
minister are more than I've ever felt working for an employer anywhere. More 
than parents. 
Some ministers were rewarding to work for because their advisers felt they 
won their respect with their efforts. Others could be harsh and extraordinarily 
demanding, of both the staff and the department. An adviser who had more 
than seven years' experience in ministers' offices, complained about her senior 
minister: 'You are only as good as the last job you did. You are proving 
yourself to him, every rotten day. It is very, very wearing.' Nor was there 
room for error. One highly respected adviser said she was damned by her 
minister, for a single mistake in a complex document she had stayed up all 
night drafting. But while the job was demanding, it was compensated by the 
heady excitement of politics at close hand. These extremes of excitement and 
effort were captured by one adviser who simply stated: 'I love my job. But it's 
killing me.' 
Throughout the thesis advisers are seen assiduously working to pursue their 
minister's objectives. Advisers were acutely aware of their minister's objectives 
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at any time. In assessing government action too often commentators ascribe 
major decisions to the drive to maintain popularity or to win the next election 
(eg Singleton 1997b; Adams 1997; Cockfield and Prasser 1997). While these are 
undoubtedly overarching political objectives and critical at some times, such a 
view oversimplifies the reasons for ministers' behaviour. It denies the fact that 
many in public life desire to 'make something of the mandate' (which is how 
one minister described what propelled him in government). Ministers' 
objectives were always more complex than simply winning office, but were not 
always particularly noble. They could be strategic personal aims, such as to 
build a strong alliance with the senior minister in the hope of cementing a 
power base in the ministry; or to 'keep one's head down' to rebuild a reputation 
after a previous political scandal; or to impress senior colleagues as a team 
player, perhaps by delivering cuts to the portfolio, in the hope of advancement 
to senior minister status in the future. At times an objective might be to keep 
certain policy areas 'quiet' to assist in the pursuit of other major policy goals. 
Throughout this thesis ministers and advisers are seen engaged in 'puzzling' 
about policy with a variety of motives and objectives; quite often only 
indirectly influenced by electoral considerations. 
This chapter provided some background needed to understand the behaviour 
of advisers in the Keating years. The next chapter reviews the literature 
relevant to the study, from which the research questions were developed. 
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Literature review 
There is a significant body of literature relevant to the topic of ministerial 
advisers, with a variety of perspectives. However there are a limited nwnber of 
studies which view advisers as subjects in their own right. The first part of this 
chapter surveys the literature and the second part discusses how it addresses 
five themes: the role and function of advisers; role variations; advisers' work 
with departments; advisers' policy roles; and advisers' coordination roles. The 
third part of the chapter places the thesis in an international context by 
describing the development of ministerial office in Canada, the UK and France. 
SURVEY OF LITERATURE ABOUT MINISTERIAL ADVISERS 
The Australian literature on ministerial advisers falls into five groups. The first 
and most significant group is a series of empirical studies of Australian 
ministerial advisers, based on interviews and quantitative surveys, beginning 
in the 1970s. 
Several studies in the 1970s examined advisers to the Whitlam and Fraser 
governments (Forward 1975, 1977; Smith 1977). They focused on the social 
backgrounds of advisers and what tasks they performed in government. In 
1986 Walter published his seminal work on the role of ministerial advisers, The 
Ministers' Minders, which built on the earlier studies by comparing advisers to 
the first Hawke government to the Whitlam and Fraser staffers. As well as 
investigating the social background, work and careers of advisers, he studied 
the evolution of the ministerial office in Australia, taking an historical and 
sociological approach. 
Over the entire Hawke-Keating period there have been only two other 
empirical studies. One is a small piece of research on advisers' policy roles by 
Ryan (1995). The other is a study of how advisers, ministers and departmental 
secretaries worked together in the Keating and first Howard governments 
(Dunn 1997). This is a significant study which explores the work of advisers 
and their relationships with public servants. Dunn views advisers as part of a 
distinctive structuring of partisan and non partisan advice to government in the 
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Australian political system. He assesses its effectiveness, drawing out 'lessons' 
for the US. 
The second body of literature on Australian ministerial advisers is from the 
1970s and is focused on the Whitlam government's use of advisers. It debates 
the rationale for and merits of the new arrangements (RCAGA 1976; Briot and 
Lloyd 1976; Roberts 1976; Hughes 1976; Smith 1977) and assesses how 
successful Whitlam's 'experiment' was in terms of its aims (Smith 1977; Hawker 
et al1979; Wilenski 1979; Lloyd and Reid 1974). 
The third body of literature is a series of articles spanning the 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s which is essentially commentary on the adviser's role, often normative 
and based on experiences of working with or as advisers (Anthony 1975; Farran 
1975; White 1988; Kennett 1989; McMahon 1991; Rudd 1992; Moore 1993; 
Fitzgerald 1996; Hollway 1993, 1996; Warn 1996; McCarrey 1987; Waterford 
1996; Woodward 1993; Volker 1993). While the changing normative values in 
these articles are interesting they generally do not warrant detailed analysis. 
A fourth group of writers analyses the role of ministerial advisers as part of 
studies of political-bureaucratic relationships in the 1980s and 1990s (Campbell 
and Halligan 1992; Halligan and Power 1992; Weller 2001). These studies, 
mainly based on interviews with senior public servants, consider the impact of 
advisers on the public service. They view the ministerial office as part of 
attempts by the political executive at this time to dominate the bureaucracy and 
increase its responsiveness to government. Related to this is a study of the 
executive leadership style of the Hawke and Keating governments in a 
comparative context (Campbel11998). However, while it explores Labor's 
engagement of the bureaucracy and coordination within the ministry, it pays 
little attention to its use of advisers. 
The final group comprises accounts of the Hawke and Keating periods (Gruen 
and Grattan 1992; Gordon 1996; Kelly 1994; Singleton 1997); a range of memoirs 
and biographies of Hawke and Keating ministers (Walsh 1995; Richardson 
1994; Button 1998; Blewett 1999; Hawke 1996; Edwards 1996; Watson 2002); and 
some studies of particular policy changes during this period (Edwards 2001; 
Harman 1996; Gyngell and Wesley 2000; Goldfinch 1999; C Howard 2001). 
Advisers are glimpsed 'at work' in this literature but their role is generally not 
analysed in any depth. 
In addition to this Australian literature about ministerial advisers, there is a 
body of international literature about executive advisory structures. Much of 
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this is descriptive, and tracks the development of advisory units in different 
countries with limited comparative analysis (Plowden 1987; Campbell and 
Wyszomirski 1991; Peters, Rhodes and Wright 2000a). The Australian 
contribution to these volumes is usually limited to discussing advisory support 
for the Prime Minister (by the Prime Minister's office and the Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet) (Weller 1987; Weller 1991; Weller 2000). It does 
not describe the evolution and role of ministerial advisers in Australian 
government generally. There are few detailed studies of advisers in Canada, 
UK and France. Most of the literature is article- or chapter-length commentary. 
This material will be discussed later in the chapter, in describing the 
international context for developments in Australia. 
There have been several attempts at comparative analysis of executive advisory 
institutions (Campbell1983; Bakvis 1997; Peters, Rhodes and Wright 2000b). 
Bakvis (1997) compares a range of executive advisory mechanisms (of which 
partisan advisers are but one) in Australia, Britain, Canada, Germany and the 
Netherlands, and assesses their relative strengths in performing a number of 
functions for the executive. Bakvis claims Australia has weak political staff, 
who are not significantly involved in policy making. This is based on two 
assumptions: that they behave similarly to Canadian ministerial advisers and 
that a weak political staff is inevitable in Westminster systems of government. 
These statements lack empirical foundation. He judges political staff generally 
to be useful in meeting the needs of executives in five ways: mobilising the 
bureaucracy in the transition phase of a new government; performing partisan 
tasks; evaluating bureaucratic advice; and providing legitimation and 
mobilisation to ministers who attempt to innovate (1997:118). 
The chapter by Peters, Rhodes and Wright (2000b) is unique in its attempt at a 
comparative and conceptual analysis of advisory structures to chief executives 
in eight countries. It conceptualises the functions of the staff of executive 
leaders, compares different institutional responses, and analyses the factors 
which structure the influence of advisory staff. 
Looking across eight countries, Peters, Rhodes and Wright make three 
conclusions. First, and most importantly, there is an 'apparently paradoxical 
phenomenon: the general erosion of the policy making capacity of the state has 
been accompanied by a strengthening of its core executive' (2000b:7). While 
there has been a reduction in the scope of central political authority, there has 
been a 'centralisation of political authority towards and within the executive' 
(2000b:21). This centralisation (that is, the emergence of presidential or prime 
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ministerial government) has resulted in a growth in staff to the core executive, 
and especially its political leader (2000b:21). Their second conclusion is that the 
staff of executive leaders have common tasks but the weight attached to each 
task varies from country to country. Third, national distinctiveness, rather than 
convergence, characterises the institutional response of different countries 
(2000b:6). 
While staff in all countries exhibit similar trends - growth, institutionalisation, 
politicisation and hybridisation - they also have differences in structure, size, 
composition and internal organisation and culture (2000b:15). Peters, Rhodes 
and Wright suggest that to explore the influence of staff one must pay attention 
to three types of opportunity structure: political, administrative, and 
institutional (2000b:18-21). Unfortunately these points are not developed in 
great detail in what is essentially a broad overview chapter. 
Peters, Rhodes and Wright's focus on staff to chief executive leaders (Presidents 
and Prime Ministers) is limited - it does not explore the structure and function 
of advisory staff to the executive as a whole. In the case of Australia, a focus on 
the Prime Minister's staff alone obscures important developments in the 
structure of ministerial offices generally, in their relationships with each other 
and in their relationships with departments. Much of the political-bureaucratic 
struggle occurs between portfolio ministers and their departments. Focusing 
solely on the Prime Minister's staff also neglects the dynamics between offices, 
which are important in understanding the work advisers do in coordination. It 
also ignores the pivotal role of the Finance minister's office and Treasurer's 
office. 
Finally, there is a related body of literature which examines the work of 
ministers. Several studies from the 1970s and 1980s describe the work of 
ministers and attempt to distinguish between them (Headey 1974; Weller and 
Grattan 1981; Rose 1987; and Theakston 1987). These studies are somewhat 
pessimistic about the ability of ministers to have input to policy making and 
generally stress the limited nature of their power. They emphasise either 
ministers' lack of interest in policy making or obstacles which prevent their 
involvement, such as overload or lack of training and expertise (Beckett 1998). 
However recent studies from the UK (Campbell and Wilson 1995; Norton 2000; 
Smith et al2000; Marsh et al 2000) have challenged this image and portray 
ministers as increasingly knowledgeable and engaged. They assert that 
ministers are involved in formulating policy, and have the capacity to impact 
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on the work and culture of departments. In their study of British ministers 
Smith et al (2000) found that: 
all ministers have a policy role and this policy role has cumulatively increased 
in the last three decades. . .. Ministers now have more concern with formulating 
effective policy and making a difference (2000:153). 
They identified ministers who did more than initiate policy; these 'agenda 
innovators' and 'institutionalisers' actually shifted the policy bias of the 
department (2000:154). Campbell and Wilson ascribe the changing role of 
British ministers to two developments: the rise of the career politician and the 
greater ideological commitment of ministers (1995:56-59). They argue this 
means ministers are more likely to have clear objectives, the confidence to 
overrule objections and a desire to prevail over the department (1995:306-308). 
In other words, they are more likely to be interested in policy making, and to be 
determined to overcome the obstacles they face. Senior public servants in a 
recent Australian study have also expressed the view that ministers are better 
educated, more interested and more assertive than in the past (Weller 
2001:2,97,100). This literature counters the approach which suggests that few 
ministers intend to, or are able to, pursue active policy agendas. It confirms the 
need to bring policy-interested ministers and their activities to centre stage in 
studies of political-bureaucratic relationships. 
This part of the chapter has surveyed the various bodies of literature relevant to 
ministerial advisers. The next part of this chapter analyses the literature in 
relation to five themes: the role and function of advisers; role variations; 
advisers' work with departments; advisers' policy roles; and advisers' 
coordination roles. 
THEMES IN THE LITERATURE 
Literature on the role and function of ministerial advisers 
Many writers describe the role of advisers by listing their tasks. Smith (1977) 
lists a wide range of activities that advisers undertook in the Whitlam years: 
research; policy advice; information gathering; working with the department; 
helping ministers with parliamentary work; problem solving; and liaising with 
the party, interest groups, the media and people and organisations outside of 
government (1977:145-7). 
24 
Forward (1975) used quantitative surveys to weight different aspects of the job, 
by asking Whitlam advisers to choose three of a list of nine predetermined roles 
_as their 'main roles'. Aggregating the results he found liaison with the public 
service was rated highest, followed by general office administration; advising 
the minister on policy; general trouble shooting; personally assisting the 
minister; dealing with the press; speech writing; political party work; and 
handling electorate matters (1975:144-5). He repeated the survey with Fraser 
advisers (1977). 
Walter replicated the survey in his study of Hawke advisers, who rated the 
roles in a slightly different order, the main difference being a major 
accentuation of the advising the minister on policy role, and the general trouble 
shooting role, and a de-emphasising of the role of personally assisting the 
minister (1986:133). These surveys reveal the far lesser importance to staff of 
the roles of 'spin' and 'minding' (electorate, party and media work; and 
personally assisting the minister) compared to their tasks of policy advice, 
trouble shooting, working with the public service and office administration. 
They show an increasing policy orientation. However the aggregation of 
answers masks some important differences between different types of staff; and 
quantitative surveys are a limited tool for capturing the nature of advisers' 
work and exploring their role in government fully. 
In analysing advisers' role, writers use different ways of sorting their tasks. 
Walter describes different types of tasks. He sees advisers' primary role as 
supporting a political master, through a range of personal, technical and 
political tasks (1986:130-132). He is most interested in advisers' role in the 
policy process. But while he lists a range of policy roles for advisers he does 
not conceptualise them. His discussion of advisers' work also lacks a context of 
political-bureaucratic relationships, despite the fact this is an important part of 
his discussion of the emergence of advisers in Australia. In discussing advisers' 
work, he does not examine how they function to promote political control, or 
their interactions with public servants. Ministers and public servants have no 
voice in the book. 
While Walter's study is impressive and seminal, it represents only a beginning 
to the exploration of the work of advisers. It is also dated in an important 
aspect. Major changes to political-bureaucratic relationships and to cabinet 
have occurred in Australia since it was written. These changes, which occurred 
in the Hawke period, altered the context in which advisers operate, and in 
which their role and significance must be viewed. 
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Dunn (1997) provides more recent empirical evidence of the role of ministerial 
advisers. The study is based on interviews with ministers, advisers and 
departmental secretaries in the Keating and Howard governments (done in 
1992 and 1996). Dunn's focus is on what advisers do and on how they assist 
ministers in achieving political direction of departments. He distinguishes 
between the different arenas in which advisers work. These are: working with 
the department; working with other ministers; working with parliament; and 
personal services to the minister. He is most interested in the roles advisers 
play in relation to departments: he found that advisers evaluate the 
department's work, assist the minister to direct the department, and facilitate 
department-minister interaction by communicating with the department. 
Comparing his findings to that of Walter, Dunn suggests that the role advisers 
play in policy making has extended in recent years into oversight of 
implementation of policy. Another new development was an important role 
not played within the minister-department relationship. This was advisers' 
work in brokering agreements with other ministerial offices before cabinet; and 
coordinating within portfolios (1997:107-8). 
There are several important features of Dunn's study. First, advisers are not the 
main subject of his study; it is the political-bureaucratic relationship. Therefore 
he interviewed a small number of advisers (13) across two governments and 
did not explore differences in their behaviour. Second, advisers' work is 
viewed mainly within the minister-department relationship. The 'brokering' 
and coordination roles he detected are seen as another part of ministers' 
political direction of departments (1997:93). Yet they suggest the role of 
advisers was more extensive than their work within the minister-department 
relationship. 
The distinctions made by Walter (1986) and Dunn (1997) point to the 
complexity of the job: advisers performed a range of types of work (Walter 
1986) across a number of arenas (Dunn 1997). They also point to the difficulty 
of analysing the role. How can we move beyond listing a range of tasks to 
conceptualising the role of advisers, in a way which helps to explain their 
increasing importance in government? This thesis argues that the role of the 
adviser must be analysed in terms of the function that advisers perform for 
ministers. Focusing on function directs our attention to the significance of 
advisers' work for the executive, and therefore helps us to understand why they 
have become so important in government. 
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The function of ministerial advisers: political control 
The literature on Australian ministerial advisers is clear in seeing their core 
function as to increase political control for the executive. This has two aspects. 
The first can be seen as an indirect contribution to political control: to help 
ministers to perform their jobs. The second is a more direct contribution: to 
help ministers to steer and control the work of departments. 
Helping ministers to perform their jobs 
The most limited view of advisers' function is to help ministers perform their 
jobs through personal support and political support. 
In the 1970s advisers were justified as attempts to increase the capacity of 
ministers, and thus as a way of bolstering existing structures to cope with 
pressures from a changing political and social environment (Whitlam 1974; 
Fraser 1978; RCAGA 1976). There was a recognition that ministers were 
becoming overloaded, and needed more resources to be able to perform their 
roles adequately (Weller and Grattan 1981; Hughes 1976:61; Briot and Lloyd 
1976:10). The overloading of ministers was seen as threatening the concept of 
ministerial responsibility (RCAGA 1976). There was a view that some jobs 
should be delegated to allow ministers to concentrate on their most important 
work - policy making and deciding the overall policy framework (Hughes 
1976:72) -but that such jobs could not be delegated to the department due to 
the principle of ministerial responsibility (Fraser 1978:5). There was thus a need 
for appropriate surrogates to whom ministers could delegate some of their 
work. 
There was also a recognition that government was becoming more complex and 
that ministers needed help to cope with the challenges of office. Whitlam noted 
the 'exceptionally high expectations' of government and the need 'to have 
available machinery and advice to plan for the inevitable and accelerating 
change now occurring in all modern communities' (1974:4-5). There was a need 
for 'the extension and deepening' of support because: 
As the tempo of the business of government grows faster and the range of 
political involvement of the people extends, Ministers must necessarily look to 
more help from their own immediate offices (1974:14). 
There was an increasing demand by the community to participate in decision 
making. Ministers needed help to evaluate competing demands from a range 
of different sources (RCAGA 1976:105). Advisers could help ministers to 
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function in a new policy making environment by managing a diversity of input 
to government. 
The second reason given for the introduction of ministerial advisers was so that 
they could perform partisan functions) Ministers needed help to cope with the 
political aspects of their jobs, and this was work which departments could not 
do (Briot and Lloyd 1976). Enabling ministers to perform these functions 
within their own office strengthened the concept of the political neutrality of 
the public service. It was in terms of the separation of partisan and non-
partisan work that both Whitlam and Fraser justified their use of advisers; they 
'relieved departments of involvement in party-political matters' (Whitlam 
1974:14; Fraser 1976). It was also in these terms that senior public servants 
found themselves able to support the initiative (eg Tange in Roberts 1976:12). 
Thus advisers' function has been seen as to help ministers cope with the 
demands of their jobs by providing personal and political support. They 
provided the extra resources ministers needed to be able to govern effectively 
in a changing political and social environment. They were also seen as 
strengthening two fundamental aspects of the political system which were 
threatened by the changes to society and governance: the concept of ministerial 
responsibility and the concept of the political neutrality of the public service. 
Helping ministers to direct and control the work of departments 
The second aspect of advisers' political control function involves helping 
ministers to direct and control the work of departments. This is the main way 
that Australian writers have conceived of the role and function of advisers. 
Australian governments in the 1970s and 1980s dearly desired political control 
and saw advisers as a mechanism for pursuing it. In 1974 Whitlam commented 
that: 'There have been notable cases in Australia in the past of a remarkable lack 
of ministerial control over departments and over policy. The lack of competent 
ministerial staff undoubtedly contributed to this' (1974:15). He saw ministerial 
control as an essential part of the doctrine of ministerial responsibility: 
1 This was understood as explicitly party political work, involving media management, speech 
writing, liaison with party units and local electorates and so on. 
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Central to [the Westminster] system is the principle that ministers as 
individuals and the cabinet as a whole must exercise real control over the 
public service and accept full responsibility for policy .... To the extent that the 
appointment of a competent personal staff assists ministers to exercise their 
proper constitutional authority we are enhancing the basic Westminster 
tradition (1974:15). 
Fraser too emphasised the importance of political control. He said that one of 
the two fundamental requirements for responsibility in government was that: 
the ministers and government must themselves be in control of public policy ... . 
To the extent that responsibility is diffused beyond the elected government ... to 
that extent is effective, popular control diminished (1978:2). 
In 1983 the Hawke government made it clear that a desire to strengthen 
ministerial control drove its plan to employ more ministerial advisers: 
The balance of power and influence has tipped too far in favour of permanent 
rather than elected office holders .... Ministerial- that is democratic - control 
will be bolstered only if large numbers of politically committed people can have 
a close involvement in the development and implementation of policy 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1983:21-23). 
The Liberal Party shared these views, stating in 1983: 
The task of any incoming government in giving direction to the modem public 
service, and remaining through its term of office in effective political control of 
the public service, has placed almost impossible burdens on ministers (Report 
of the Liberal Party Committee of Review in Commonwealth of Australia 
1983:21-22). 
Prime Minister Keating (1993) expressed this as a desire 'to ensure the 
government of the country belonged to the elected politicians' and to put 
ministers 'in the driving seat'. 
Underlying these statements is a Weberian concept of political control. Weber 
observed the rise of both professional politicians and the bureaucracy. He saw 
that bureaucrats, with their superior knowledge and experience, would tend to 
dominate the politicians. The challenge for political leadership was to control 
the bureaucracy (Weber in Gerth and Mills 1958). 
The problem of political control has been perceived as two-fold: that ministers 
were too dependent on the bureaucracy; and that the bureaucracy was not 
sufficiently responsive to the ministry (RCAGA 1976). Advisers were seen as 'a 
solution to the problem of bureaucratic power' (McMahon 1991:148) in two 
ways. They could provide or procure independent advice for the minister and 
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help the minister to evaluate the advice received from the department, reducing 
the minister's dependence. They could also increase the minister's ability to 
direct the department and monitor its behaviour, thereby forcing greater 
responsiveness. 
Halligan and Power (1992) see the drive for greater political control as the 
motive force behind the growth of ministerial advisers in Australia. They 
describe the 1970s and 1980s as a period in which 'profound systemic changes' 
occurred within executive branches in many Western democratic countries; and 
in Australia this period 'usher[ed] in the most fundamental executive branch 
transformations since ... the turn of the century' (1992:23). These changes were 
attempts to redistribute power within the executive, resulting in the resurgence 
and ascendancy of the 'the political executive and its retinue of advisers vis a 
vis appointed officials' (1992:2). 
In their studies of political-bureaucratic relations in Australia in the Labor 
years, both Halligan and Power (1992) and Campbell and Halligan (1992) claim 
the Australian political executive used ministerial advisers to increase its power 
by extending the scope of influence of the ministerial office. This enlarged the 
partisan element within the executive. Advisers appear as important players in 
these studies, increasingly relied upon by ministers as a means of exerting 
influence on the bureaucracy (Campbell and Halligan 1992:60). Advisers are 
also seen as displacing bureaucratic roles and weakening departmental power 
through their interactions with interest groups (Campbell and Halligan 1992: 
62, 68, 83, 203-205). 
Also fundamental to the shift of power within government at this time were the 
major administrative reforms of the 1980s, which weakened the public service 
and put it under great pressure to be more responsive to ministers (Campbell 
and Halligan 1992; Halligan and Power 1992). The growth in the role of the 
ministerial office and the administrative changes worked together to increase 
the responsiveness of the bureaucracy and to deliver political control. 
Campbell and Halligan believe that 'firm political control' was achieved during 
the Hawke period, though this is disputed by others who stress bureaucratic 
influence (Pusey 1991; Walter 1992; Jones 1993). The limitation of this research 
is that it is based almost entirely on the views of senior public servants. 
Advisers were not the main focus of the study and their role is asserted rather 
than being explored. 
Underlying Dunn's (1997) book, too, is the idea that advisers' main function is 
to increase political control by their work within the minister-department 
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relationship. Dunn's study saw advisers as enhancing political control by 
extending the influence of ministers and increasing the political responsiveness 
of the bureaucracy (1997:107). They provided 'strong assistance to the elected 
executive for exercising political direction of departments' (1997:108). They are 
also seen as playing an important role in facilitating the meshing of the inputs 
that bureaucrats and politicians bring to policy making. Dunn sees their work 
within the minister-department relationship as enabling the optimum blending 
of responsive and neutral competence in policy making (1997:108,145,149). This 
can be expressed as effectively engaging the bureaucracy. 
Yet Dunn understands political control in a broader sense than simply directing 
departments. He sees political control as also involving coordination amongst 
ministers (1997:93). 
H political control is understood as being able to effectively steer government, 
then it requires not only control over the bureaucracy, but also an ability to 
prioritise and coordinate amongst ministers; management of political 
relationships; and an ability to devise and develop partisan policy goals. This 
thesis argues that advisers' contribution to political control goes beyond 
helping ministers to manage their jobs and to direct the bureaucracy. There is a 
need to explore the full breadth of the role advisers played in the Keating years 
in helping ministers to effectively steer government. 
A wider range of help for ministers 
A wider concept of political control is evident in the body of literature about the 
problems of modem governance and executive leadership (eg Weller, Bakvis 
and Rhodes 1997; Smith 1999; Campbell1998). 
Campbell (1998) argues there is a crisis in executive leadership in advanced 
liberal democracies. In his study of executive leadership in the US, UK, Canada 
and Australia, he found all leaders faced difficulties in governing and that 'our 
systems have encountered considerable slippage in the capacity of leaders to 
deliver' (1998:220). He sees engaging the bureaucracy as only one of the two 
'gearboxes' governments must effectively manage if they are to steer 
government. Thus, for Campbell, political control has two elements: effective 
engagement of the bureaucracy (gearbox I); and effective management of 
relationships between the Prime Minister, ministers and advisers within the 
political executive (gearbox IT). 
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He identifies two negative trends in relation to these gearboxes. The first is an 
emphasis by executives on responsive competence rather than policy 
competence - in other words, a failure to properly engage the bureaucracy in 
policy making (gearbox I). The second is a 'de-institutionalisation' of cabinet 
systems, which has reduced collective decision making and made coherence 
and coordination within the executive difficult to achieve (gearbox IT). Thus 
Campbell argues executives in advanced liberal democracies experience 
difficulty in both engaging the bureaucracy and coordinating within the 
executive. In his analysis of the Labor years, he praises the Hawke 
government's record in this regard, arguing it was 'good at gearboxes' 
(1998:197). However he does not adequately explore the role of ministerial 
offices as a tool for achieving Labor's successful management of both 
'gearboxes'. 
The concept of political control can be widened further by examining the 
literature which sees the problem of modem leadership as a loss of capacity and 
coordination at the centre of government, referred to as 'hollowing out of the 
state', and a 'weakness at the centre' (Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes 1997; Rhodes 
1997; Smith 1999). This view sees the executive as ill-equipped to deal with 
modem government, which is characterised by overlapping networks, 
fragmented policy structures and multiple policy actors. The trends of internal 
fragmentation, external dependence and 'institutional differentiation and 
pluralisation' (Rhodes 1997:200) erode the capacity of the executive to steer and 
achieve policy coherence. Thus the problem of political control or steering 
government can be seen to include not only engaging the bureaucracy and 
coordinating within the executive, but also managing multiple political 
relationships inside and outside of government, and in engaging in complex, 
multiplayer policy processes. However this literature does not adequately 
analyse how ministerial staff may help the executive to address these problems. 
If, as this thesis argues, advisers' key function in government is to assist the 
executive to pursue political control, then their role must be understood as 
wider than personal and political support or helping to direct departments. It 
will be argued in Chapter Four that the role advisers played in the Keating 
years had five elements which were directly related to the problems of political 
control faced by modem executives. Thus the role of advisers grew over the 
Labor period to encompass work directly related to the problems of steering 
modem government. This explains why advisers became so important in 
government at this time, and provides a rationale for the growth in their role. 
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on 
Forward (1975, and Walter identified four different types of 
advisers in their studies Fraser and Hawke advisers. However 
these types were mainly based on career background and attitude, and only 
partly linked to behaviour. Forward's typology had two axes: whether the 
adviser was a member of the public service or not; and whether he or she had a 
'political' orientation (this was assessed on the basis of party membership, 
reasons for joining a minister's staff and/ or engagement in 'political party' 
work in the office). Thus four types were identified: political public servants; 
non-political public servants; political non-public servants and non-political 
non-public servants. These types touch on what was controversial in the 1970s 
-the influx of partisans from outside of the public service into ministerial 
offices. 
In his 1995 study Ryan stressed the diversity of policy roles that advisers 
assumed in different portfolios and under different ministers (1995:147, 150, 
155). He distinguished their behaviour by asking ministers and advisers to 
name which of a predetermined list of five policy roles best described the role 
played by the ministerial office in a series of policy decisions. The five roles 
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were: arbitrator between parties; proactive initiator; cautious 'minder'; manager 
of the policy process; and administrator (1995:160). 
The factors mediating advisers' behaviour have also proved difficult to identify. 
In 1977 Smith noted that the work patterns of advisers varied according to: 
the minister- his position, portfolio, personality - and the way he saw his role; 
his department, its scope, and its reaction to his approach; the work of related 
departments and institutions; other ministers and their staffs; the minister's 
relations with caucus, caucus committees and government backbenchers 
particularly interested in his portfolio; and finally the extent to which the 
extraparliamentary party, trade unions and interest groups had claims on the 
minister's time and authority (1977:145). 
Ryan's small study suggested it was the portfolio and the disposition of the 
minister which most affected the roles played by advisers in policy making 
(1995:150). 
Advisers do not all act in the same way and, in describing their behaviour, 
differences must be identified. Understanding how advisers differ in 
performing their role is important to assessing the impact and the significance 
of their work. As yet the literature has not provided a way of capturing the 
variation in their behaviour and the factors associated with this variation. 
Literature on advisers' relationships with departments 
As discussed earlier, ministerial advisers have generally been seen as playing 
important roles in helping ministers to exert control over departments. The 
impact of their work on political-bureaucratic relationships has been the focus 
of several studies (Dunn 1997, Ryan 1995). Yet how advisers work with senior 
public servants needs further examination. 
Dunn (1997) provides the most comprehensive account of how advisers, 
ministers and departments worked together in the 1990s. As well as directing, 
monitoring and evaluating the work of departments, he sees a broader role for 
advisers in helping ministers to engage with the bureaucracy. This broader role 
is helping ministers to effectively blend partisan and neutral competence in 
policy making. Campbell (1998) too sees effective engagement with the 
bureaucracy as involving a balance between responsive and neutral 
competence in policy making- achieving what he terms 'policy competence'. 
He sees this as the most effective executive leadership style. He is critical of 
governments in advanced liberal democracies for not achieving 'policy 
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a generally 
complementary relationship between work of advisers departments. 
found relationships were mostly cooperative and symbiotic, because of an 
underlying belief in a politics-administration dichotomy in there was an 
understood division of labour between advisers public servants (1997: 92-3, 
108). 1hls echoes Davis' description an 'emerging Australian model' in 
which ministerial and bureaucratic functions are distinct and complementary, 
as well as some normative comment by practitioners (Hollway 1996). However 
the harmonious, complementary relationships described by Dunn conflict with 
the disquiet and resentment expressed by public servants in Campbell and 
Halligan's 1992 study and some other commentary by former public servants 
(Fitzgerald 1996), which suggest advisers were competitors and had taken over 
some of the work of senior public servants. 
Ryan's (1995) small study identified two types of harmonious and cooperative 
relationships between advisers and departments (where advisers played active 
policy roles and where they played more administrative roles); and two types 
of conflictual relationships (where there was agenda conflict and where 
advisers demanded powerful roles). 
1hls is an area needing more research. We need to explore how ministerial 
advisers work with public servants in helping ministers to engage effectively 
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on 
policy 
describes Queensland Goss government) as 
assessing the proposals according to three criteria: the political 
impact the proposal; its compatibility with proposals of other ministers; 
and its compatibility 
as a whole.2 
the long term strategic priorities of the government 
Walter (1986) describes a wider range of policy roles for advisers- such as 
policy development, articulation, raising alternative policy options and 'paying 
attention' to the policy agenda. He sees the modem political executive as 'the 
core of a small work group', comprising both ministers and partisan advisers 
(1986:161). Thus a group is the basic unit on the political side of the policy 
making equation (1986:58) and policy making at the top is 'the outcome of 
shifting coalitions around political executives' (1986:29). The emergence of 
partisan advisers in Australia is thus an important change in the operation of 
the policy making elite (1986:59). Walter's discussion of policy roles is limited 
by his notion of advisers as members of a group enterprise; he finds their 
contributions difficult to trace (1986:161). He is ambivalent about the 
importance of advisers in policy making, suggesting the adviser is 'for the most 
2 The rest of his paper is normative - arguing that ministerial advisers have a legitimate role in 
the policy process, one that should be kept separate from the role of the department. This 
normative approach is typical of much of the practitioner commentary on advisers' policy roles. 
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ministers, "',''7"""".,.."' 
advisers on two aspects 
setting. Very 
surveying was amongst advisers 
methodology. 3 to interpret the meaning 
were 
dominant influence on the final decision 
advisers was significant 
Ryan asked respondents to nominate one 
advisers in the decisions between 
the responses 
be 
of 
cautious 'rninder'; manager of the policy process; and administrator) and found 
that the role advisers played varied (1995:149-150). key finding of his study 
was that advisers had an important role in agenda setting (1995:155). However 
the complexity of advisers' policy roles and how they participated policy 
making was not revealed in Ryan's simple survey questions. 
Ryan concluded that 'ministerial staff exert enough power and influence over 
the policy process to be considered formidable actors for the purpose of public 
policy analysis' (1995:156). Yet his focus on power and influence, rather than 
policy roles, limits his analysis. 
Advisers must be recognised as policy actors and their policy roles need to be 
fully explored. These must be seen not only within the minister-department 
3 Ryan received survey responses from 3 ministers, 8 advisers and 2 public servants, despite 
sending out over 100 questionnaires. He excluded the public servants and conducted 13 
supplementary interviews. 
relationship, but also as extending outside of it, as the agenda setting and 
brokering work glimpsed in the studies by Ryan (1995).and Dunn (1997) 
indicate. Some writers argue that policy making has become more difficult, as 
'policies and interrelationships become more complex, and as the electorate 
fractures along multiple fault-lines' (Davis 2000:241-2). Linking back to 
advisers' function in government, there is a need to explore how advisers help 
ministers to devise, develop and realise policy goals. How do they help 
ministers to steer government by enabling partisan engagement in modem 
complex policy making? 
Literature on advisers' coordination roles 
There is a large body of literature about coordination within the executive, but 
little of it focuses on the use of ministerial advisers as a coordination 
mechanism. 
The relationships amongst the Prime Minister, ministers and their advisers is 
seen by Campbell as one of the two 'gearboxes' which a government needs to 
engage effectively if it is to have the capacity to govern (Campbell1998). The 
political executive needs to achieve 'coherence through collective deliberation' 
(1998:228). A strong drive towards coordination and priority setting within the 
executive is seen as a particular feature of Westminster-style governments 
(Davis 1997). This is usually seen as the function of cabinet. 
Executive coordination is seen in the literature as not only important, but as 
increasingly difficult to achieve. British studies of the core executive emphasise 
political and administrative fragmentation and the increasing complexity of 
policy making as creating a greater need for coordination, while 'sapping' the 
executive's ability to coordinate (Rhodes 2000d:257-9). Kavanagh and Seldon 
(2000) see the increase in resources to the British Prime Minister as 'a reaction to 
a felt weakness, a frustration with the inability to pull effective levers' 
(2000:74-5). This has been termed a 'weakness at the centre' (Rhodes 1997). 
There are two views about the changing role of cabinet. One is that there is a 
disturbing trend towards a de-institutionalisation of cabinet systems (Campbell 
1998). This is seen in a reduction in formal collective decision making and a 
'presidentialisation' of government. The other view sees the reduction in formal 
cabinet business in a more positive light, as part of a series of reforms to 
strengthen the collective role of cabinet and enable it to cope with the pressures 
on it (Keating and Weller 2000). However the role of ministerial staff in 
38 
contrast to this emphasis on 
It is ministers and who proposals and if have 
the support from cabinet colleagues, and/ or the Prime Minister, they can 
usually succeed in securing the safe passage of their policy. 
majority of policy, the impact of the Prime Minister is limited to a veto power 
(2000:161). 
This thesis argues while the Minister and Prime Minister's office are 
undoubtedly important in executive coordination, executive decision making is 
more complex and collective than many writers suggest. Rather than taking an 
individualised focus on the Prime Minister, executive coordination should be 
seen as a process occurring amongst ministers and ministerial offices through a 
set of structures, relationships and practices. 
Davis (1995, 1997) is the only writer who studies ministerial advisers as an 
executive coordination mechanism. He identifies three 'domains' in which 
routines and structures operate as mechanisms for executive coordination. 
These are the political, policy and administration domains. He locates 
4 Staff providing political and policy advice were defined as those who were not media or 
administrative staff, so did not include media advisers, Departmental Liaison Officers and 
secretaries and receptionists. As well as these ten political and policy advisers, the Prime 
Minister also had three advisers who managed cabinet and parliamentary procedures and 
appointments, which other ministers did not have (Ministerial Directory April1995). The staffing 
structure in the Prime Minister's office is described in Appendix 2. 
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Campbell praises the government 'good' at executive 
Review Committee as the 'engine room' government. However 
acknowledges that Hawke 'worked intensely the team work side 
cabinet government' suggests Hawke 'enjoyed a cabinet with a 
high degree of ideological consensus' (1998:222-223). This is not borne out in 
accounts of the period, which indicate strong ideological conflicts within the 
ministry, exemplified in the following anecdote: 
Science minister Barry Jones asked Communications minister Michael Duffy ... 
after an economic policy announcement following a meeting of the full 
ministry: 'How did that happen?' 'It's purely a matter of numbers; Duffy 
replied. 'There's four of them and only 23 of us' (Steketee 2001:140-142). 
It appears that in the Labor period the government used strong and effective 
mechanisms to enforce consensus within the ministry; and that ministerial 
advisers were used as an important coordination mechanism. However their 
role in executive coordination at this time has not yet been fully explored. 
This part of the chapter examined the literature on ministerial advisers as it 
relates to five themes: the role and function of advisers; role variations; 
advisers' work with departments; advisers' policy roles; and advisers' 
coordination roles. It argued that it is difficult to analyse the role of advisers 
since it is wide-ranging and performed differently by different advisers. It 
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Ministerial offices have not developed as strongly in Canada as they m 
Australia in the Labor period. There is a large body of literature on Canadian 
ministerial offices (Axworthy 1988; Deutsch 1973; Aucoin 1986, 1991; Savoie 
1983; Campbell 1983; Jackson 1989; Bakvis 1997, 2000; Peters and Savoie 2000), 
though there is a scarcity of recent work. 
In Canada ministerial offices are highly partisan, but do not appear to be 
substantially involved in policy making. Canadian ministerial advisers have 
traditionally had a limited policy role. Bakvis claims that as sources of policy 
advice political staff in Canada rank amongst the weakest, with a typical 
5 While there is an extensive literature in the US on White House staff (eg Kessel1984, Hart 
1995, Rockman 2000), and Congressional aides (eg Malbin 1980; Fox and Webb Hammond 
1977; Webb Hammond 1985) it does not provide a useful comparison to Australian ministerial 
advisers, because of the difference in the way the executive is structured and operates in our 
political systems. However in some ways the interaction of partisan appointees and career 
public servants within the US federal bureaucracy is comparable to that of Australian ministerial 
advisers and senior public servants (see Heclo 1977, Dunn 1997 referred to in Chapter Six). 
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minister's office tending to be unduly preoccupied with 'picayune political 
matters' (1997:114). Campbell explains that: 
Canadian Prime Ministers have generally observed a taboo against extensive 
use of political appointees either in the Prime Minister's office or ministers' 
personal staffs ... Few Prime Ministers have even attempted to avail themselves 
of this approach. And those who have failed pretty abysmally (1998:148). 
Liberal governments (1968-1979; 1980-1984; 1993-present) are seen as having a 
strong symbiosis with the bureaucracy. Therefore there was not a spur for the 
development of a counter staff within ministerial offices during their long 
periods in government (Campbel11998). Long standing Liberal Prime Minister 
Trudeau stressed the importance of bureaucratic central agencies as policy 
advisers and coordinators within the government (Aucoin 1986:17). 
However Progressive-Conservative governments (1984-1993) did feel a need for 
developing partisan ministerial offices. When it came to power the Mulroney 
government intended that ministerial offices would play an important policy 
advising role, but it appears this did not occur (Bakvis 1997; Aucoin 1991). In 
1984 ministerial offices were expanded and upgraded and the role of the policy 
adviser in each office was strengthened. The changes were not successful 
partly because of 'the inadequacies of the persons appointed, who, with 
precious few exceptions, lacked the requisite governmental experience' (Aucoin 
1991:155). Mulroney intended that the chief of staff of each office would be 
from outside the bureaucracy and have substantive policy expertise, but few of 
those hired as chiefs of staff were experts (Bakvis 1997). The Prime Minister's 
office extended its sphere of interest to a wide range of policy areas, but it was 
also seen as overloaded, and having little policy capacity (Bakvis 1997:88; 
Hockin 1991). Only a handful of advisers were engaged in substantive 
advisory roles and the office only occasionally acted as a mechanism for 
providing comprehensive policy advice (Hockin 1991:165). Despite his 
intentions, Mulroney's closest adviser proved to be the clerk of the Privy 
Council Office (Bakvis 1997:120). 
The current Chretien Liberal government (elected in 1993) severely restricted 
the number and pay of ministerial staff, promising it would rely more explicitly 
on public servants rather than on political staff for policy advice (Bakvis 1997, 
2000). Ministerial offices were reduced from an average of 40 staff for each 
minister to a maximum of 13, and there was also a reduction of staff in the 
Prime Minister's office (Campbell1998:175). While some political staff, 
especially in the Prime Minister's office, are seen as having a strong influence in 
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(Campbell 
has been an upsurge in interest the structures executive advice 
the with several recent publications (eg et 1998; Kavanagh and 
Seldon 2000; Clifford 2000) which add to an earlier body of literature (Plowden 
1991; Jones 1987; Shepherd 1983; Bulmer 1988; Young and Sloman 1982). These 
studies focus almost exclusively on advisers to the Prime Minister (the 
institution of 'No 10') and track developments that occurred over the Thatcher, 
Major and Blair governments. 
Traditionally British ministerial offices have been mainly composed of civil 
servants who are on secondment from the department, are rarely chosen by the 
minister and maintain dual loyalties to the minister and the department 
(Page 1992:129, Headey 1974:130; James 1992:16-17). The partisan element in 
ministerial offices, though increasing under Blair, is still relatively small and 
distinct; and still considered to be controversial and needing to be justified. 
Perhaps because of their small numbers, partisan advisers in the UK have 
traditionally occupied a relatively marginal place within ministries (Page 
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1992:129) and have played a surprisingly small part in the processes of making 
policy (Plowden 1991:238). Ministers have tended to use advisers to help 
present policies to public and party audiences rather than actually to help 
formulate them (Young and Sloman 1982:91). The distinction between partisan 
work and policy work is still normatively strong and much anxiety has been 
expressed recently about the involvement of partisan (or 'special') advisers in 
policy work. Recent inquiries by the House of Commons have been very 
concerned with finding out whether the influx of special advisers under Blair 
are 'political' or 'technical' advisers (House of Commons Select Committee on 
Public Administration Sixth Report (1998), Fourth Report (2001), Seventh 
Report (2001)). 
A crucial feature of the UK advisory institutions is the requirement that civil 
servants in ministerial offices do not play explicitly partisan roles. Civil 
servants cannot be 'special advisers'. 
Recent, and much discussed, trends under Blair include a marked increase in 
the size of the Prime Minister's support staff; a stronger political element within 
No 10; and some blurring of previously 'rigid demarcation lines' between 
partisan and non partisan staff who support the Prime Minister (Kavanagh and 
Seldon 2000, Lee et al1998:254). However the civil service continues to exercise 
most influence within No 10 (Kavanagh and Seldon 2000:74). There has also 
been much concern about the 'damaging' impact of partisan advisers-
particularly media advisers - on the work of the civil service, with a number of 
high profile controversies. A parliamentary inquiry was recently launched to 
examine the relationship between ministers, special advisers and the civil 
service (BBC 2002, Mulligan 2002). 
Thus the partisan element of British ministerial offices remains relatively small 
and distinct, except in the Prime Minister's office. However there is remarkably 
little research or analysis of advisers working for ministers other than the Prime 
Minister. 
France 
France has the most clearly elaborated and deep rooted institution of partisan 
ministerial staff - called cabinets ministeriels - which has a very long history and 
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tradition.6 The features of the French model have remained relatively constant 
over the last 30 years (Elgie 2000). There are a number of studies of French 
ministerial staff, though there is little recent work in English (Suleiman 1974; 
Wright 1989; Gaborit and Mounier 1987; Gaffney 1991; Siwek-Pouydesseau 
1975; Searls 1981; Elgie 2000). British commentators have often seen the French 
model as representing an extreme, even dangerous, example of highly 
developed ministerial staff resources. The French model provides an 
interesting comparison with Australian ministerial offices in the Keating years. 
Like many of the Australian advisers in this study, French ministerial advisers 
can be seen to combine partisanship, policy focus and policy competence. 
Cabinets ministeriels are highly partisan. Similar to the Keating offices in this 
study there is usually a mix of public servants with policy expertise and party 
people (Elgie 2000). Yet the vast majority of cabinet members are public 
servants or have a background in the public service (Gaborit and Mounier 
1987:104; Elgie 2000). There is a high level of interchange between the upper 
public service and the cabinets. This led Suleiman to include cabinet members in 
his study of the higher public service and to refer to them as an element of the 
French bureaucracy (Suleiman 1974:6). 
Both the President and Prime Minister have policy advisers, though their staff 
numbers have remained relatively 'light' (Elgie 2000). The Prime Minister has 
around 40 policy advisers and the President around 27 (Elgie 2000). 
Presidential, Prime Ministerial and ministerial cabinets play a central role 
amongst French political institutions. They are 'the central locations of decision 
making' (Gaborit and Mounier 1987:104). They are significant sites of policy 
elaboration and play a crucial role in the policy process (Gaffney 1991). They 
perform important coordination work in frequent interministerial meetings 
chaired by the Prime Minister's advisers (Thiebault 1994:142). They are 
essential channels of information within French government: 
As political information moves up towards the Prime Minister and the 
President and back down again, moves across to Parliament or down to the 
services of the bureaucracy, the ministerial cabinets are constantly involved, 
fashioning, interpreting, drawing up, rewriting, proposing and pursuing with 
varying degrees of emphasis virtually all textual and other manifestations of 
political information (Gaffney 1991:8). 
6 They were formed as we know them today at the beginning of the Third Republic in 1870. A 
19111aw and a 1912 decree laid down rules for them (Siwek-Pouydesseau 1975:197). 
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However their most important role is to ensure political control over the 
bureaucracy: 'The essential function of the cabinets ... is to short circuit ... the 
procedural inertia of the bureaucracy' (Gaffney 1991:6). Studies have revealed 
significant levels of conflict between ministerial staff and higher public servants 
(Suleiman 1974). 
The reason why this institution developed so strongly in France can be found in 
its history of weak executives and strong bureaucratic control of policy. The 
centralisation of French government and the particular strength, closure and 
status of the French bureaucracy (arising from its elite training and corps 
structure) requires a robust and competent counterstaff institution to effectively 
oppose and control it. This may be one reason why emphasis is placed on 
policy capacity, as well as partisanship, in recruitment of cabinet members. 
There are several reasons suggested for the preponderance of public servants in 
cabinets. First the allocation of payment for the cabinet is very limited, which 
means that its members must be paid from outside. Very few professions apart 
from the public service have a facility for continuing to draw their salary while 
working in a cabinet, whereas public servants may relinquish a position for an 
undetermined period of time and be reintegrated back into the public service at 
the end of their employment with the minister (Siwek-Pouydesseau 1975:200). 
Second, public servants in France who have attended the elite training colleges 
constitute an 'intellectual caste'; they are high fliers who are highly trained and 
well suited to this type of work (Gaffney 1991:9). 
Third, ministers believe that the knowledge and experience public servants 
bring strengthens their ability to oppose and control the department. The 
strength of the informal networks within the upper levels of the French 
bureaucracy, arising from the corps structure, mean it is important to appoint 
public servants to the cabinet if a minister hopes to influence policy making. 
Suleiman claims that in appointing outsiders to their cabinets ministers would 
be acting against their own interests. By not playing according to the rules of 
the game they and the ministry would carry less weight in interministerial 
battles and within the technostructure that 'makes all decisions' (1974:264-265). 
Because of the strength of these networks and relationships, 'were it not for the 
ministerial cabinet the minister might conceivably [be] entirely left out of the 
decision making process' (1974:265). Fourth, Elgie (2000) argues that the 
preponderance of public servants is a general feature of the French political 
system, in which a highly trained administrative elite can be found not only in 
46 
ministerial offices, but also in the public service, political parties and public and 
private sector businesses. 
Thus the French system of ministerial staff represents a powerful political 
institution providing partisan policy advice to ministers. It has some 
interesting similarities to Australian ministerial offices in the Keating period. 
CONCLUSION 
1his chapter has examined the literature relevant to a study of the role of 
ministerial advisers in the Keating period. It revealed there are very few 
studies focused on Australian ministerial advisers as subjects. The most 
significant study of advisers is dated, as it surveyed ministerial advisers at the 
beginning of the Hawke-Keating period (Walter 1986). Later studies (Dunn 
1997; Ryan 1995) have not explored advisers' role in its entirety. It argued there 
is a gap in our conceptual understanding of adviser's role, which needs to be 
linked to advisers' function within government. There are also important gaps 
in our understanding of the variations in the behaviour of advisers; the work 
advisers do with departments; their policy roles and coordination roles. The 
chapter also described developments in ministerial offices in Canada, UK and 
France as a backdrop to identifying the distinctive features of the Australian 
ministerial office at this time. These features are discussed in the conclusion to 
the thesis. The next chapter outlines the methodology of the study. 
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Three 
Methodology 
There are a number of difficulties in researching political elites, such as getting 
access, lack of time for interviews, lack of supporting documentary material 
and the secretive attitude of 'political insiders'. There is also the problem of 
how to capture variations in behaviour and meaningful data in short structured 
interview situations. These problems are particularly apparent in studying 
ministerial advisers. 
This chapter first describes the method used in the study. It then outlines why 
a qualitative method was chosen as most appropriate. It discusses two key 
issues in qualitative research - sampling and validity - and how each was dealt 
with in the design of the research project. It then describes the distinctive 
features of this study compared to other studies of advisers. 
HOW THE STUDY WAS CONDUCTED 
The method used in this study was qualitative research. Forty-one Labor 
ministerial advisers were interviewed between April1995 andApril1996.1 
Most interviews were conducted before the March 1996 election (which Labor 
lost). Some interviews which had not been able to be completed before the 
election occurred were conducted after the election. Interviews were conducted 
with 13 ministers who had worked with these advisers; and with 10 public 
servants who had worked with these clusters of ministers and advisers. One 
leading Caucus member was also interviewed about advisers' relationships 
with Caucus. 
Advisers of four different classifications were interviewed. These were 
assistant adviser; adviser; senior or principal adviser; and consultant. Media 
advisers were excluded from the study, as their work tends to be distinct from 
that of other advisers and they may not have much involvement with the 
department or with policy issues. Walter (1986) and Dunn (1997) did not study 
media advisers, though they were included in Forward's studies (1975, 1977). 
1 While 43 interviews were completed, two subjects were excluded from the study for various 
reasons, leaving 41 usable interviews. 
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Along with previous studies, all administrative staff such as personal 
secretaries, secretaries and departmental liaison officers were also excluded, as 
were electorate officers.z 
Pre-study interviews were conducted with two advisers and one minister 
known to the author. They provided valuable feedback on how to refine the 
interview schedule. Interviews with advisers ranged from 45 minutes to three 
hours, and were conducted mainly in ministerial offices, but also in cafes, at the 
homes of some advisers and at the university. 
Most of the advisers were very open, candid and keen to talk about their 
experiences. Many were fascinated by the processes of policy making and 
interested in thinking and talking about how things happen in government. 
Some relished the opportunity to talk about what they did and what they had 
observed, and what its significance was. Interviews were conducted close to an 
election they felt they were likely to lose, and this motivated some to talk about 
their experiences over the years and to think broadly about what they had seen. 
Some interviews had a confessional aspect.3 Some advisers were very 
generous with their time. For example, two advisers were interviewed twice 
because they felt they had more to say when their allocated time had run out. 
Some advisers were driven to impart their experiences by a view that their 
work is not well understood by 'outsiders', particularly researchers. 
Interviews were arranged by a combination of methods. First, snowball sampling 
was used, in which a few advisers were contacted personally and interviewed 
and they referred me to other people in their networks, who then referred me to 
further contacts. Snowball sampling is one of the two most common sampling 
techniques in qualitative research (Minichiello et all995:161). It is particularly 
suited to studying groups where access can be a problem. Almost three-
quarters of the interviews were obtained through this gradual building of the 
sample. This was a successful way of gaining access to a very busy and wary 
target group. Being referred by someone they trusted was important as it is 
fundamental to the way advisers operate (through trusted networks). Only one 
2 Electorate officers perform distinct roles associated with the minister's local electorates, do 
not deal with the department or with policy matters and are not located in the Canberra 
ministerial office. Walter and Dunn did not include departmental liaison officers (DLOs) in their 
studies but Forward did. Forward's inclusion of DLOs and media advisers in his sample 
complicates his analysis and tends to mask the distinctive features of policy advisers. 
3 It is useful to compare the television series 'Labor in Power' which was taped just prior to the 
1993 election. Several of the interviews with advisers that lasted for around three hours were 
almost like a 'debrief of some of their experiences, with someone familiar with the situation. 
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person contacted in this way refused to be interviewed. Of 30 verbal requests, 
29 interviews were obtained. 
The second stage involved contacting advisers by letter in the offices that had 
not been reached through the snowball sampling. Of 41letters written to 
advisers and followed up with phone calls, 14 interviews were obtained. A 
comparison of response rates shows that snowball sampling was an effective 
way of reaching the target group.4 
Ministers and public servants were all contacted by letter. While all public 
servants contacted agreed to be interviewed, the response rate for ministers was 
much lower (the busy pre-election period meant many were not available). Six 
of the ministers interviewed were senior (or cabinet) ministers; seven were 
junior (or non cabinet) ministers. 
The senior public servants selected were at the First Assistant Secretary and 
Assistant Secretary level. They were from eight departments. Like the 
advisers, they were interested and keen to talk about their experiences. They 
provided candid and at times colourful assessments of individuals. Most 
interviews lasted for a little over one hour. The interviews with ministers 
ranged from 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. 
The interviews with advisers were semi-structured in the sense I began with a 
list of topics to be covered, but allowed the interview to take its course by 
following the lead of the person being interviewed (an important technique in 
qualitative research). The interviews with ministers and public servants were 
also based on a list of topics to be covered but were more structured because 
they were asked about their experiences of specific individuals and to comment 
on advisers' accounts of what had occurred in particular cases. 
Interviews were either taped or detailed notes were taken which were 
immediately written up into a transcript. Many advisers opted for notes rather 
than tape recording. The tape recorder could constrain some interviewees (on 
several occasions the tape had to be turned off at crucial moments in recounting 
events). 
Interviews were conducted on a confidential basis. This was important in 
obtaining consent. Subjects are therefore not referred to by name, and quotes 
4 One person declined to be interviewed and seven who agreed to be interviewed after the 
election were then unavailable or untraceable because they left Canberra. Nineteen people did 
not respond at all to the letters and phone calls. However it should be noted that second stage 
interviews were sought in the extremely busy pre-election period that began around December 
1995, which took many advisers out of Canberra for extensive periods. 
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and examples have been stripped of identifying program references.s Advisers 
are referred to as Adviser 1, Adviser 2, Adviser 3 and so on, abbreviated as AOl, 
A02, A03 where necessary. The 13 ministers are each named with a colour, 
such as Minister Blue or Minister Yellow. Public servants are referred to by 
numbers, for example Public Servant 1, Public Servant 2 and so on, abbreviated 
as POl or P02 where necessary. Ministers and advisers who were referred to by 
respondents but not interviewed in the study were also assigned colours and 
numbers. This reference system is detailed in Appendix 1. 
During each interview with advisers, demographic data was collected. This 
included the length of time they had worked as an adviser; the number of 
ministers they had worked for; the number of portfolios they had worked in; 
whether they were currently a party member; whether they were from the 
public service; their career background; and their gender, age and education. 
This information is summarised in Appendix 3. 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
A qualitative method was chosen for several reasons. The research question 
('what was the role of ministerial advisers in the Keating government?'), in its 
exploration of the experiences and perceptions of individuals, and variations in 
behaviour, called for a qualitative rather than quantitative approach. The study 
aimed to reveal the reality of the phenomenon in some depth and detail, based 
on the experiences of participants. Qualitative methods, particularly 
ethnographic, unstructured interviewing, permit one to 'understand and 
capture the points of view of other people without predetermining those points 
of view through prior selection of questionnaire categories' (Patton 1990:24). 
Quantitative research cannot capture the complexity and contingency of 
advisers' work. For example, there is a limit to how meaningful Forward and 
Walter's data is when it asks advisers 'what in practice are your main roles?' 
and gives nine predetermined roles from which they must choose three.6 A 
quantitative method does not reveal much about how the role is performed. 
Nor does it provide the context or depth to understand what advisers' 
responses mean. 
5 Anonymity was also a feature of Forward (1975, 1977), Walter (1986) and Dunn s (1997) 
studies and I believe it is unavoidable in researching advisers. 
6 The level of non-response to this question may indicate the inappropriateness of the 
predetermined categories (Forward 1975:145). 
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Ryan's (1995) study shows the difficulty of trying to get quantitative data from 
advisers, ministers and public servants about complex policy processes; and the 
difficulty of making sense out of the data that is obtained. From over one 
hundred questionnaires sent out, he received only 13 responses? Finding the 
answer to the question 'what was the influence of advisers on the decisions?' to 
be 'very important' and 'important' does not reveal much about the role of 
advisers in decision making or how they behave and exert influence. 
Quantitative studies (such as those by Forward (1975, 1977) and Walter (1986)) 
have proved inadequate for exploring differences between advisers. Forward's 
four 'types' of advisers- based on whether they were public servants or not, 
and classed as 'political' or not (discussed in Chapter Two)- cannot be taken 
very far as they are not meaningfully linked to behaviour.8 Quantitative 
classifications can also be rigid and arbitrary. For example to be classified as 
'political' in Forward's typology an adviser had to meet three, four or five 
criteria as 'political' (based on their answers to five of the survey questions). 
Those who met two, one or none of the criteria were judged as 'non-political'. 
However this resulted in 26-50% of those classed as 'non-political non-public 
servants' in 1975 being members of the ALP (Forward 1975:149). 
An important aim of this study was to capture a range of different types of 
advisers and to distinguish their behaviour. A qualitative approach is effective 
for highly individualised situations and suited to capturing and understanding 
variations in behaviour (Patton 1990:17). It is also a methodology suited to 
incorporating multiple perspectives (Strauss and Corbin 1994:280). 
There are two issues which relate to the credibility of qualitative studies and 
which must be addressed in designing a qualitative research project. These are 
sampling and validity. 
Sampling 
In qualitative research, it is important to assess the adequacy of the sample and 
its representativeness to ensure that the study's findings are meaningful. The 
aim of qualitative research is to elicit adequate data to reveal the variation and 
complexity of the phenomenon. 
7 The fact that a letter was circulated amongst advisers urging them not to respond to the 
survey also indicates the inappropriateness of his method (Ryan 1995:145). 
8 Classification as 'political' was partly based on engagement in 'political party' work in the office 
(Forward 1975). This was not defined and was changed to 'political-policy' work by Walter 
(1986). 
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The number of interviews in this study (64) compares favourably with the size 
of earlier studies. Forward's work was based on 40 interviews (1975) and 56 
interviews (1977) with advisers; Walter's book (1986) was based on 23 
interviews with advisers; and Dunn's book (1997) was based on 38 subjects (12 
cabinet ministers, 13 department heads and 13 advisers), seven of whom were 
interviewed twice. Ryan's (1995) article was based on 13 interviews (one 
minister, seven ministerial advisers, three senior public servants and two 
journalists ).9 
The variation among advisers means that small samples may skew the analysis 
by covering only some of the types of advisers or behaviours involved. To 
ensure there is adequate data, qualitative researchers keep interviewing until 
responses begin to be repetitive (termed 'saturation'). Sampling ends when no 
new information emerges from interviews. This study planned to interview 
more than 41 advisers, but there began to be considerable repetition in 
interviews and this indicated that further interviews were not necessary. It 
signified an adequate sample group for a qualitative study. Minichiello et al 
explain that in qualitative research: 
Sampling is guided by the search for contrasts which are needed to clarify the 
analysis and achieve the saturation of emergent categories .... This sampling 
strategy allows the researcher to study the range of types rather than determine 
their distribution or frequency (1995:13-14, [italics in original]). 
In this sense qualitative research does not produce statistically representative 
samples. However samples are representative in other ways, for example in 
their coverage of all types or aspects of a phenomenon. Because sampling was 
not random, the sample group is not statistically representative. (The data was 
not collected randomly and all possible subjects did not have the opportunity to 
participate in the study). This is common in qualitative research and elite 
interviewing. 
How representative the sample group of advisers is compared to the total 
population of eligible advisers can be assessed using the only two measures 
publicly available for the total group: rank and gender.lO Table 3.1 and Table 
3.2 show that the sample group over-represents the higher ranks and males. 
9 Forward, Walter and Ryan combined interviews with quantitative surveys. 
10 These are found in the Ministerial Directories. How the total sample group was defined is 
explained in Chapter One, page 10. 
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Table 3.1: Comparison of respondents with total sample: rank 
assistant adviser senior/principal consultant 
adviser adviser 
study sample 10% 29% 32% 29% 
total samplea 20% 36% 25% 19% 
a at April 1995 (advisory staff to ministers only) 
Table 3.2: Comparison of respondents with total sample: gender 
male female 
study sample 71% 29% 
total samplea 61% 39% 
a at April 1995 (advisory staff to ministers only} 
However the sample is still a significant advance on previous studies, such as 
those by Walter and Dunn, where the assistant adviser and adviser group 
(which comprised 56% of the advisory group in April1995) were virtually not 
represented at al1.11 The over-representation of senior advisers and consultants 
in the study sample may suggest that those interviewed were slightly more 
experienced than the advisory group generally .12 
The breadth of coverage of the study sample is very good. The sample includes 
advisers from 20 of the 30 offices that existed in April1995. Between them the 
advisers interviewed had worked for 31 ministers. These ministers were from 
all factions (8 Left; 8 Centre; 13 Right; 2 Non aligned) and were both senior and 
junior. Eighty-five per cent of advisers had worked for senior ministers and 39 
per cent had worked for junior ministers.13 The fact that 39% of the sample had 
worked for junior ministers indicates the sample is broadly representative 
compared to other studies. During the Keating years there were 17 senior 
11 While they account for 39% of the sample in this study, only three of the thirteen advisers 
Dunn (1997) interviewed were not senior advisers and 'most' of Walter's interviewees were at 
the senior private secretary level (equivalent to senior adviser) (1986:115). While Forward 
daims his 197 4 and 1976 samples closely represent the canvassed group on the criteria of sex 
and rank, Walter ( 1986) makes no such claims and it is unclear whether his respondents 
resembled the total sample. Because Dunn interviewed subjects from two different 
governments, he does not argue its representativeness. 
12 However, the differences may not be great. On average, senior advisers in the study sample 
had 4 years 4 months' experience and consultants 3 years 6 months; while advisers had 3 
years 3 months and assistant advisers 2 years 3 months' experience. 
13 This exceeds 1 00% because those who had worked for both represented 24% of the 
sample. 
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ministers and 13 junior ministers. By comparison Dunn interviewed only 
senior cabinet ministers and advisers working for cabinet ministers.14 
The portfolio coverage of the sample is also very good. The subjects 
interviewed had worked as advisers in 28 different portfolios. There were only 
five portfolios in which no subjects had experience.15 All five were elements of 
larger portfolios that were covered by advisers in the study. 
Thus the sample is adequate and the breadth of coverage of advisers is very 
good. Indeed it represents an advance on samples used by other writers in its 
coverage of a more diverse range of advisers as interview subjects (eg Dunn 
1997, Walter 1986). 
Validity 
How valid the findings of a study are depend on the credibility of both the data 
collection and the interpretation of the data. The search for validity is 
approached differently in qualitative research from quantitative research. 
Minichiello et al suggest that ensuring validity in in-depth interviewing 
involves staying 'close to the empirical world in order to ensure a close fit 
between the data and what people actually say and do' and 'being concerned 
with the ... correctness of one's understanding of the informant's perceptions, 
view, attitudes and behaviours' (1995:176). There are several ways of checking 
the validity of qualitative research. These include triangulation and 
crosschecking. 
Triangulation 
In qualitative research, triangulation involves the use of more than one method 
or more than one source of data.16 The term 'triangulation' is taken from land 
surveying. Patton comments that: 'knowing a single landmark only locates you 
somewhere along a line in a direction from the landmark, whereas with two 
landmarks you can take bearings in two directions and locate yourself at their 
intersection' (1990:187). In this case, the study was designed so that three 
sources of data would be used to test the consistency of the material provided 
14 A two-tiered ministry was not in existence when Walter did his study (1983). 
15 These were Administrative Services; Small Business and Customs; Resources; Trade; and 
Schools, Vocational Education and Training. 
16 It may also involve the use of more than one theory or more than one researcher (Patton 
1990:187). 
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in interviews (ministers, advisers and public servants). This enhanced validity 
in two ways. First, the interviews with ministers and public servants who had 
worked with many of the advisers studied provided some confirmation or lack 
of confirmation of the views expressed by the advisers and their accounts of 
events. In particular these views were used to confirm the categorisation of 
advisers as 'active', 'very active' or 'passive/reactive', based on their reported 
behaviour (to be discussed in Chapter Five). 
Secondly ministers, advisers and public servants provided three points of view 
of the same phenomenon. Multiple perspectives increase the depth and 
complexity of the analysis. There is no single objective reality, but rather, all 
views are 'situated'.17 Incorporating three views added to the richness of the 
data, and produced a more complete picture of the phenomenon. 
Patton notes that triangulation seldom produces a single, totally consistent 
picture (1990:467). An interesting aspect of the triangulation in this study was 
that in general, the accounts of advisers and public servants were very similar. 
If there was a discrepancy of view it tended to be the ministers who differed 
from the advisers and public servants. For example one minister described 
herself as closely involved in directing the department on a day to day basis. 
Yet both her advisers and the public servants involved claimed she was distant 
from the department and delegated most of the relationship to her advisers. 
Another minister denied that his advisers had any role in negotiating a major 
policy change on his behalf, though both his adviser and the public servant 
involved stated that the adviser did most of the negotiations. 
Such discrepancies were not common, but where they occurred, had several 
explanations. One is that interviews with ministers were rarely informal; 
unlike other participants they often maintained an 'official' stance in interviews. 
This is understandable as, even with assurances of anonymity, ministers always 
expect that their utterances may be publicly cited. They also had an incentive, 
as the public figures associated with the period, to have history recorded as 
they would like it to be (compared to advisers and public servants who are 
rarely public figures).18 
17 Silverman suggests the researcher's role 'is not to adjudicate between participants' 
competing versions but to understand the situated work that they do' (in Minichiello et al 
1995:188). 
18 Others have commented on the issues associated with interviewing ministers. For example 
Seldon commented that in his study 'ministers were, for the most part, poor interviewees. . .. 
The author frequently had reason to wonder whether some former ministers had served in the 
same administration, so at variance were their accounts of the way that coordination took place 
at the heart of Whitehall' (1995:126). 
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Secondly, ministers experience the world very differently to advisers and 
public servants. Ministers are at the centre of all decisions and actions in their 
work world. Much of the 'leg work' is done by others and is not seen by them. 
Their own activities are far weightier and therefore often form the basis of their 
descriptions of events. 
Thirdly ministers see advisers as extensions of their own identity since they act 
as delegates. In other words a minister may recall that 'I negotiated with 
Minister X to achieve this result' even though it was an adviser who actually 
undertook the negotiation. The minister perceived it as his or her own action, 
as the advisers were acting as him or her. This is a valid interpretation of 
events. Ultimately ministers are the actors of significance, and advisers are 
their agents. In this way, some ministers used the term 'I' to broadly embrace 
the work of the whole team in the ministerial office. 
Crosschecking 
Another way of testing the validity of qualitative research is to check findings 
against other sources and perspectives, termed crosschecking. In September 
1999, I presented a seminar to approximately 50 public servants from the 
Depaitment of Transport and Regional Development which outlined the 
different aspects of the role of the adviser. They were asked to assess how well 
the analysis matched their own experiences. The public servants suggested the 
analysis had captured well their experience of advisers. They were very 
positive about the interpretation of the data (with some saying 'you have it 
exactly right'). Some of the analysis was also sent to one of the ministers 
interviewed for the study. He provided positive feedback on the interpretation 
of the data. 
Insider/outsider status 
It is worth considering the 'insider I outsider' status of the researcher in this 
study. There are two sides to this debate. On the one hand 'insiders' can claim 
to have special knowledge of their own group which means they bring special 
insight and discernment to the tasks of interviewing and interpreting data. 
They may see different problems and pose different questions to 'outsiders' and 
have insight into nuances of behaviour not understood by others. On the other 
hand there are claims that 'insiders' may be biased in researching a group 
known to them (Minichiello et al1995: 82-186). This latter view does not 
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acknowledge that 'outsiders' also bring value-laden assumptions to the task of 
research, and cannot be said to be 'objective'. 
My experience as an adviser had several advantages in this project. It 
facilitated access to advisers, by providing known individuals with whom to 
begin the snowball sampling. It increased my understanding of how to 
approach advisers and adjust my methods to their working conditions. It 
helped in decoding the meanings of what advisers said and in understanding 
the context of their behaviour. It alerted me to the complexity of the situation. 
It also enabled me to have a good rapport with advisers when interviewing. 
Good rapport is critical in eliciting rich and meaningful data in qualitative 
research, as Fontana and Frey suggest: 'Close rapport with respondents opens 
doors to more informed research' (1994:367). Advisers who were aware I had 
worked as an adviser often seemed to relax and open up much more as they felt 
I understood the situations they were describing. 
I believe my own experience enabled me to obtain richer, more complex data 
and to interpret it in the light of an intimate understanding of the processes of 
executive government. I also brought to the research some years' experience as 
a public servant, and experience of working as a public servant with advisers, 
as well as current status as academic researcher. Patton suggests that: 
'Closeness does not make bias and loss of perspective inevitable; distance is no 
guarantee of objectivity' (1990: 48). Rather than detachment and distance, what 
guarantees valid research is neutrality. He refers to the concept of empathic 
neutrality: 'Empathy ... is a stance toward the people one encounters, while 
neutrality is a stance toward the findings' (1990:58). I aimed to take a stance of 
empathic neutrality throughout this research. 
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THIS STUDY 
There are several features which distinguish the study from previous research 
on ministerial advisers. 
First the range of respondents is more comprehensive than has been studied 
before and the views captured are more diverse. Advisers of all levels were 
interviewed and from both senior and junior ministers' offices. This is different 
to most previous studies where mainly senior advisers to senior ministers were 
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interviewed (Walter 1986; Dunn 1997).19 This was a deliberate part of the 
study design. Senior advisers made up only 25% of advisers in April1995; they 
cannot represent advisers as a group. Interviewing a range of advisers is 
important in distinguishing between different types of advisers and exploring 
the impact of advisers' work. 
The ministers and public servants were also selected differently to previous 
studies. Both senior and junior ministers were interviewed. The public 
servants in the study were all at the Assistant Secretary (AS) and First Assistant 
Secretary (FAS) level. Previous studies have mainly interviewed cabinet 
ministers, senior advisers and departmental secretaries, which has resulted in a 
partial view of adviser behaviour and political-bureaucratic relationships 
(Walter 1986, Dunn 1997). Senior advisers can be more distant from the day to 
day policy work and interaction with the department which is carried out by 
advisers with specific policy responsibilities. Secretaries have fewer dealings 
with advisers than public servants at the AS and FAS level, who often interact 
daily with them and who do not have their own access to the minister or their 
own authority as secretaries do. The study aimed to move away from the 
views of the heads of offices and departments, as they are not involved in much 
of what occurs between advisers and officials. 
Second, the study captures three perspectives on the role and work of advisers: 
that of advisers themselves, their ministers and the public servants who worked 
with them. Walter's (1986) work lacks the balancing views of ministers and 
public servants. His advisers appear to operate in a vacuum, rather than being 
immersed in close relationships with ministers and public servants. Dunn's 
(1997) study covers all three perspectives but with more limited numbers, and 
across two governments. His subjects were not necessarily known to each 
other. Ryan's small study is mainly based on survey responses from ministers 
and advisers. 
Finally, the use of a large sample of in-depth interviews provides an analysis 
with considerable depth and context. It is a serious attempt to capture the 
experiences and perceptions of advisers, and the views of those who work 
closely with them, at a particular moment in history (1995-96). 
19 The exception is Forward's 1977 study which surveyed almost all advisers (92%) working at 
the time. 
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Fo~ 
More than 'spin' and 'minding': 
The role of ministerial advisers 
The thesis now turns to the main research question: 'what was the role of 
ministerial advisers in the Keating government?' It describes the role played by 
advisers which emerged in interviews with ministers, advisers and public 
servants. It also constructs a conceptual framework for analysing the role 
advisers played at this time. It argues that the role of the adviser must be 
analysed in terms of the function that advisers perform for ministers. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the core function of advisers is to help ministers to 
pursue political control over the apparatus of government. This chapter argues 
that the role played by advisers developed over the Labor period to include 
important work directed at increasing political control for ministers. This work 
went beyond their traditional roles of political and personal support. The 
chapter briefly describes the five elements of the role played by advisers in the 
Keating years. 
THE ROLE OF ADVISERS 
At the outset it is important to note that a great range of tasks was performed 
by advisers, and that individuals varied in the work they did and in their 
approach to the job. This was a feature of the role: that an adviser could range 
across a wide variety of work at any one time, and that individuals could 
specialise in aspects of the role. The description of the work of advisers which 
follows tries to capture the scope of the role in this period, rather than any one 
individual performance of it. It sketches the boundaries of the role of the 
adviser, acknowledging that not all advisers performed the role in this way and 
that there were more limited versions of it. (Chapter Five explores this 
variation in detail.) 
The review of the literature in Chapter Two showed that while it is possible to 
list the range of tasks performed by ministerial advisers, analysing the 
boundaries and deeper function of the adviser's role has proved more difficult. 
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The role has traditionally involved political and personal support, often 
disparagingly called 'spin' and 'minding'. It now goes far beyond this. 
Table 4.1 shows how Walter (1986) and Dunn (1997) analysed the role of 
ministerial advisers. Walter divides advisers' work into personal, technical and 
political tasks. Dunn distinguishes between the different arenas in which 
advisers work (working with the department; working with other ministers; 
working with parliament; and personal services to the minister). This points to 
the complexity of the job: advisers performed a range of types of work in a 
number of arenas. These frameworks provide ways of organising advisers' 
tasks, but do not conceptualise the function that advisers perform with their 
work. Focusing on function directs our attention to the significance of advisers' 
work for the executive, and therefore helps to explain why they became so 
important in government. Dunn saw the overall function of advisers as to help 
ministers to achieve political direction of departments and to enhance the 
responsiveness of the bureaucracy (1997:89, 93). 
Table 4.1: Frameworks for analysing the role of advisers 
Walter (1986): Types of work Dunn (1997}: Arenas in which advisers work 
personal 
- administration of the office 
- emotional support 
- sounding board/confidante 
-surrogate 
- eyes and ears 
technical 
- evaluate policy ideas 
- seek outside ideas 
- write speeches and briefs 
working with the department 
- evaluate department's work 
- direct the department 
-facilitate department-minister interaction 
working with other ministers 
-broker policy positions 
- coordinate portfolios 
working with Parliament 
personal services for the minister 
political - manage minister's time 
- attend to the politics of the electorate, the party, - eyes and ears 
the ministry, parliament and the bureaucracy 
In their comparative work on advisers, both Bakvis (1997) and Peters, Rhodes 
and Wright (2000b) provide frameworks based on function (Table 4.2). Bakvis 
(1997) compares a range of executive advisory mechanisms in five countries, 
and assesses their relative strengths in performing a number of functions for the 
executive. 
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Table 4.2: Functions of advisers 
Bakvis (1997): 
Needs fulfilled by political staff 
[strengths and weaknesses] 
- develop mandate in Opposition [weak] 
- mobilise bureaucracy in transition phase 
[strong] 
Peters, Rhodes and Wright (2000b ): 
Functions of staff to executive leaders 
- policy coordination 
- policy advice 
- partisan tasks [strong] 
-political management (relations with parliament, 
parties, pressure groups, the media) 
- provide countervailing advice [moderate] -systemic management* 
- legitimation (ie mobilise support for policy -ensuring 'good government'* 
innovation) [strong] 
- managing the state apparatus* 
- reflection/rejuvenation [weak] 
*performed by the public service in Australia 
Bakvis judges political staff generally to be useful in meeting the needs of 
executives in four ways: mobilising the bureaucracy in the transition phase of a 
new government; performing partisan tasks; evaluating bureaucratic advice; 
and providing legitimation and mobilisation to ministers who attempt to 
innovate (1997:118). In addition to these four functions political staff act as a 
primary node in a network of contacts, 'channelling critical information to the 
key decision maker, the minister' (1997:118). 
Looking across eight countries, Peters, Rhodes and Wright (2000b) 
conceptualise six functions of staff to chief executives, only some of which are 
performed by ministerial advisers in Australia. These are policy coordination, 
policy advice and political management (2000b:11-13). The other three roles are 
undertaken by public service central agencies in Australia. These are systemic 
management (oversight of the international or intergovernmental interests of a 
country); ensuring 'good government' (through procedural tasks); and 
managing the state apparatus (through personnel management and 
appointments) (2000b:11-13). The task of engaging the bureaucracy is absent 
from this list. 
Dror (1987) also conceptualised the function of advisers to 'rulers'. He saw 
advisers' function as to improve the performance of rulers by helping them to 
overcome the inherent 'defects' of rulership (1987:185-193). These defects 
included quantitative and qualitative work overload; stress; court politics; too 
much positive feedback; and option manipulation. 
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This thesis suggests a way of conceptualising the role of advisers which 
emphasises its new and increasingly important elements, that now constitute 
significant functions within government. It argues that advisers' contribution 
to political control in the Keating period went beyond helping ministers to 
manage their jobs and to direct the bureaucracy. If political control is 
understood as being able to effectively steer government, then it involves not 
only engaging the bureaucracy, but also coordinating within the executive, 
managing multiple political relationships inside and outside of government, 
and engaging in complex, multiplayer policy processes. The thesis argues that 
over the Labor period the role played by advisers grew to address these 
challenges faced by ministers. The role of ministerial advisers in the Keating 
period can be understood as encompassing five elements: personal support, 
political support, communication, steering policy and coordination. Table 4.3 
shows this conceptual framework in more detail. 
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Table 4.3: Conceptual framework for understanding the role of ministerial 
advisers in 1995-96 · 
role 
personal 
support 
political 
support 
aspects 
- managing time 
- 'corridor' work 
- emotional support 
- intellectual support 
- parliamentary work 
- working with the party 
- issue management 
communication - articulation 
-linkage 
-speech writing, positioning, presentation, 
media management 
- channelling information 
- managing the minister's relationships with 
Caucus, interest groups, other ministers 
etc 
steering policy - engaging the department - supervising 
-orienting 
coordination 
-mobilising 
- alternative source of advice 
- engaging in policy making -vertical: shared with departments 
- policy coordination 
- political coordination 
- generating ideas 
- policy development 
- policy implementation 
-horizontal: independent roles 
- agenda setting 
"' linking ideas, interests and opportunities 
-mobilising 
- bargaining 
- delivering 
- facilitating cabinet decision making 
- resolving conflict 
- pulling together new policy 
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Advisers continued to provide the traditional personal and political support 
leaders required, and for some individuals this was the core of their work (for 
example those termed 'politicos' or 'political warriors'),l However many 
advisers played other important roles in contributing to political control, and to 
ministers' capacity to govern. 
The aspects of the role termed 'communication' and 'coordination' became 
fundamental elements of the adviser's role over the Labor period. Ministers 
and public servants clearly expected that advisers would do this work, and saw 
it as an important part of the 'value' they added. While communication as 
'articulation' has always been a part of the staff role, the 'linkage' element is 
new. It became increasingly important in the Keating period and was an key 
source of influence for advisers. While political coordination has always been a 
part of the staff role, the role that advisers played in policy coordination became 
vitally important to the executive. The 'communication' and 'coordination' 
elements of the role of adviser were thus elaborated over the Labor period, and 
came to be seen as core elements of the role. They became key functions that 
advisers played for the executive and contributed in important ways to political 
control. 
The aspect of the role termed 'steering policy' encompasses the traditional idea 
of advisers working closely with departments to promote partisan agendas. 
However the study also identified an independent capacity for steering policy 
through a range of policy roles particular to advisers themselves. These roles 
have not been articulated before and represent a potentially very significant 
function for advisers in policy making and in helping the executive to steer 
policy. The 'steering policy' function was more contested and controversial 
than the other aspects of the advisers' role and there was great variation in how 
advisers performed this work. Some of those interviewed in the study did not 
see all aspects of this work as appropriate. 
The primacy of location: 'where everything comes together' 
These roles can be seen to grow out of advisers' location in government. The 
traditional personal and political support work derives from proximity to the 
minister. The increasingly important roles that advisers played in linking and 
coordinating arise from their location in the ministerial office - a place where 
the political and administrative worlds meet, at the confluence of the many 
1 See Appendix 3. 
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forces that desire input to government. Minister Orange described the 
ministerial office as 'the place where everything comes together'. The active 
roles that some advisers played in policy making were only possible because 
they could move amongst the many stakeholders located inside and outside of 
government, able to reach into the bureaucracy, the ministry, policy networks 
and out into the wider community. The ministerial office is a crucial locus of 
political authority and also a key site of communication and negotiation in 
government. This central location made possible the expansion and elaboration 
of advisers' role at this time. 
The next part of the chapter briefly describes the work performed by ministerial 
advisers in their roles of personal and political support, communication, 
steering policy and coordination. Chapters Six, Seven, Eight and Nine explore 
two of these roles (steering policy and coordination) in more detail, using 
interview material and examples. 
Personal support 
Advisers had some important tasks that related to the personal needs of 
ministers. Ministers in the study put a strong emphasis on this aspect of 
advisers' work. Dunn (1997) listed two tasks in this category: managing the 
minister's time; and providing information about informal activities within 
Parliament. Both emerged strongly in this study, but so did two other tasks: 
providing emotional support; and providing intellectual support. 
Avalanches and kaleidoscopes: managing the minister's time 
Managing the minister's time was a very important aspect of advisers' work 
and many of the ministers interviewed listed it first when outlining the 
adviser's job. This involved running the minister's diary and making decisions 
about how time was allocated. It also involved making time. Adviser 26 
described this as the key to his work: 'My job is to buy him time. That's the 
adviser's ultimate job, to make time for very busy people.' This had several 
aspects. Firstly advisers needed to run an efficient office so that information 
could be retrieved when needed and they could ensure that the minister was at 
the right place at the right time with the right papers. One very experienced 
senior minister, Minister Blue, stated that the 'number one' part of the adviser's 
role was: 
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to manage the paper flow with impeccable organisational effectiveness 
ensuring that nothing that's urgent gets neglected on the way in and nothing .. . 
gets neglected or falls between cracks on the way out. The paper load is vast ... . 
Managing that system, making it work and knowing where every bit of paper 
was at any given point in time and being able to respond accordingly - that was 
criteria number one .... You need to do that in order to have a clear head, an 
unmuddled head, an unhurried head, ... to deal with the complex issues as they 
come on. 
Ministers have a crippling workload, involving what one former adviser 
referred to as 'an avalanche of paper' and 'a kaleidoscope of issues and 
pressures'.2 More than simply managing paper flow, advisers acted as a buffer, 
shielding ministers from the barrage of demands on them and selecting what 
received the minister's attention at any time. This filtering role enabled 
ministers to prioritise their time and to focus on what was important and 
urgent. This was described by ministers as 'operating as a filtering mechanism 
of the massive amount of stuff which comes to a minister' (Black), and 'dealing 
with the welter of people and paper that was coming in that needed to be dealt 
with' (Brown). To do this required an understanding of the totality of the 
demands the minister faced at any time and a clear sense of the minister's 
objectives and priorities. It involved the exercise of political judgement, as 
Minister Blue stressed: 
It's political antennae. An ability to instantly understand what's important and 
what's less important in terms of time prioritising and in terms of attention 
prioritising. . .. It's more than a mechanical function, it's a sense of what's 
important and what's not. And individual staffers who can't get that right are 
just the most useless people around even if they are intellectually very bright. 
'Corridor' work 
The second personal support task was keeping the minister informed about 
what was happening within Parliament House. Often described as being the 
'eyes and ears' of the minister, it involved watching out for his or her interests 
amongst the political machinations that occurred within the building. Minister 
White, a junior minister, referred to this as 'corridor work', which involved 
'walking around, having a cup of coffee with someone, seeing who was coming 
in and out of various offices, finding out who's talking to whom and who's not 
talking to whom ... a sort of ASIO-type role ... a spying role'. Good political 
skills were needed to analyse the information that circulated. 
2 Sandy Hallway, quoted by Peter Cole-Adams in The Canberra Times 14 December 1993 p 9. 
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Supporting, tolerating and curbing emotions 
The third aspect of the personal support that advisers provided for ministers 
was emotional support. Walter (1986) described this as being a 'confidante, a 
comrade on the leader's side in battles with political peers and bureaucrats, 
perhaps a participant in inside jokes that relieve the pressure of the daily 
confrontations which elsewhere the politician must represent as serious' 
(1986:130). This could be important to ministers, that there was someone with 
whom they could be themselves in a job in which they were constantly under 
scrutiny. In supporting ministers emotionally, staff could become 'part of the 
family' for a minister. Minister Blue explained: 
While you want your staff to be objective and beady eyed and not have you 
living with a false sense of euphoria if everybody else is stabbing you, equally 
it's very important that your staff give you psychological and emotional 
support at times of stress. There's got to be someone somewhere that's saying 
'There, there, it's all right. Yeah, well we may be in a little bit of strife about this 
but think positive - this is the way out of it'. When you have staff who just go 
around in a pall of gloom and say things to you like 'well that was disastrous or 
you've really fucked that up haven't you?' ... That may be objectively absolutely 
right but it's not what you need in that situation. 
The high pressure environment that ministers operated in meant that 
sometimes, as part of this role, advisers had to tolerate the minister's emotional 
excesses, and even try to curb them. One junior minister, Minister Purple, 
admitted she could be 'a real prize bugger at times': 
Ministers are awful people. Every bad characteristic of your character will get 
forced out in the ministry. Because when you're under stress or you're tired-
those poor devils will cop it. One of the things I used to say to staff was if I ever 
pushed them to the point where they couldn't bear it they had to tum around and 
tell me to pull my head in. I wanted that. I needed a relationship with people who 
could say 'hey, hey, hey!' [One department] used to drive me grey. I used to go 
spare. If my staff didn't follow things up or drive [the department] mad with 
trying to get things for me if I wanted it, they would cop it a bit I'm afraid. 3 
Adviser 26 worked for a senior minister with an explosive temper. He had 
worked for him for three years. He recalled male and female advisers running 
to the bathroom to cry and other things 'which I won't repeat because I'm sure 
they border on the criminal'. He felt the minister subconsciously tested people 
out, judging that 'if the person breaks down in tears before him then they're 
3 An adviser who worked for an often bad-tempered minister reported that for Christmas one 
year, he gave each of his staff a small cactus, 'to remind you of what a prick I am'. 
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vulnerable ... whereas if they take it laconically and stoically and lift their game, 
he says "OK that person can take the pressure".' He felt the reason he could 
handle the aggression was because he came from a 'tough' background and had 
spent seven years in the Army reserve. He tolerated the behaviour because he 
understood the minister was 'highly strung', had high standards, and was 
'delivering results': 
It's always like 'I'm doing this task, why the hell are you fucking it up, why the 
hell haven't you done what I asked you to do?' ... The thing then comes off because 
it's so perfectly planned and he's done his homework, then he's happy and then 
he'll share a drink and a smile with someone who he's been berating only an hour 
ago. But the irony is he won't remember it. So you've got to discount it.4 
(By contrast some ministers were wonderfully placid. One adviser told of how 
he made a grave error when a journalist reported his 'off the record' comments 
criticising a powerful cabinet minister; yet when his (junior) minister found 
out, he just laughed.) 
Another aspect of emotional support involved protecting ministers from their 
own emotional excesses. One adviser told of how on her first day in the job she 
went with the adviser she was replacing to talk to the minister about what he 
wanted to do about a conflict situation with a state minister. (There were two 
days of 'handover' between the two advisers.) The minister was angry. He 
raved at length about who she should ring and what she should say, what to 
write in the letter to the state minister and so on, and the new adviser took 
careful notes. When they came back to her desk, the (outgoing) adviser leaned 
over, tore off the pages of her notebook and tossed them in the bin, saying, 'the 
first thing is, we're not going to do any of that!!!' The new adviser quickly learnt 
her job was to protect the minister from his excesses and to do what was in his 
best interests - in this case, to take a more diplomatic and strategic approach to 
solving the problem. 
'Intellectual jousting' 
The fourth aspect of the personal support role of advisers was intellectual 
support. This emerged frequently in interviews with ministers. It ranged from 
being a sounding board, someone to bounce ideas off, to 'intellectual jousting' 
(Brown). It appeared to be important to ministers to have people who could 
disagree with them and 'argue it out standing up if necessary'. Perhaps this 
4 He said if the junior minister behaved this way he'd 'deck him' and tell him to 'go shove it up 
your arse' because he did not see him as 'delivering'. 
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The of the adviser is to assess 
minister to the out the errors 
be If the minister 
his to his minister. someone who minister' and then 
goes out and says to himself in trouble on this one' is no 
to you. 
was having 
ready access to the minister 
nature ministers advisers 
some were close friends colleagues long-standing whose relationship 
dealt with matters that went way beyond the portfolio; another good 
relationship could be purely at the portfolio level, it not need to go 
than Some relationships were extremely close. Minister White described 
his relationship with his senior adviser as like a marriage. He told the adviser: 
'I want to be able to say things to you that I can only say to my wife. I want to 
say the same things to you in a political and ministerial sense'. 
The basis of a good relationship was loyalty, trust and confidence. Without 
this, relationships could quickly become dysfunctional. The slightest doubt 
about loyalty was enough to damage the relationship, as Minister Red 
explained: 'Any hint, any whiff of any dis-ease or unhappiness ... was very 
difficult. The minute that happened then a whole lot of things fell out of place.' 
Loyalty was not always mutual. Most advisers were only too aware of their 
expendability: no matter how well they had served, once they were no longer 
useful they would go. This insecurity added a certain edge to what were often 
dose and mutually dependent relationships. Minister Orange stressed the 
incredible insecurity of the adviser's position: 
In the end if they don't perform they 're out. If they cause their minister to be 
embarrassed or any problem, they 're out -no ifs and buts. There's no nice little 
appeal mechanisms or cosy little retreats that can be found. It's on the knife edge 
all the time. 
Ministers could 'move against you pretty fast' (A26). Minister Purple declared: 
I'm very firmly of the view that if an adviser isn't giving you the sort of advice 
you want, or you've got concerns about their capacity to hear what is 
happening or to understand it ... then you have to say 'Go! QUICK!' 
Minister Blue, who admitted he was 'always famously demanding', hammered 
the table with his finger when he said: 'A high level of expertise and 
professionalism and competence was demanded. And everyone knew they had 
to shape up or ship out!' Yet not all ministers had this attitude. One long time 
adviser, Adviser 37, said that while some ministers were 'brutally dismissive 
and treated their staff with savage contempt', others were 'absurdly protective' 
of staff who were 'donkeys'. 
Political support 
The second aspect of the role of the adviser in the Keating period was to 
provide political support. This had three main aspects: parliamentary work; 
working with the party; and issue management. (Advisers' work with Caucus 
will be discussed under the category of 'communication'.) 
Parliamentary work 
Public servants in the study saw advisers' parliamentary work as one of their 
most valuable contributions. After the 1993 election the Labor party did not 
control the numbers in the Senate, and needed the votes of nine of the ten 
independent or minor party senators to win a majority vote (Kelly 1994:xvi). In 
1993 the minor parties and independent Senator Harradine not only extracted 
Budget concessions, but demanded consultation processes for dealing with all 
government legislation. This dynamic, of having to negotiate extensively with 
the minor party senators on legislation, created an important role for advisers. 
Depending on the nature of the policy area, some advisers were more likely to 
be involved in these negotiations. Some had no involvement at all. It was the 
type of activity departments could not do. Some advisers found the 
responsibility for these negotiations to be theirs alone. Adviser 14, a long time 
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adviser whose minister delegated responsibility for a policy area almost 
entirely to her, said: 
My negotiations with the Opposition and the Greens and Democrats are crucial 
and time consuming and delicate but the minister wouldn't even know about a 
lot of what I do - he just lets it happen. His view is that you get on with it. He 
doesn't want to know about it unless there's a problem. 
Another important part of advisers' parliamentary work was preparing the 
minister for question time. A sub-group of advisers were the 'question time 
team' and devised question time strategies for the government. This was a very 
important role, as ministers usually did not have time to meet and discuss 
strategies. Other advisers had a responsibility to identify questions that could 
asked of their minister in Parliament and to ask the department to prepare 
answers, which had to be checked and often rewritten to inject political 
rhetoric. This was a very important role which often took a considerable part of 
each question time day. Advisers were also rostered on to be present while 
ever Parliament was sitting, to assist the minister with any matters that may 
arise. This could be onerous and entail long hours. 
Working with the party 
It was surprising how little contact many advisers had with the party 
organisation. A subgroup of advisers had important responsibilities for 
working with the party, a group termed 'political warriors'.S Nine of the 41 
advisers were in this group. They were often long time party apparatchiks or 
long time advisers who were close to ministers. 
Some advisers worked on local electorate matters, particularly those whose 
minister had a marginal seat, or those who had worked locally with the 
minister before joining the advisory staff. They kept contact with branches, 
individual members, and other party units in the electorate. 
Party work at a state and national level for some advisers was nearly non-
existent. There were surprisingly few links between many advisers and the 
national party headquarters. However a minority had strong links and worked 
closely with party officials. Their work ranged from talking tactics with the 
party secretary to intense factional manoeuvrings at a state or national level. 
Often one person in the office was responsible for party liaison. For most other 
advisers their contact with the party was limited to attending party policy 
5 See Appendix 3. 
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committees with the minister to discuss policy changes, and distributing 
information about programs and policies to party branches where it was seen 
as important to keep them informed. 
However there was one area where advisers who were policy-oriented could 
play an important role. This was being involved in changing the party 
platform. Ministers were asked to submit proposed changes to the platform 
before Labor's National Conference. These requests came to advisers who 
could draft changes to the platform either to bring it up to date with policy in 
the area or to propose new developments. In this sense advisers operated as 
policy experts within the party. A few advisers reported significant 
involvement in drafting and promoting platform changes, including attending 
the conference and lobbying delegates to support changes. Adviser 1, a party 
member from the public service, listed one of her biggest achievements as 
successfully rewriting part of the party's platform and having this accepted by 
National Conference. This process involved extensive negotiations with the 
Prime Minister's office. Another adviser (also a party member from the public 
service) was active in resisting a move to put university fees into the party 
platform. It was something she and her minister felt strongly about. She 
helped people in the unions to draft their motions and worked with the 
students and the factions to ensure it got through. But she stressed how 
important it was that her role remain secret: 
No one knows how much I did behind the scenes because it was important that 
I wasn't seen to be active in the change. I don't think even the minister knows 
how much I did. 
A very significant part of advisers' work for the party was to develop new 
policies which could be presented to the electorate during election campaigns. 
This was work that could not be done by departments and it was creative -
advisers often relished the fact they could write and cost new policy 'on the 
back of an envelope' (A34). The year or so before an election was a particularly 
active time as the party prepared for the election. This involved promoting 
what the government had done, often through organising events and speeches 
for local members, as well as articulating government philosophies and plans 
for the future. It involved developing arguments that could be used to attack 
Opposition policies. It also involved positioning- working with interest groups 
and with the media to gain support for the government. 
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Articulation 
Articulation is a function that is traditionally associated with advisers to 
ministers and with courtiers generally (Walter 1986). Even before the 
development of the modern ministerial office in Australia (around 1972) 
ministers had employed press secretaries in their offices to perform this role. It 
includes helping ministers clarify or put into words their ideas and objectives. 
It involves the use of language to persuade and communicate with the 
electorate, through speech writing and helping ministers to develop 'lines' to 
use in talking to the media. It also involves working on the presentation and 
packaging of policy initiatives and decisions. 
In modem politics, with an active media and the fast pace of political debate, 
this type of political communication is essential to the management of 
government. It involves positioning and repositioning, and reasserting the 
central themes of the government. Through it ministers express the rationale 
for decisions and policies, outline future directions and link action to broader 
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philosophies or narratives. It is about defining the public agenda. Ministers 
valued this work highly. Senior Minister Yellow described the role as: 
competent day to day expression of the government's existing policy, and 
defending it against unreasonable attack ... making sure that the right notes are 
being struck and the right issues being addressed. 
Other ministers described it as 'telling the story on behalf of the government 
and the minister' (Red), and 'helping you shape what you say to the world' 
(Brown). Advisers called it 'wordsmithing'. 
This is a partisan function, not appropriate for the public service. Material 
provided by the public service was often reworked to add some 'risk and 
excitement' and partisan positioning. It required a close understanding of the 
minister's thinking and of the party's values and philosophy; and a willingness 
to engage in political debate from a partisan standpoint. There was also a need 
for proximity to the minister, as major speeches often involved resolving policy 
issues and taking risks which could only be done with the minister's authority 
(see Mills 1996:169; Watson 2002). 
Media management is also an important part of the adviser's communication 
role, but while some advisers were deeply involved in this, usually this was the 
role of the media adviser in the office. As media advisers were not subjects in 
the study, it will not be discussed here. 
Linkage 
Advisers' second communication role can be termed linkage. It has two 
elements: information and relationships. Advisers were conduits for 
information flowing inside and outside of the executive. In their role as the 
point of access for those wanting to contact the minister, advisers were also 
centrally involved in the minister's relationships with other players: the 
department, other ministers, other governments, Caucus, interest groups, the 
media, the party, and parliament. 
Advisers were essential channels of information within the Keating 
government. Their role was similar to Gaffney's description of French 
ministerial staff, as 'constantly involved, fashioning, interpreting, drawing up, 
rewriting, proposing and pursuing with varying degrees of emphasis virtually 
all textual and other manifestations of political information' (Gaffney 1991:8). 
The role of the ministerial office as a centre of information networks has grown, 
reflecting the needs of a media-driven political environment; increasing 
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demands for community input to government; and the growing complexity of 
policy making, with its overlapping networks, fragmented policy structures 
and multiple policy actors (Rhodes 1997). Most ministers set a high value on 
advisers' linkage role. Minister Yellow described the role in this way: 
One of the things they've got to do is to act as a conduit for community input. ... 
In an area like [-] you are going to have a large number of organisations all 
wanting to have a say on various matters ... and the advisers are often the most 
immediate port of call for those connections. So there's that very important kind of 
link role which the minister can't perform on a daily basis. 
Yet advisers were more than conduits, and the ministerial office was more than 
a 'switchboard'; it was a place where connections were made which generated 
powerful energies in government.6 In their 1992 study of political-bureaucratic 
relations Halligan and Power refer to advisers 'managing networks of political 
interaction' (1992:83). Advisers had a crucial role in managing the minister's 
relationships with other players. Two of the most important relationships were 
with Caucus and with interest groups. The next section briefly discusses how 
advisers worked to manage these relationships? 
Communicating with Caucus 
Working with Caucus could be a very important part of the adviser's job. Not 
all ministers set high value on their relations with Caucus, but those who did 
delegated much of this work to their advisers. Advisers to such ministers were 
expected to be available to Caucus and to serve members by prioritising their 
queries, handling their funding requests and identifying ways to promote them 
locally through the department's programs and policies. This could take a great 
deal of time and effort. 
As well as engaging with their local and constituent issues, advisers also dealt 
with Caucus on policy issues. This could involve attending Caucus policy 
committee meetings and briefing them when the minister was unavailable; and 
responding to Caucus members who disagreed with government policy. It was 
important that conflicts were soothed and that backbenchers felt their views 
were being heard by the minister. Minister Blue commented: 
6 The 'switchboard' image was used by Campbell (1983) to describe the role of the Canadian 
Prime Minister's office. Hollway (1996) used the image of a 'powerpoint' to describe the role of 
the minister's office. 
7 Also vitally important were relationships with other ministerial offices. However this is 
described under the role of 'coordination'. 
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I always regarded it as a very important part of the [adviser's] job to service 
Caucus members and absolutely not piss off anybody or brush anybody off ... 
even if they were neurotic, as they often were about particular aspects of [my 
portfolio], ... but try and calm them and soothe them and talk to them. 
Caucus could be a powerful force to deal with. It had the role of approving all 
legislation, with Caucus committees undertaking detailed scrutiny of bills 
(Steketee 2001:148). Former minister Neal Blewett's descriptions of Caucus 
meetings in 1992-3 paint a picture of ministers fending off attacks, 'in strife', or 
facing tough questioning from sometimes 'irascible' or 'pugnacious' Caucus 
members, as well as Caucus deferring bills and condemning policy decisions 
(1999: 55,257,263, 271). Indeed, there was a full scale Caucus revolt over the 
1993 post-election Budget, and Treasurer Dawkins was forced to make changes 
to it (Steketee 2001:153-5). 
Part of the adviser's job was to 'educate' Caucus through policy development 
processes so that opposition would be minimised when final decisions were 
made. It was crucial to 'bring Caucus along' with reforms. Advisers could also 
alert Caucus members to threatened changes and ask them to lobby more 
powerful ministers on their minister's behalf. Junior Minister Red commented 
that one of her adviser's jobs was 'to round up support for our programs within 
the Labor Caucus so that we could have the numbers anytime anybody in the ... 
executive government was minded not to proceed with what they had 
faithfully promised to do.' 
In the Labor Party ministers are elected by Caucus, with each faction usually 
electing its own nominees for vacancies.8 Thus for a minister to be secure, 
particularly a junior minister or one without a strong power base, it could be an 
advantage to be seen to be an active, responsive minister, 'looking after' 
Caucus. It was at least important to show you recognised that 'you are there at 
the behest of their vote' (Purple). Junior Minister Orange, who was not in a 
strong position factionally, expected his staff to put an enormous effort into 
servicing the needs of Caucus members. His portfolio suited this approach 
because it involved many funding grants and openings of local facilities. He 
consequently enjoyed great popularity within Caucus. He felt advisers had to 
be very astute at playing politics with Caucus: 
8 Though this was overturned to some degree by Keating after the 1993 election when he 
refused to accept all of the left's nominees. Hawke recounts negotiating with the factions over 
the selection of ministers (1996:417-420). 
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Caucus is pretty uppity about the way in which they are treated and if they're not 
given information and support, treated as if they are inferior or they don't matter 
then they get very shirty and they express that in a number of ways. By mumbling 
between a couple of them. The way in which they ask pretty pointed questions in 
Caucus [meetings]. The way in which a staff member responds to the needs of 
Caucus members is very very important for the harmony of government and for 
the success of a minister. 
Some staff felt very strongly that Caucus should be central to the work of an 
adviser. Adviser 1, a young party member from the public service, went as far 
as to put Caucus on a par with her minister: 
Caucus to me is such a powerful and important group in an adviser's life and I 
think it's the responsibility of an adviser to be very close to Caucus and to 
understand that Caucus is the government and you are equally working for 
Caucus as you are your portfolio minister. 
She felt her connections with Caucus helped protect her from cooption by the 
bureaucracy: 
The balance of power in Parliament House really is so easily skewed to the 
bureaucracy and Caucus will protect you from that. Because Caucus has a totally 
different perspective from the bureaucracy on policy and politics - they're out 
there, living in the real world. I think it's important for the balance of policy 
power that Caucus are an equal partner in all the processes. Now the minister 
obviously can't get around and meet those people and the advisers have to do that. 
That means the advisers have to be connected to the two hundred or so people - its 
enormous, an enormous amount of work. 
Her ideological stance was echoed by Adviser 2, who saw his relationships 
with backbenchers as 'critical': 
In all the competing demands I have, I put Caucus first. They are at the pointy end 
of it- they must be a conduit into the main line of government. They listen to what 
people are saying and pick up issues that are developing. You have to treat them 
with respect as they have stood for office and been elected. Advisers have a 
subsidiary role to theirs, even though we may be more powerful. 
Not all advisers were as assiduous in their work with Caucus. Some were 
notorious for not returning backbenchers' phone calls. Dissatisfaction was 
expressed by some ministers after their return to the backbench; Minister Silver 
said: 
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There are some advisers who think they are running the bloody world - some 
usually younger advisers who try and bounce you. You say 'Please yourself. I 
don't regard your response as satisfactory'. Then you threaten to go and see their 
boss. The last thing a minister wants is open public criticism of his office. It's an 
unwise adviser who believes you are incapable of tipping a bucket or won't do it. 
Caucus members could make life difficult for advisers, and their ministers, if 
they did not think they were being treated properly. Minister Purple explained: 
There's nothing quite like a group of pollies sitting around ripping to hell the staff 
in the minister's office. It happens and it is absolutely damaging for that minister. 
You blame the minister, because if they don't have the nous to (1) employ the right 
people and (2) to know if something's gone wrong and deal with it, then the 
minister cops it .... If you find someone in a minister's office who is sharp and 
snaky and uppity then it's in no-one's interest. 
The perils of getting Caucus off-side are evident in this leading Caucus 
member's account of his dealings with two advisers. He 'went ballistic' about 
the first, and shafted the second: 
I went ballistic about an adviser once .... She was not receptive to any ideas outside 
what the department was doing. We had a huge fight and it was terrible and it left 
a black mark against that adviser in my mind. She was not up to scratch in my 
view. Once I complained to a minister about his senior adviser. I had had a lot to 
do with him. I said he is psycho, unstable, paranoid, with delusions, he is unable 
to deal with people and he is hurting you in regard to perceptions in Caucus and 
amongst other ministers. I said the best thing for you to do is sack him or shoot 
him. It was not received well, as he was extremely close to the minister - he had 
shielded [the minister] from many things. But within two months he was gone as 
others were also commenting. 9 
He admitted that tension between Caucus and advisers was probably inevitable 
as 'Caucus is wanting something and advisers can say yes or no to it. And they 
are the source of advice to the minister so if you don't like the policy you blame 
them for that.' 
The relationship between advisers and Caucus is important as it involves 
bringing the party and the electorate into contact with government. As filters of 
Caucus input, how advisers responded was important. If operating well, this 
connection could ensure that the bureaucratic agenda did not dominate, and 
that party interests were served by government decisions. The responsiveness 
of advisers to Caucus was also crucial to the harmony of the government. 
9 This Caucus member was interviewed originally as a part of the adviser sample as he had 
previously worked as an adviser. However he preferred to speak mainly in relation to his 
position as a Caucus member and therefore was excluded from the adviser sample group. 
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Communicating with interest groups 
The work that ministerial advisers do with interest groups has become 
increasingly important in government. The demand by interest groups for 
contact and consultation with government is growing; yet ministers are busier 
than ever. The growth of the ministerial office has provided increased access to 
the political realm for interest groups. It is with advisers, rather than ministers, 
that interest groups had direct and frequent contact. Managing relationships 
with interest groups was an important part of the evolving role of the 
ministerial adviser. 
How important this was in an adviser's job varied according to the portfolio 
and the minister's approach. Some portfolios had very few client or industry 
groups associated with them or those that existed were in agreement; whereas 
other portfolios had a multitude of differing interests involved in the portfolio, 
often completely opposed, at a state and federal level. Groups which might 
have little public profile could be very influential within the policy sector and 
the government could be highly dependent on them to implement policy 
effectively. 
Ministers expected their advisers to build positive relationships with interest 
groups and the key individuals within them, as Minister Orange stressed: 
In those roles in particular, in relationships with consumers and the industry side, 
staff were very important. They are the ones on the phone talking to people all the 
time, building up the contacts, building up the trust and credibility. 
Trust was important as these relationships often involved the trading of 
confidential information that, if made public, could be damaging to either 
party. The passing of information between lobby groups and advisers had the 
potential for manipulation, though few advisers wished to speak openly about 
this. Advisers could leak information about proposed changes the minister 
opposed, and use lobby groups to direct political pressure against other 
ministers to soften their positions.lO Adviser 1 said: 
There are certain people who want the government to do well and they are outside 
of the government. It's OK to work with those people and there are certain trusted 
individuals that you work with all the time. ... You trust their political judgement. 
10 This was often justified as making the minister more aware of the possible political 
ramifications of decisions. 
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A very important resource for ministers was an adviser's knowledge of the 
interest groups in the sector and of individuals within them. Experienced 
activists were often recruited as advisers because they brought such knowledge 
(as well as their own relationships and credibility) with them. Junior Minister 
Green stressed the importance of his staff understanding the personalities of 
key lobbyists: 
At any time if I wanted advice about individuals, about organisations ... then I 
expected my senior adviser to know. If he says to me 'You'll be meeting with so 
and so from such and such an organisation this afternoon, you might recall you 
met him a couple of months ago and you undertook to follow something up. Now 
we've had advice on it, it's not something that we can possibly agree with.' I 
would expect him to suggest to me, 'this fellow expects you to be blunt, no 
bullshit, you tell him now what the position is and he might not be happy with it 
but he will respect it'. If it's someone else with whom you need to tread more 
cautiously he might say 'There is no way in which we can possibly assist this 
person or help him to pursue his purposes. But there are still some options left that 
we could perhaps try.' You expect a senior adviser to know those people so well 
and to have that level of human understanding - understanding people, 
understanding what makes them tick, understanding how they would respond. 
Advisers helped ministers to manage politically the involvement of interest 
groups in policy making. Interest groups could help the minister to identify 
issues within the portfolio needing attention and provide feedback about how 
programs were operating on the ground. Ministers could use this to challenge 
the department's assessment of programs or to request information from the 
department. The very existence of good relationships with interest groups 
could ensure the department was more forthcoming as they knew the adviser 
had his or her own sources of information. This could be particularly 
important in Commonwealth-State programs where the minister was even 
further removed from the administration of the program (as it was 
administered by the state bureaucracy). 
Contact with interest groups could also provide ideas for new policy directions. 
Trusting relationships with key individuals could enable an adviser to test out 
policy ideas on a confidential basis. Minister Orange described his advisers as 
having 'an essential role in being hooked into industry and consumer networks 
and feeding in ideas for new policies and new directions'. 
Advisers' relationships with interest groups were also important in negotiating 
policy change and achieving the implementation of policy change. This was 
expressed as 'bedding down' policy changes or 'bringing them along with 
where you want to go and helping them to better understand the reason for 
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change' (Orange). Long time Adviser 14 explained how she used her 
relationships with lobby groups to achieve policy change: 
I talked to all the relevant lobby groups and parties to get them to agree to sign up 
to the package we were proposing so that when it came out they wouldn't criticise 
us. . .. I've managed to build up a good relationship with the lobby groups over the 
years and I've been able to establish credibility with them and that's enabled us to 
get a lot of incremental change through. 
Ministers could also bring certain interest groups into the process of 
government, with the aim of promoting their influence within a policy 
community. For example ministers often established ministerial advisory 
committees which met regularly with the minister. This could be a way of 
subtly coopting key individuals through the patronage of regular personal 
contact with the minister and ready access to the minister's staff. Minister Red 
described how her adviser selectively engaged key individuals, by finding out 
which ones were 'thoughtful' and 'open to persuasion' and then setting up 
'ways in which we could consult with and incorporate those people'. 
Communicating with interest groups is an important part of the evolving role 
of the ministerial adviser. In the Keating period advisers became increasingly 
important interlocutors in the dialogue between ministers and interest groups. 
This is not one of the aspects of the role which the thesis explores in detail, 
though it appears in the discussion of advisers' policy roles in Chapter Seven. 
There is clearly scope for more detailed research into this aspect of advisers' 
work.ll 
Steering policy 
The fourth element of the adviser's role in the Keating years was steering 
policy. It had two aspects: advisers' work with departments and their work in 
policy making. This is because the executive's ability to steer government 
involves direction and control of the bureaucracy and also partisan input to 
policy making. Steering policy was the most controversial and contested aspect 
of the role amongst interviewees. It was also the area of most variation in 
advisers' behaviour. The following section describes the boundaries of the role; 
its most 'active' version. 
11 This could include the impact on the public service of the growth in advisers' work with 
interest groups. Campbell and Halligan (1992) suggest that it has diminished the scope of 
relationships between senior public servants and interest groups, which are now 'more 
circumscribed, partly taken up and/or mediated by ministerial advisers' (1992:206). 
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Engaging the department 
Advisers played a vital role in helping ministers to engage departments. There 
were two aspects to this work which contributed to partisan steering. By 
working closely with the department, advisers greatly expanded the minister's 
resources and authority within the portfolio. By providing an alternative 
source of advice to the department, advisers reduced the minister's reliance on 
the bureaucracy. 
Ministerial staff in this study spent a great deal of their time and energy 
working closely with public servants. For many this was the focus of most of 
their attention and the site of their most important struggles. Performing this 
role effectively could be difficult, as many ministers saw advisers as responsible 
for both the quality of the relationship with the department and for its 
productivity. One young adviser commented that 'if the department's not 
delivering, the minister will rightfully ask the adviser to explain' (A01). 
The usual arrangement in ministerial offices in the Keating period was that the 
program areas of the department were divided amongst the advisers in the 
office, so that each program area was the responsibility of a particular adviser. 
Often the senior adviser would take an overview role but could also have 
program responsibilities. Advisers then had responsibility for dealing with the 
department in these areas. They were the conduit for information flowing from 
the department to the minister; and for feedback and direction from the 
minister to the department. Advisers' day to day work with departments 
involved supervising, orienting and mobilising the department. 
Advisers had gained significant administrative authority in their role of 
supervising the department's work. This involved scrutiny of documents going 
to the minister for approval, and ongoing dialogue with public servants about 
issues in the portfolio. They had considerable leverage in their dealings with 
public servants because of their power as gatekeepers, controlling the flow of 
documents to the minister. 
Another important part of the adviser's role was orienting the department to 
focus on and work towards the minister's or government's agenda. It involved 
directing the department on the minister's behalf; clarifying the minister's 
preferences and priorities; and interpreting the minister's agenda for the 
department. It could also involve taking minor decisions on the minister's 
behalf. Fundamental to this work was the adviser's capacity to act as the 
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surrogate of the minister. This work greatly expanded the minister's authority 
within the department. As the surrogate of the minister, the adviser could 
invoke the minister's authority in a wide range of departmental activities, and 
thus shape them towards the ministers' objectives. 
Adviser's work with departments also involved mobilising the department to 
work on the minister's key projects or to deliver policy change. This was a 
crucial part of directing government and delivering a partisan agenda. While 
ministers were critical in inspiring or driving a department to deliver that 
agenda, advisers had an important role in day to day mobilisation. In their 
interaction with officials, this could involve enthusing them about the agenda; 
providing energy or momentum to push the agenda forward; pushing progress 
by setting dates for the department to have achieved key milestones; and 
checking and chasing the department. Advisers called this 'pushing' or 'driving' 
the department. It could involve persuading key individuals to embrace the 
agenda and neutralising those who might oppose it. Advisers needed an ability 
to push public servants to achieve things, often in unrealistic timeframes, 
without alienating them too much. Often departments responded readily and 
effectively to a minister's agenda; however it was a critical role where the 
minister needed to push against resistance in a department. The minister's own 
inspiration, drive, and authority had to be reinforced on a daily basis. 
One of the most powerful roles of the adviser was to provide ministers with 
independent knowledge resources. By providing an alternative source of advice to 
the department, advisers reduced the minister's reliance on the bureaucracy. 
Ministers said it was not necessary that advisers themselves be experts, but that 
they could bring a native intelligence and questioning approach to the 
department's work. Most importantly they were not imbued with the 
department's agenda, and had an ability to recognise where it deviated from 
the minister's. If they were not experts, advisers needed to be able to obtain 
expert advice from outside the bureaucracy when required. One very 
experienced senior minister, Minister Brown, saw this role as critical to political 
control: 
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[You need] people who can bring another point of view to bear on the 
department's advice whose values you appreciate and respect and are reasonably 
close to your values you hope and whose capacities you have confidence in. . .. 
Then you've got a sounding board which is not just the department. I was looking 
for two key values. That they had a political perspective that was not radically 
different to my own and a capacity to intellectually joust with department and 
with me! It's just a sensible precaution if you don't want to be a tool of the 
department. 
Advisers who were themselves experts were extremely useful to ministers. 
Three of the academics in the study had technical expertise which rivalled that 
of the experts in the departments they worked with (Adviser 16, Adviser 21, 
Adviser 39).12 They were able to re-interpret the data the department provided, 
critique the models or assumptions underlying it and do their own calculations 
and analyses for ministers. Adviser 16 recounted not only picking up mistakes 
in the figures the department provided, but also identifying 'major technical 
problems' and 'inbuilt biases' in the analytical frameworks the department 
used. During a major debate about interest rates within the ministry, Adviser 
39 'didn't agree with the whole model Treasury were using' and was able to do 
his own research and calculations to promote a different position.13 These 
independent experts were extremely valuable to ministers as they could not 
only challenge how departments calculated data but also their interpretations 
of what the data meant. 
Adviser 21 was an academic who for ten years provided independent economic 
comment to Labor ministers. He felt the Treasurer and Finance minister had a 
particular need for independent expert opinion as most of their advisers came 
from Treasury and Finance: 'You need someone whose understanding of 
economic affairs you trust and who can ride shot gun on what the department 
is telling you and whose career prospects lie not within the public service.' He 
recounted some classic battles with Treasury, fights which few advisers had the 
ability to win: 
Senior people in Treasury ... can put a logical argument very well, but they can 
also put an illogical argument very well, with great sophistry. Arguing against 
them requires a lot of effort. Most who try to argue against them fail because they 
don't marshal strong enough arguments on their own ground. Adviser 54 could 
fight them and win; and so can I.14 
12 They were all employed as ministerial consultants. There were five academics in the sample 
of 41 advisers. See Appendix 3. 
13 His position won the day and he claimed that later 'it was seen that I had got it right' {A39). 
14 Adviser 54 was another academic economist. 
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His minister also asked him to 'keep an eye on' the other three advisers in the 
office, who all came from Treasury: 
They were like the Wermacht and I was Waffen SS. They were the respectable 
officers and gentlemen and I was the party man in black uniform and arm band! ... 
Two ... were completely trustworthy - the other one left after a while. 
Thus advisers could help ministers to engage departments by supervising, 
orienting and mobilising; and by providing an alternative source of advice. 
How advisers worked with departments is explored in more detail in Chapter 
Six. 
Engaging in policy making 
The second way that advisers helped ministers to steer policy was by engaging 
in policy making. 
Traditional accounts of policy making which describe policy ideas as being 
framed in the bureaucracy, receiving approval of the minister and going to 
cabinet for endorsement, before being transmitted to officials for 
implementation, have been challenged by the large body of writing about the 
horizontal linkages between policy actors, who interact in complex ways to 
shape policy outcomes. In his description of the policy process, Colebatch 
(1998) identifies two dimensions to policy- a 'vertical' and a 'horizontal' 
dimension. The 'vertical' dimension refers to the interaction of authorised 
decision makers and officials, encompassing the processes of ministers and 
departments working together in policy making, as well as hierarchical decision 
making in the minister's office and the cabinet (1998:37-39). The 'horizontal' 
dimension involves policy activity across organisational boundaries, with 
relationships among policy players in different organisations (1998:39). 
Advisers in the study participated in both the vertical and horizontal 
dimensions of policy activity. 
Advisers in the study could be deeply involved in three areas of policy making 
traditionally conducted between ministers and departments (the 'vertical' 
dimension). These were generating ideas; policy development; and policy 
implementation. In these areas advisers often worked closely with departments; 
and some saw these as shared roles. However the legitimacy of advisers' work 
could also be contested. There could be tension and competition between 
officials and advisers. How advisers performed these roles is explored in detail 
in Chapter Seven. 
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Some advisers also engaged in policy work in the 'horizontal' dimension, which 
involves ministers interacting with other policy actors in a complex set of 
relationships involving interest groups, cabinet colleagues, senior public 
servants, backbenchers and other political parties. There were five types of this 
policy work: agenda setting; linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilising; 
bargaining; and delivering. In this work partisans could have significant input to 
policy making. These roles could be critical in steering policy because they 
enabled ministers to develop partisan agendas; manage the political 
environment; and steer policy proposals through complex, often tortuous, 
political processes. This is a new way of understanding the policy making role 
of advisers, and is explored in more detail, using cases and examples, in 
Chapter Seven. 
Coordination 
The fifth and final element of the role of advisers in the Keating years was 
executive coordination. Advisers were crucial in coordinating within 
government at two levels: within a portfolio (between senior and junior 
ministers); and within the ministry (between ministerial offices). This work 
ranged from keeping channels of communication open and information flowing 
within the ministry, to negotiation and even de facto decision making. This 
work is vital to political control because 'a government's ability to determine 
political direction and priorities depends on its capacity to function collectively' 
(Campbell and Halligan 1992:17). 
In his study of Keating and Howard advisers Dunn (1997:94-97) detected the 
importance of the work advisers did together in coordination, particularly in 
brokering policy agreements between ministerial offices before cabinet 
meetings. He saw this as a key responsibility of staff in his study, and 
suggested it could be a new function that had grown over the Hawke-Keating 
period, since it was not found by Walter (1986). 
While this function may have previously existed to some extent,15 it represents 
a major development in the role of advisers within government over the Labor 
years. This role grew because of changes to the way cabinet operated in this 
period. As cabinet acted to reduce its workload and prioritise the matters 
ministers decided formally, an increasing amount of business had to be decided 
outside of cabinet, in informal interactions between ministers. Yet ministers 
15 Forward found some networking amongst advisers in his earlier studies (1975, 1977). 
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were busier than ever. By using advisers for much of the preliminary and 
detailed discussions, it was possible to delegate much of this work to partisan 
actors who carried the authority of ministers. Thus the informal interactions 
between advisers became an important adjunct to the cabinet system at this 
time, enabling cabinet to operate efficiently and creating an alternative 
mechanism for coordination within the executive. Tills mechanism became 
essential to the effective operation of the executive. 
Both ministers and public servants in the study saw this work as an important 
part of what advisers contributed to government, and expected that advisers 
would perform this role. Minister Orange saw it as a fundamental part of the 
way the ministry operated: 'It's part of the bread and butter of this place really, 
very much .... Advisers are essential in negotiating policy - offices talk with 
authorisation and move it along, towards agreement.' One minister stated that 
'the networking advisers do for you is crucial' (Purple); another felt that 
interoffice relationships were 'exceptionally important' (Black). Negotiations 
between advisers were seen as 'extraordinarily important' in the Budget process 
(White). Public servants were positive about this role and described it as 
useful, part of the 'value' added by advisers to their work. 
Fundamental to this function was the role of advisers in the three central offices 
(Prime Minister's office, the Treasurer's office and the Finance minister's office), 
as well as a clear power structure amongst advisers and unwritten rules of 
appropriate behaviour. These dynamics within the network of relationships 
between advisers are explored in detail in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
The coordination role played by advisers encompassed both policy and political 
coordination. Advisers' role in policy coordination had three elements: 
facilitating cabinet decision making; resolving policy conflict; and pulling 
together new policy. 
Policy coordination 
Facilitating cabinet decision making 
Advisers facilitated the operation of cabinet by doing preliminary work on 
matters which were scheduled to come to cabinet for decision. Their 
discussions clarified and refined the issues to be discussed and identified areas 
of disagreement. This made cabinet's discussions more focused. Advisers also 
did important work in preparing cabinet members for cabinet meetings. 
Advisers read all incoming cabinet documents, selected those which the 
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minister would be most likely to have an interest in, researched those proposals 
by speaking to others and advised the minister whether support was 
warranted. This was a service line departments did not provide for ministers. 
Minister Brown, a very senior minister, said: 'Your office is crucial in enabling 
you to play an effective role in cabinet.' Advisers also did important work in 
the decision making that occurred outside of cabinet. They could negotiate 
matters with other advisers; or do the preliminary work necessary for ministers 
to decide matters informally. 
Resolving conflict, developing consensus 
Advisers did important work in developing consensus on issues which fell 
between or across a range of portfolios and where there were conflicting views 
within the executive. Resolving the government's position on complex, multi-
player policy issues could be very time consuming and was often done 
informally, through dialogue and negotiation between advisers. Sometimes on 
difficult issues consensus was ground out through meetings of groups of 
advisers, chaired by someone from the Prime Minister's office. This process 
was critical in forcing ministers to take a whole of government perspective and 
in managing conflict within the executive. 
Pulling together new policy 
The other area of coordination that was significant was where packages of new 
policy were being developed that crossed portfolios or involved a number of 
portfolios. This involved forcing consensus and a whole of government 
approach and also shaping a coherent policy outcome which met the 
government's objectives and could be presented beneficially. In such cases 
groups of advisers could work together to develop policy and to negotiate the 
detail and shape of packages. The Keating government was remarkable for the 
large number of cross-portfolio and portfolio policy statements it released 
(Walsh 1995:291; Cockfield and Prasser 1997). This indicates the sophistication 
of the processes for dealing with interdepartmental policy development at this 
time, which used ERC structures and protocols. The importance of 
relationships between advisers in coordinating such policy exercises is seen in 
Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Political coordination 
The second aspect of advisers' role in executive coordination was political 
coordination. This occurred at two levels. First, advisers reported that there 
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was a distinct inner circle of advisers which had responsibility for day to day 
political management and political coordination. Second, the Prime Minister's 
office played a special role in political coordination. Amongst advisers they 
had a role in disciplining or controlling renegade offices. Amongst the ministry 
generally their job was 'to monitor what ministers are doing and to bring them 
back into line, drawing attention to stupidity that some minister is involved in 
and suggesting what to do about it or not to do anything' (Brown). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter addressed the main research question: 'what was the role of 
ministerial advisers in the Keating government?' It proposed a new conceptual 
framework for analysing the role advisers played at this time, arguing that the 
role must be analysed in terms of the function that advisers perform for 
ministers. As discussed in Chapter Two, the core function of advisers is to help 
ministers' to pursue political control over the apparatus of government. The 
chapter argued that the role played by advisers grew over the Labor period to 
include important work directed at increasing political control for ministers. 
The chapter described the five roles played by advisers in the Keating 
government. The first two were the traditional roles of personal support and 
political support (often referred to as 'spin' and 'minding'). This work was 
crucial in helping ministers to manage their jobs. The other three roles advisers 
played were communication, steering policy and coordination. 
As well as their well-understood 'articulation' work, this study suggests there is 
now an important 'linkage' element to advisers' communication role. While it is 
generally understood that advisers are an important tool in steering policy, this 
is generally seen in terms of their supervision of departments and their 
provision of alternative policy advice. This study argues that the work advisers 
did in policy making at this time was also important in helping ministers to 
steer government. Advisers in the Keating years saw many policy roles as 
shared with departments. They also developed new policy roles which grew 
out of their location, their access to information and their linkages with other 
key players. This work could be a powerful resource in helping ministers to 
devise, develop and deliver partisan policy goals. How advisers engage with 
departments is explored in Chapter Six, and their engagement in policy making 
is examined in Chapter Seven. 
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Finally an important coordination role developed for advisers in the Keating 
period. This was detected by Dunn (1997). It was important in facilitating the 
decisions of the ministry, both inside and outside of cabinet, and enabling the 
executive to manage the conflict within government. It was recognised as one 
of the main functions of advisers, by ministers, advisers and public servants in 
this study. It is work that ministers do not have time to do themselves but it is 
vital to the effective operation of the government. This role is explored further 
in Chapters Eight and Nine. 
Advisers' roles in communication, steering policy and coordination enable 
management of modem government by the executive; and the possibility of 
partisan influence over government decisions. They are made necessary by the 
busyness and workload of ministers, and their expectations of policy control 
and policy activity. They are made possible by the unique position of advisers: 
conduits of information flowing within the executive and outside of 
government; linked in surrogate relationships with the variety of players 
within government; and with enough authority, knowledge and opportunity to 
act on behalf of the minister in negotiation and exchange. 
This chapter sketched the scope of the adviser's role at the time, rather than any 
individual performance of it. There was considerable variation in how advisers 
behaved. The next chapter explores this variation and accounts for it. 
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Fi~e 
Role variations 
Advisers do not all act in the same way and in describing their behaviour, 
differences must be identified. Understanding how advisers differ in 
performing their role is important to assessing the impact and the significance 
of their work. As seen in Chapter Two, the literature has not yet provided a 
way of capturing the variation in advisers' behaviour nor the factors associated 
with this variation. This chapter distinguishes between advisers on the basis of 
their behaviour in the steering policy role (described in Chapter Four). It also 
examines some of the factors associated with this variation. 
VARIATION IN THE ROLE PERFORMED BY ADVISERS 
This study found considerable variation in the performance of the role of 
adviser. There could be great variation in one office in the way advisers 
operated. An individual adviser might act differently at different times and in 
relation to different issues. Some policy areas required little attention because 
they were not a high priority for the minister at the time; or because policy 
settings were in place; or because individuals in those areas of the department 
were seen as capable and trustworthy. By contrast other programs required 
constant oversight and direction, down to the level of very fine detail, situations 
where the adviser played a de facto management role in the department. The 
choice of approaches could change as a policy area became controversial or 
levels of trust in sections of the department changed. An adviser's behaviour 
could also change with the electoral cycle, their growing understanding of their 
minister's expectations or their increasing skills.l 
The main role variation was between the advisers in the three central offices 
(the Prime Minister's office, Treasurer's office and Finance Minister's office) and 
advisers in the line ministers' offices. This chapter describes the behaviour of 
'line' advisers (that is, 31 of the 41 advisers interviewed). The very different role 
of advisers in the three central offices will be explored Chapter Nine. 
1 Advisers learn on the job as there is no formal training (Warn 1996). 
93 
Three different types 
The main area of variation amongst line advisers was in the steering policy role 
-their work with departments and in policy making.2 The aspects of the 
steering policy role are summarised in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: The steering policy role of ministerial advisers 
- engaging the department - supervising 
-orienting 
- mobilising 
- alternative source of advice 
- engaging in policy making -vertical: shared with departments 
- generating ideas 
- policy development 
- policy implementation 
-horizontal: independent roles 
- agenda setting 
- linking ideas, interests and opportunities 
-mobilising 
- bargaining 
-delivering 
Their behaviour in steering policy formed the basis of classifying them into 
three types. 3 Advisers were classified using the reports of the ministers and 
public servants they worked with as well as their own perceptions. How active 
advisers were ranged on a scale with three points, termed 'very active', 'active' 
and 'passive/reactive'. Around one third of respondents fell into each 
classification.4 
The 'very active' group marked themselves out by a drive to achieve certain 
policy agendas - often major change agendas or personal agendas to which they 
were committed - and their use of a series of strategies to pursue these agendas. 
They were highly directive and deeply involved in the department's work, and 
energetically performed the roles of supervising, orienting and mobilising the 
department. They exerted considerable authority in their dealings with public 
2 As outlined in Chapter Four, even those advisers who described the most limited roles for 
themselves participated fully in the personal and political support, communication and 
coordination aspects of the role. 
3 This can be compared to Forward's (1975) typology which was mainly based on 
demographics and only partly based on behaviour. 
4 Because sampling was not random this does not indicate that these proportions would be 
reflected in the overall group of advisers working at this time. 
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servants. They saw the policy roles of generating ideas, policy development 
and policy implementation as shared with the department. They frequently 
came up with new policy ideas, and saw this as one of their most important 
roles. They marked themselves out from other advisers in their concentration 
on policy implementation. Some were almost obsessed with keeping control 
over the details of implementation. This grew out of a strong commitment to 
ensuring certain policy goals were achieved. These advisers also differed from 
the other two groups in performing the 'independent' policy roles of agenda 
setting, linking, mobilising, bargaining and delivering (these roles are described 
in detail in Chapter Seven). Thus in their work they covered all aspects of the 
steering policy role. 
Those advisers classified as 'active' varied in their behaviour. Some could be 
involved in all aspects of steering policy on some issues at some times, but they 
were not consistently active, as those in the 'very active' group were. They did 
not usually have major change agendas that they pursued vigorously. Some in 
this group were keen to perform a 'very active' role, and were capable of doing 
so, but something prevented them from behaving in this way. (These factors 
are explored later in the chapter). Many of them were very energetic and 
careful in their work with departments: supervising, orienting and mobilising, 
and being closely involved in policy making work with the department. 
However for a variety of reasons they rarely performed the 'independent' 
policy roles of agenda setting, linking, mobilising, bargaining and delivering. 
Sometimes this was because they were mired in conflicts with their 
departments, and this consumed most of their time and resources. 
Those advisers classified as 'passive/reactive' performed a limited version of 
the steering policy role, for a variety of reasons. Some tended to spend their 
time fighting fires or reacting to policy agendas which were driven from 
outside the ministerial office. For some their focus was not on policy but 
elsewhere, such as their political or parliamentary work; or they were senior 
advisers who left the active policy roles to others. In general their work with 
departments was limited to supervising and orienting, and providing an 
alternative source of advice. They often had little involvement in policy 
making, except in a reactive way. The three groups of advisers will be 
discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
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2. Minister's needs 
- scope and demands - motivation 
- minister's 
- roles within the office 
Since advisers' work is as assistance to the minister 
performed within a one-on-one relationship with a minister, it unsurprising 
that the role should be greatly affected by who that person is. The approach of 
the adviser had everything to with how the minister operated and what his 
or her objectives were. The defining power of the minister is evident in Adviser 
35's description of the role as 'to do your bit to advance the interests of the 
minister you work for. It's as simple as that. Only one thing matters: what is in 
the minister's interests - that should be your first question and the basis on 
which you work.' There were two factors associated with the minister which 
affected how active advisers were: the minister's style or approach; and the 
minister's needs. 
The minister's style or approach 
Advisers, ministers and public servants stated that ministers had different ways 
of working and this very much affected how their advisers worked. Their style 
not only encapsulates their personality, but also their attitude to the 
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The 
their rnrnn•"'tP1nrP 
Minister 
want to 
This is reflected in who 
hierarchical and rni<>P1"01h 
move away. Minister Bronze and Minister 
who 
the 
full of 
This reflects 
Other ministers have a more humane attitude to the 
... It all comes down to the minister sees their role and how are 
prepared to work 
Those ministers who what 
Those ministers who have advisers 
and their advisers are the same. 
run 
ministers who are merely for their departments. Those ministers 
who are self-directing and critical. may have advisers from departments 
but they play a more authoritative role. ... The main involved is the 
strength and style of the minister. Some are overawed and don't handle the 
situation, especially if come against an alien department. Others feel 
uncomfortable and either step outside their departments or are swallowed up. 
It depends on their personalities and abilities as to which way it goes. 
the minister was capable, wanted to get involved in policy making, and 
expected to direct action in the portfolio, then his or her staff were often 
expected to play 'very active' roles in relation to the department and to policy 
making. All except one of the 'very active' advisers worked for such ministers. 
'Ibis was noticeable amongst ministers who were pursuing particular policy 
agendas or who were committed to the idea of policy reform. They often had 
high expectations of their advisers and looked to them to be knowledgeable 
about policy, to generate policy ideas and opportunities, and to deliver policy 
outcomes by steering through decision making processes. 
An exception to this was where ministers were policy experts themselves. Two 
ministers fell into this category {Minister Crimson and Minister Blue). They 
had both written books on the issues in their portfolios and had very clearly 
articulated policy agendas. Even though they were active policy makers, they 
did not expect their staff to have great input to policy. They both felt the 
department understood their agenda and responded to and they did not 
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to or 
tended to ,""''Arn-n 
making. 
sense 
Eleven to have political 
over the either run 
department or be run by These ministers perceived that a.elDaiun 
actively pursued own agendas, which were from 
government's agenda. 
Table Attitudes ministers 
sense of contest 
with department 
no sense of contest 
with department 
Desired political control 
Orange 
Purple 
Green 
Grey 
Red 
Brown 
Black 
Crimson 
Silver 
Gold 
Did not desire political control 
White 
Yellow 
Minister Brown, a very experienced senior minister, saw departments in this 
way: 
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Departments are not benign implementers. They have policy agendas of their 
own, which is what they see as the intellectually proper approach and they 
think that way whichever government is in power and they try to get that 
policy implemented .... They may move the nuances a bit but they still have 
their agenda. . .. They often dress that up in terms of getting you to implement 
your policy but in fact they're trying to implement their policy. 
For six of these eleven ministers (Orange, Purple, Green, Grey, Red Brown), 
ensuring that it was the government's agenda that prevailed was an ongoing 
struggle, in which advisers were an important weapon. Junior Minister Purple 
explained: 
The bureaucracy has a culture and a brief of its own. . .. And sometimes its 
agendas are counter to what ftle government of the day wants. Well, tough! If 
that means taking them on through your office you must .... [As an adviser] 
you've got to be fairly astute and know that working for the minister you will 
prevail. Because cabinet government means that the minister must prevail. 
Junior Minister Green had a very strong department with its own agenda. He 
reported frequent clashes with public servants: 
On one occasion I said to a senior officer from the department "Look I 
understand that you people have got your agendas but let me remind you that I 
also have my agenda, and if I don't achieve mine, then you bloody well won't 
achieve yours!" There were occasions where I found it personally exhausting 
to attempt to push the government's agenda in the face of a quite legitimate 
agenda which the bureaucrats had. They had policy ideas in mind - that is their 
vocation, that is their profession, they want to see things being achieved. And 
that's perfectly legitimate. But I said to them on numerous occasions "You 
fellows have to understand that you are the bureaucrats, and I'm representing 
the government!" ... I found it often very physically and emotionally exhausting 
because they would dig in their heels, they would shift up their position, "But 
Minister, you can't do it that way." They would give me the options, A, Band 
C. And you didn't have to be brilliant to see that in developing option A and 
option B, they gave you options that were just not acceptable. And you knew 
that they were wanting you to adopt option C. 
The other five of the eleven ministers who sought political control had no sense 
of contest with the department. There was either a coincidence of agendas - the 
department had its agenda and pursued it, but that agenda happened to 
coincide with or fit with what the government wanted to do (Gold, Silver) -or 
where there was a difference in agendas the minister did not have difficulty 
prevailing (Crimson, Blue, Black). Therefore it was possible to work 
cooperatively with the department. These ministers talked less about staff 
fighting or driving the department, though they still had an important role in 
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providing alternative views and challenging the department's advice. In two 
cases (Crimson and Silver) the main enemies were outside the portfolio and 
both the department and the advisers were 'up to their eyes' in fighting those 
battles together. One of those who had no sense of contest with the 
department, Minister Blue, said: 
Basically I ran the policy from the office for thirteen years and ... I never at any 
stage felt that there was a contest between the minister's office and the 
department. I saw the department as a resource there to be used with varying 
degrees of capacity within it, mostly much more than they're given credit for. 
There were certain people who were old-fashioned and entrenched in their 
ways. [Some departments I had] were notoriously not very good or high 
flying. [Some] were very technically competent but with not too many brave or 
adventurous policy ideas. But when challenged to develop them I had no 
particular difficulty in getting them focused and moving because basically there 
were enough good people higher up. From time to time senior officials and 
even secretaries were a bit of a dead hand, a bit of a drag in the sense they 
weren't really an engine, but I was able to go around them without any 
particular sense of struggle. 
Two of the thirteen ministers, however, stated that they did not try to control 
the department (White, Yellow). They saw the relationship as a cooperative 
partnership. 
Minister Yellow saw her role as more leadership than domination, saying: 'I 
didn't try to exercise control in the department'. She admitted to having fairly 
modest objectives which she relied on the secretary and the executive to pursue 
within the department. She felt her agenda and that of the secretary were very 
similar and for that reason she could be confident in relying on him more than 
other ministers might have. She did not perceive that the department had its 
own agenda and she saw no reason to be sceptical about its ability to deliver 
what was required. In her description of the role of advisers she did not list the 
control functions of supervising or orienting the department or an active role in 
policy making, except in the pre-election period. 
Junior Minister White did not feel comfortable with the word 'control'. He had 
a corporate view of the relationship between a minister and the department. 
He saw the minister as 'the executive chairman of the whole show': 
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I'd like to think of the relationship that we had as an extension of my office into 
the department. We had ideas to contribute, and we'd like to hear from them as 
well .... I had a philosophy that was totally corporate, not just within my office 
but within the department which I still to this day would like to think didn't 
represent any real threat to them .... That's not to say at times that I didn't think 
that they were never going to try and get one up on me ... and they probably 
succeeded! I'm sure that's true with every single minister, much as ministers 
would not care to admit it. But I really can't think of any damaging examples 
where ... it was a battle of ministerial versus departmental control over a 
decision. 
He described the role of his advisers as to 'act as a filter to me from the 
department'. He did not describe a policy making role for his advisers. 
Delegation 
The scope of the role advisers played also depended on their minister's 
approach to delegation. Some were given high levels of delegation to act with 
the minister's authority, while others were far more constrained in what they 
could do. Those who were most autonomous were those in the three central 
offices (Prime Minister's office, Treasurer's office and Finance Minister's office). 
For advisers in line offices the amount of delegation the minister gave them 
affected how extensively they could be involved in policy making activities. 
At one extreme, amongst line ministers' offices, some advisers were given 
almost complete delegation to run their program areas. This could occur within 
a portfolio where the minister chose to become heavily involved in some areas 
and left other areas to advisers to run, or where ministers generally delegated a 
great deal of authority. It sometimes occurred with an extremely busy cabinet 
minister, or one with several portfolios. Adviser 14, a 'very active' adviser, 'ran' 
a particular policy area for many years in this way, working closely with the 
department, and acting as the de facto decision maker. The department knew 
and accepted that the minister had delegated the area to this adviser while he 
concentrated on other areas of the portfolio. Ironically while advisers in these 
situations had great freedom to act, they could be constrained in their impact 
on policy making. They could not make major changes, because the authority 
delegated to them only stretched so far. They required the minister's 
involvement and interest to make changes which entailed going to cabinet and 
this could be difficult to get. It could be hard to get access to the minister. 
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In other cases highly delegating ministers were preoccupied with political 
difficulties or with extremely marginal electorates. Two other ministers 
delegated to their staff because they were either unwilling or unable to get too 
involved. One of them was said by his department to 'want a quiet life' and the 
other reportedly had difficulty understanding the portfolio. In the latter case, 
his adviser claimed that the ministerial office had a free rein to form policy 
opinions, deal with other offices and with outside bodies virtually without 
reference to the minister (A25). This was rare and perhaps due to the highly 
technical nature of the policy. 
Ministers generally felt that such high levels of delegation were legitimate. 
When asked if she thought that type of arrangement was appropriate Minister 
Purple said 'yes, if that was what the minister wanted'. However she felt that 
departmental secretaries should be able to meet the minister from time to time 
with no adviser present, so that if the department had grave concerns about 
what was happening in an area that was run by an adviser, they would have 
the ability to raise it with the minister. 
At the other extreme were ministers whose style limited the role their advisers 
could play, because they refused to delegate much authority to them. There 
were two examples of this type of relationship in the study. Both involved 
junior ministers. Adviser 4 and Adviser 6 had active role conceptions and 
sufficient policy competence to be 'very active' advisers. However they were 
only classed as 'active' because they were constrained by a lack of delegation. 
One of the ministers - Minister Red -had been involved in a number of 
controversies and, perhaps as a result, did not trust her staff or her department. 
She read draft legislation in detail (and claimed to find grammatical mistakes) 
and wanted to read all the letters that came into her office. To her frustration 
neither her office nor the department would allow her to do this. She was a 
slow decision maker, refusing to sign anything she had not personally read and 
fully understood. (This can be compared to the position of other ministers who 
stated that they would never sign anything their sta.ffhad not read.) Adviser 4 
had previously been 'very active' when working for Minister Orange, playing 
many of the 'independent' policy roles. She had much energy, many new 
policy ideas, and a wide network through which to pursue them. However she 
found Minister Red to be too cautious and untrusting to allow her to play a 
'very active' policy role. 
Most ministers fell into a middle ground in which they maintained their 
involvement, but they delegated sufficient authority to enable their advisers to 
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be 'very active' in dealing with the department and in policy making. In some 
cases these ministers were involved personally; in other cases they left a great 
deal to their staff but they insisted that staff consult them and obtain their 
authorisation for actions they took or had taken. These ministers were very 
much the directors and authorisers of action though it was conducted by others. 
Advisers described these as very productive arrangements where they could 
progress issues effectively as they had the delegation to do so, and could obtain 
the minister's imprimatur when they needed it. 
2. The minister's needs 
The second factor which was important in defining how active advisers were in 
steering policy was the minister's needs. Their needs related to the portfolio 
and how they organised their office. 
Portfolio 
A major finding of the study is that advisers in the three central offices (Prime 
Minister's office, Treasurer's office and Finance Minister's office) played distinct 
roles to those in 'line' offices. Thus portfolio is a crucial factor in defining 
advisers' roles. However the following analysis applies only to advisers in 'line' 
portfolios. 
When asked what he saw as the role of the adviser, Minister Silver said that it 
depended entirely on the portfolio you had. He had had five portfolios in 
seven and a half years. The nature of the portfolio in which advisers worked 
could drive or limit the scope of the role played. This depended on the scope 
and demands of the portfolio; and the nature of the minister's authority within 
the portfolio. 
i) scope and demands of the portfolio 
The scope and demands of the portfolio could greatly affect the role that it was 
possible for advisers to play and the role they needed to play. Some portfolios 
did not lend themselves to major policy development. Some were limited in 
policy terms (Minister Purple described policy in one of her portfolios as 'like 
eating a piece of cardboard between two pieces of stale bread'); while in other 
portfolios the policy settings were in place and it was simply a matter of 
delivering on them ( eg Minister Black). The demands of portfolios varied 
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according to the complexity of the policy area; the level of conflict within the 
policy community and the political arena; and the number and complexity of 
the lobby groups associated with it. 
Portfolios with extensive involvement with state governments (such as 
community services or health) tended to require 'very active' advisers, 
compared to a department which was fairly self contained with its own service 
delivery (such as social security). One minister described his four years with an 
extremely controversial portfolio (aboriginal affairs). In implementing the 
party's agenda in that area he met resistance at every level including amongst 
his own colleagues. He had to work very closely with state governments and 
there was a confrontation with a state minister 'almost daily'. In that portfolio 
he relied heavily on his advisers who had a very significant role in policy 
development and who were needed to push the agenda and to participate in 
the many political fights he had to undertake. They worked closely together 
with the department in 'hand to hand combat' with other political players. Four 
of the ten 'very active' advisers worked in portfolios with major 
Commonwealth-State components. 
Another important difference was between spending portfolios and policy 
portfolios. Spending portfolios required far more work for advisers in dealing 
with other ministerial offices, especially working with the three central offices, 
because of their need to win money or avoid cuts in cabinet, especially at 
Budget time. Advisers in spending portfolios were likely to be far more active 
in their policy roles for this reason. (Virtually all 'very active' advisers in the 
study worked in spending portfolios). 
The demands of a portfolio could also change over time. A r_ninister who held 
one portfolio for seven years, Minister Crimson, reported that he needed 
different types of advisers as the 'health' of the portfolio changed. At first it 
was a stand-alone department with considerable policy prominence. At this 
time he had a senior adviser with technical abilities, who was not a great 
networker. As the portfolio came more and more under attack from the 
economic departments and became subsumed into a large mega department, he 
needed an adviser who could promote his cause in Caucus; who had the skills 
to win intra- and interdepartmental battles; and who could build support in the 
Prime Minister's office. His new senior adviser had these abilities. Later the 
role of his senior adviser again changed, as the minister became more and more 
desperate to fulfil his agenda and to prevent further cuts. 
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ii) the nature of the minister's authority within the portfolio 
There were different requirements of advisers in senior and junior ministers' 
offices. Some of the most energetic advisers in the study were in junior 
minister's offices. There were two reasons why they had to be. Often they 
reported that they did not receive the response and service they desired from 
the department (because the minister was not accorded the same priority or 
quality of personnel as the senior minister) and thus spent much energy in 
supervising, directing and mobilising the department. They also often needed 
to secure the agreement of other ministers for the minister's decisions, and this 
required extensive negotiation and consultation with other offices. Some also 
had ministers who were very energetic and ambitious. 
By contrast, advisers in senior ministers' offices often had less contested 
authority both with the department and in their dealings with other ministers. 
The standing of the minister and the portfolio within cabinet could make a big 
difference to how much time advisers spent fighting, either to achieve an 
agenda or to stave off the directives of more powerful ministers. 
Where ministers did not have clear authority over their policy area, or where 
the authority over the policy area was shared, their advisers often had to play 
far more active roles than in portfolios where the minister had undisputed 
authority. Such situations could be very difficult, especially where ministers 
had the portfolio of a 'minister assisting', such as the Minister Assisting the 
Prime Minister on the Status of Women, or the Minister Assisting the Prime 
Minister on Aboriginal Affairs. In such cases not only did the ministers have an 
interest in what was being done by other ministers in their portfolios (and thus 
a need to intervene or influence outcomes over which they had no authority) 
but they also did not have clear authority over the department they were 
dealing with on a daily basis (the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet). Advisers and ministers in these situations reported very strenuous 
roles in supervising, orienting and mobilising the department, active roles in 
policy development and policy making, and important roles in lobbying, 
negotiating and consulting other ministerial offices, especially the Prime 
Minister's office. 
It was not only junior ministers who could find themselves without clear 
authority over their policy area. A classic senior portfolio in this situation was 
the Environment portfolio, where the minister had the job of influencing 
outcomes in other portfolios, over which he or she had no authority. Much of 
the advisers' work involved negotiating with other ministerial offices and they 
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often played 'very active' roles in policy making. Four of the ten 'very active' 
advisers and six of the eleven 'active' advisers worked for ministers with split 
or contested authority. Only one of the 'passive/reactive' advisers was in this 
situation. 
Roles within the office 
For some advisers, the role the minister required of them within the office 
constrained how active they were in steering policy. Four advisers who were 
very experienced, knowledgeable and had active role conceptions were limited 
by their responsibilities as senior advisers (A35, A30, A05, A28). Two advisers 
(A26, A17) had special party political roles which limited their policy activity; 
they were both classified as 'passive/reactive'. 
The adviser 
In addition to the requirements of ministers and the demands of portfolios, how 
the role was played also depended a great deal on what the adviser brought to 
the job. Several advisers commented that the role was 'whatever you made it'; 
that in many ways advisers defined their own roles. There were two factors 
which either drove or limited the role they played: their policy competence and 
their role conception. 
1. Policy competence 
Advisers' level of policy competence greatly influenced how active they could 
be in working with departments and in policy making. Public servants 
particularly commented on the fact that the scope of the role played by advisers 
depended on their policy knowledge and abilities. 
A crucial aspect of policy competence was subject matter expertise. Eight of the 
ten 'very active' advisers were subject matter experts. They usually had a 
background in either the public service (where they had been working on the 
policy issues for some years) or were activists or academics, who also could 
bring significant subject matter knowledge to the job. However it was possible 
to be 'very active' without subject matter expertise. Two of the 'very active' 
advisers and many of the 'active' advisers had general expertise in policy 
making. They often had a wide range of experience in government and policy 
making either as public servants or as long time advisers. These 'generalists' 
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could be highly valued by ministers and frequently moved with the minister 
from portfolio to portfolio. Their experience, basic skills and general 
understanding of policy making and political processes, enabled them to play 
'very active' roles even in portfolios which were new to them. 
By contrast, several advisers were constrained in the roles they played by their 
(sometimes self admitted) lack of policy competence. Three of those classified 
as 'passive/reactive' (A03, A24, A17) played limited policy roles partly because 
they did not have enough policy knowledge, even though two of them worked 
for very driving ministers with policy agendas. They also had difficulty 
directing the work of departments and could not 'share' policy roles with them 
as they lacked sufficient experience and knowledge. 
2. Role conception 
An adviser's role conception was an important factor in the scope of the role 
they played in steering policy. Role conception refers to what they saw as the 
appropriate role of an adviser and what they personally hoped to achieve in the 
job. 
Appropriate role 
'Very active' advisers in the study typically saw all the aspects of the steering 
policy role as not only appropriate for advisers, but as their responsibility. 
They expected to be highly directive of departments and to play the 
'independent' policy roles of agenda setting, linking, mobilising, bargaining and 
delivering. It was their responsibility to 'deliver' policy outcomes and to ensure 
the department was also 'delivering'. By contrast other advisers did not see all 
of the aspects of the steering policy role as appropriate, and felt some elements 
were the responsibility of departments. 
Two 'passive/reactive' advisers were unusual in having limited role 
conceptions based on the fact that they were public servants. (They represented 
a small proportion of the 22 advisers who came from the public service.) 
Adviser 23 saw his position as 'really a de facto additional departmental 
position in the office' and thus felt there were limits on what it was appropriate 
for him to do. He avoided most contact with political aspects of the job such as 
dealing with Caucus and lobby groups. Both Adviser 23 and Adviser 29 said 
the reason they took the job was because they 'wanted a change from working 
in the bureaucracy', and Adviser 29 added she felt it would look good on her 
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CV. They identified themselves as public servants rather than as advisers and 
tended to down-play their policy role. Adviser 23 described his role as 'a 
facilitator and filterer rather than a policy maker' though he admitted 
'contributing ideas to the policy process' and substantially influencing some 
submissions before they reached the office. Adviser 29 saw her role as 'a mix of 
handmaiden and real policy adviser' but stated that most of the policy she 
undertook was 'implementing what was there', 'fixing things within the current 
framework' and facilitating the contact of the minister and the department. 
These limited role conceptions constrained the roles they played in working 
with the department and in policy making. 
Motivation 
The second aspect of role conception was motivation. Advisers who came to 
the job with either specific policy agendas they wished to pursue or influence 
agendas tended to be 'very active' in steering policy. 
Some advisers came to the job with a strong commitment to particular policy 
agendas and to the realisation of specific policy goals. They were often involved 
in mobilising and implementation in their drive to ensure change occurred. 
These advisers tended to be either activists or public servants. Activists came 
into ministers' offices as specialists and often retained strong links to their lobby 
organisations. Their commitment to certain policy agendas was often separate 
from and deeper than their commitment to the minister. They often saw 
themselves as working in government for a short interval only and thus were 
very driven to achieve certain outcomes as quickly as possible. Some advisers 
from the public service had worked in one area for a long time and were 
strongly committed to realising a policy agenda in that area. They too 
described 'very active' roles for themselves in working with the department and 
in policy making. 
Some 'very active' and 'active' advisers had an influence agenda, which 
emphasised that the party, the minister or the adviser ought to be influencing 
government and directing policy. Some advisers who were recruited through 
party connections were very driven by party goals and the sense that they as 
advisers had a one off opportunity to influence government on behalf of the 
party or to 'make their mark'. They had a strong commitment to Labor in 
government and were driven to take or make opportunities to create changes. 
Some of these advisers were also public servants, who held strong views about 
the importance of executive dominance of the bureaucracy. Their experience 
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within the bureaucracy had left them with a determination as advisers to 
ensure that ministers prevailed and to take opportunities to create change 
(some expressed frustration about the pace and opportunities for change they 
experienced while working in the public service). 
By contrast, three of the advisers classed as 'passive/reactive' (A09, A24, A26) 
did not describe themselves as aiming to prevail over the department. They 
tended to accept the department's advice with little challenge and thus can be 
seen as lacking an influence agenda. 
Thus many factors interacted to define the scope of the role advisers played in 
steering policy. These related to the minister, the portfolio and the adviser him 
or herself. The final section of the chapter briefly describes the characteristics of 
the three different types of advisers identified in the study. 
'VERY ACTIVE' ADVISERS 
Some of the characteristics of the 'very active' advisers appear in Table 5.4. 
'Very active' advisers occupied all positions and were mainly public servants 
and activists. One was an academic who had worked as a state adviser and 
was recruited through political channels. 
Table 5.4: Characteristics of 'very active' advisers 
background expertise position yrs as party 
adviser member 
A11 public servant specialist M 2 y 
A14 public servant specialist Cons 5.1 y 
[+2.6]# 
A22 public servant specialist A 1.75 n 
[+1.3]# 
A41 public servant specialist SA 3 y 
A01 public servant specialist A 2.75 y 
A15 public servant generalist A 5 y 
A07 activist specialist SA 2.1 n 
A08 activist specialist Cons 1.1 n 
A33 activist generalist A 4.9 y 
A27 academic seecialist Cons 2.2 y 
AA = assistant adviser A = adviser SA = senior adviser Cons = consultant 
# periods in brackets indicate periods of employment as a DLO, continuous with work as an adviser 
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Of the six public servants, five were policy specialists in that they had been 
working on the same policy issues that they were now advising on either in the 
department the minister was responsible for or in another department (All, 
Al4, A22, A41, AOl). The other (A15) was a generalist who originally worked 
as a policy specialist, but had moved to a new portfolio. 
Of the activists, two had come directly from lobby groups to work as advisers 
dealing with the same policy issues (A07, AOS). The third had been originally 
recruited in this way, but had since worked as an adviser in two different 
portfolios outside his original policy expertise (he had become a generalist) 
(A33). He brought to the job not only his experience working with community 
organisations and lobby groups, but also almost 5 years of experience working 
as an adviser to two ministers. 
Specialist policy knowledge was clearly important to an adviser's ability to play 
a 'very active' role, but it was not essential. As the two generalists indicate, a 
wealth of experience in policy making generally, at a community, departmental 
and ministerial level, could also equip an adviser to play a 'very active' role in 
steering policy. (Both generalists had worked for around five years as an 
adviser). 
Another important factor was partisanship. Most of these advisers were party 
members, and were driven by a desire to see party policies implemented and to 
ensure that the party dominated the policy agenda. The three 'very active' 
advisers who were not members of the party had quite a different orientation. 
These three (A22, A07, AOS) were strongly committed to particular policy 
agendas that happened to be part of ALP policy. The two activists in this 
category saw their period as advisers as short term opportunities to achieve 
some of their policy agendas, after which they would return to pursuing these 
ideas as activists. The public servant who was not a party member had worked 
for more than ten years on a particular set of policy issues in his department; he 
was committed to the issues first and government second. He could not 
conceive of working as an adviser in another portfolio. He saw his future as 
returning to the department to continue pursuing 'good policy' in the area. 
All except one of the 'very active' advisers worked for ministers who desired 
political control and saw contest in the minister-department relationship. 
For most of these advisers, factors relating to the minister, the portfolio and 
themselves all drove them strongly towards playing a 'very active' role. 
Adviser 11, for example, was a young party member from the department, who 
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was not only highly policy competent but strongly committed to the party and 
to the minister's right to direct the department. Her minister (Minister Orange) 
was committed to certain policy goals and made it clear to her when she started 
the job that 'he was prepared to become unpopular in the department and have 
disputes' in pursuit of those goals. He would often ring her at home to 
complain 'we're not driving the department hard enough!' The portfolio had 
many complex Commonwealth-State programs, about which there was 
constant conflict; and she spent much time fighting off threats by Finance to cut 
program funding. Thus she faced the expectation and the need to play 'very 
active' roles in steering policy, and she had the capacity and desire to play such 
roles. 
'ACTIVE' ADVISERS 
Some of the characteristics of the 'active' advisers appear in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Characteristics of 'active' advisers 
background expertise position yrs as party 
adviser member 
A12 public servant specialist A 4.75 y 
A25 public servant specialist SA 1.5 y 
A37 public servant generalist Cons 5.6 y 
A18 public servant generalist A 5 y 
A35 public servant generalist SA 1.7 n 
A30 public servant generalist SA 7.5 y 
[+3]# 
A06 activist specialist AA 2.5 n 
A13 journalist specialist A 2.2 n 
A02 state public political SA 3 y 
servant 
A04 private sector political A 3.25 y 
A19 erivate sector generalist Cons 2.5 y 
AA = assistant adviser A = adviser SA = senior adviser Cons = consultant 
# periods in brackets indicate periods of employment as a DLO, continuous with work as an adviser 
'Active' advisers occupied all positions and most were party members. In 
contrast to the 'very active' group, the public servants in the 'active' category 
were more likely to be generalists than specialists. Two had 'political' 
backgrounds in the sense they had been recruited through party channels and 
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were not policy specialists (A02, A04). Yet unlike many 'political' advisers, both 
had role conceptions which drove them to take 'active' roles in policy. The four 
public servants who were generalists displayed high levels of policy 
competence: three had been long time advisers of between five and seven and a 
half years' standing (A37, A18, A30), and the other was a very senior and 
experienced public servant (A35). 
Most of these advisers could have played a 'very active' role but something held 
them back. For example, Adviser 12 was a policy specialist from the public 
service who was highly partisan, had an active role conception and had been 
'very active' with his previous minister. However his current minister's attitude 
to the department constrained him: the minister had an edict that 'Thou Shalt 
Get On With The Department' and he 'stepped back' from major conflict with 
the department. 
Adviser 18 was very experienced, had an active role conception, and worked 
for a driving, policy-oriented minister. He had been 'very active' in previous 
adviser positions but was not classified as 'very active' in this study because his 
minister decided to concentrate his energies on another part of the portfolio and 
specifically asked the adviser to 'play dead' in his policy area. This meant 
Adviser 18 played strong roles in working with the department, but was not 
authorised to perform the 'independent' policy roles of agenda setting, linking, 
mobilising, bargaining and delivering, which are aimed at creating new policy 
directions. 
Adviser 2 worked for a senior minister who was engaged in major policy 
reform. He was highly partisan and motivated to influence government. He 
was very involved in generating new policy ideas and active in the full range of 
'independent' policy roles. However he was classed as 'active' because his role 
conception held him back from extensive involvement in the department's 
activities: he believed his job was to set directions and leave the department to 
comply; and that it was not his job to get involved in the detail of programs and 
policy implementation. Thus while he was 'very active' in his policy making 
roles, his departmental work was more limited. Adviser 35 and Adviser 30 
were senior advisers to very senior ministers, and this role limited their 
proactive policy work. 
'PASSIVE/REACTIVE' ADVISERS 
Some of the characteristics of the 'passive/reactive' advisers appear in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6: Characteristics of 'passive/reactive' advisers 
background expertise position yrs as party 
adviser member 
A29 public servant specialist Cons 1.3 n 
A23 public servant specialist A 2 n 
A03 public servant specialist AA 1.5 n 
A26 public servant generalist A 3 n 
A05 public servant generalist SA 10.1 y 
A28 public servant generalist SA 1.8 n 
A24 electorate officer political A 2.25 y 
A17 private sector political A 4.1 y 
A09 activist specialist A 0.3 y 
A16 academic seecialist Cons 1 n 
M = assistant adviser A = adviser SA = senior adviser Cons = consultant 
The 'passive/reactive' group were in all positions and were quite diverse. Sixty 
per cent were not party members. Their reasons for playing a 'passive/reactive' 
role in steering policy varied. 
Some had a limited role conception in relation to their work with departments 
(A29, A23). They saw themselves was as a filterer or checker of the 
department's submissions to the minister. They saw the department as the 
main policy engine and that their work involved supervising the department; 
evaluating the department's work and being an alternative source of advice to 
the minister. They described their role as ensuring information flow between 
the minister and the department and where there were differences, to bring the 
minister and the department together to resolve them. 
Four had limited steering policy roles because of their other roles in the office: 
Adviser 5 and Adviser 28 were senior advisers with mainly management roles; 
and Adviser 26 and Adviser 17 had important political responsibilities which 
limited their policy work. Three worked for ministers who did not see any 
contest with the department or who were not prepared to fight with the 
department {A26, A05, A16). One young adviser had an active role conception 
but was too inexperienced to be able to realise her ambitions (A03). Adviser 24 
lacked policy experience and felt his program areas had little scope for policy 
reform. 
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This brief description of the three types of advisers demonstrates that the 
reasons why advisers played more or less active roles in steering policy were 
complex, and involved a number of factors coming together. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter described the variation in advisers' behaviour and distinguished 
three different types of advisers based on their work in steering policy: 'very 
active', 'active' and 'passive/reactive' advisers. The chapter also discussed the 
factors which influenced advisers' behaviour. These were the minister's style 
and needs; and the adviser's policy competence and role conception. 
Implicit in much commentary about the growing role of advisers is an 
assumption that they all behave in the same way. This thesis reveals the 
complexity of the phenomenon and the dangers of generalising about advisers' 
work. It is important to recognise the contingency and particularity of advisers' 
behaviour, and that there are subsets of advisers who act differently. 
The thesis now examines in detail how advisers performed the steering policy 
role, first exploring how advisers worked with departments (Chapter Six); and 
then how they engaged in policy making (Chapter Seven). It largely focuses on 
the work of the 'very active' and 'active' advisers in the study. 
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She 
Engaging the department: 
Political-bureaucratic relationships 
Tiris chapter examines how ministerial advisers in the study engaged with 
departments. Tiris engagement was fundamental to political-bureaucratic 
relationships in the Keating years. The study challenges the dominant image of 
relationships between advisers and public servants as essentially cooperative 
and complementary. It first describes the three roles played by advisers in 
engaging with departments. It identifies some different responses by public 
servants to working with advisers. Finally, it analyses closely the dynamics 
within the relationships between advisers and senior public servants and 
considers whether, as some writers suggest, there is an Australian model of 
political-bureaucratic relationships which is essentially cooperative and 
complementary. The study does not support this image of the relationship, and 
presents an alternative model of competitive and overlapping roles, producing 
fundamental tensions which must be managed in government. 
Importance of the relationship 
The relationship between ministerial advisers and departments has become 
critical in conducting business in government. Its importance is evident in 
Hollway's image of ministerial offices as 'the powerpoint that makes the day-to-
day connection between a minister's interests and the work of departments' 
(1996:133). 
Ministers realised that the quality of the relationship was critical to what they 
could hope to achieve in government and set high priority on advisers dealing 
effectively with the department. Most had delegated the ongoing conduct of 
that relationship to their advisers. Minister Blue saw it as crucial that advisers 
had 'a real capacity to liaise with the department in an effective way': 
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You need people on your staff that know exactly where to go and how to 
extract the relevant information and advice from the relevant people with a 
minimal amount of fuss. And also to do it in a way which keeps the trust and 
confidence and good humour between the office and the department. It 
requires a real set of skills too. Someone who is technically and intellectually 
very good but personally very bad in terms of their relations with others - is 
always peremptory or demanding - that can be a tum off for people at the other 
end and mean that you just don't get the service that you need. It sounds 
boring, but done well, matters crucially, done badly it's disastrous. 
Minister Orange said it was the adviser's job to do 'most of the work, the 
interchange' and to 'massage that relationship ... so it is not detrimental to the 
minister and the government'. 
Although they may not have been happy about it and would have preferred to 
have a direct relationship with the minister, most public servants appeared to 
accept that advisers were the intermediaries within their relationships with 
ministers and that they had to work well with them. It was a key part of the job 
of the senior public servant to participate in these relationships and to ensure 
they were positive, as Public Servant 8 stressed: 
Your relationships with advisers are absolutely critical. It's really, really 
important to have a good working relationship - ... being able to establish faith 
with the ministerial advisers that your advice is legit and that you're not hiding 
things from them and you're not putting a particular spin on things or you're 
not ignoring their views .... And if you alienated one of those advisers? 
You're buggered. 
Minister Grey observed: 'They've got to work well with advisers!! If they want a 
good working relationship with their minister!'. 
Ministers judged advisers by how well they conducted these relationships. 
Advisers were also aware that it was through their relationships with public 
servants that they could exert influence, as Adviser 17 explained: 
It is very difficult to have control of policy as an adviser. There's armies of 
bureaucrats versus you, and your time, and you're one of a kind. You can only 
develop some influence over the policy area by your relationship with the 
bureaucrats. 
Just like the public servants on the other side of the relationship, they felt the 
effects of poor relations could be disastrous. This was because they recognised 
they were dependent on the department's resources; Adviser 14 said: 'If you get 
the department offside you're gone. You won't be able to get anything done.' It 
was also because they felt that departments could actively obstruct them: 
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Your relationships with senior public servants are absolutely critical. If they are 
not on your agenda they'll kill you. Go slow. Block you. There are many ways 
they can do it and I don't just mean theSES and top people, Imean the branch 
heads too (A02). 
Yet while its ongoing conduct was in the hands of ministerial advisers and 
senior public servants, the relationship was largely defined by the minister's 
approach. One very experienced public servant explained: 
If it's dear the minister has a good relationship with the department and trusts 
it, then the office will have a good relationship with us. If the minister 
conversely doesn't trust the department, or thinks it's incompetent or whatever, 
then you won't have a good relationship. If the minister is standing back (like 
Minister Yellow did) then it is a question of whether the office has faith in the 
department or not (POl). 
How critical the minister's approach was in defining the relationship between 
advisers and public servants can be seen in two examples. 
In the first, an adviser had worked on the same subject area for three different 
ministers and had always had good relations with the department. An 
important part of her style as an adviser was to take what she called a 'softly 
softly' approach with the department and to be conscious of the constraints the 
department operated under. However the third minister she worked for 
(Minister Scarlet) had a driving, aggressive approach to the department, which 
he felt was resisting his agenda and 'had to be whipped into shape'. Despite 
her history of good relations, the pressure she and the department were put 
under by this minister turned many of her relationships sour. She explained: 
'I've always taken the approach of letting things go when nasty things are said. 
I've just taken it and said OK. But lately I've had some people being very rude 
to me and I've started biting back.' 
By contrast three advisers who worked for another minister reported he had an 
edict in his office that 'Thou Shalt Get On with the Department' (because of 
problems in his last portfolio). Though he was an active minister with his own 
policy agenda, his advisers were told to pull back from major conflict with the 
department. If a disagreement occurred with the department the minister 
himself always stepped in. They felt this undermined their ability to produce 
the outcomes he wanted. 
It is also important to recognise that departments were not monolithic. Senior 
public servants varied in how they responded to advisers, and this greatly 
affected how relationships operated. Within the small sample of ten senior 
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public servants in the study, four distinct approaches to working with advisers 
were identified: a cooperative approach, a responsive approach, a competitive 
approach and a powerful approach. These different responses are also 
discussed in the chapter. 
ADVISERS' ROLES WITHIN THE MINISTER-DEPARTMENT 
RELATIONSHIP 
In Chapter Four it was argued that advisers performed four key roles within 
the minister-department relationship: supervising, orienting and mobilising the 
department, and providing an alternative source of advice. This work enabled 
the minister to engage the bureaucracy and thus contributed to political control. 
The following section explores how advisers in the study performed the roles of 
supervising, orienting and mobilising the department. 
Supervising the department: the adviser as gatekeeper 
Advisers supervised the department's activities in several ways. The most 
important way was by the adviser checking and evaluating all the documents 
that came to the minister from the department. Advisers could also request 
reports from the department on what it was doing. Apart from these more 
formal means, advisers could generally require, in their day to day 
conversations with senior public servants, that they be kept informed of what 
was happening in their program areas. However the core of this role was the 
scrutiny of documents. 
Advisers had accrued considerable administrative authority in their dealings 
with departments. No brief went to the minister without being read and 
commented on by an adviser first. Advisers had the authority to check and 
question the department's work and to approve it to go forward to the minister. 
Each adviser had responsibility for scrutinising documents coming from the 
department in their designated policy areas. While some advisers had 
'barrowfuls' and 'mountains' of papers coming into their in-trays, others did not 
have as much and rarely saw a brief that they were not already very familiar 
with. 
For most advisers, the task involved devising a set of questions about each 
brief; it was in answering these questions that flaws or gaps in the document 
might be exposed. However because of the volume many felt they could not 
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The F AS ap<>!o~!;lse:a he was wrong, but it made me very worried. 
What about all the other .,,u,uu."'"'""' I How many were 
Some ministers had high eX]:>ec:tatlOrlS 
adviser 1"CT,.nrron 
she could answer any question had and if she could not, 
growled 'then why you "OK sign"?' However to achieve this level 
of understanding took time and interaction with department. 1his 
conflicted with the need to deal with briefs promptly and not them up in 
the minister's office. 
Ministers in the study saw this as an extremely important part the adviser's 
role, but their needs varied. One senior minister/ Minister Blue, only needed 
his advisers' views to add to his own: 
I wanted the submissions from the department to be scrutinised and my 
attention drawn to anything that was iffy, unsustainable or dopey or 
misconceived. I certainly didn't want my staff to sit there all day long 
summarising submissions for me and telling me [what was in them]. But 
because they'd be by definition devoting more time to each given thing than I 
would, what I wanted was the benefit of their reactions as to whether the 
submission was either good, bad or indifferent. 
1 The pay TV inquiry in 1993 involved much discussion about what was meant by the term 'OK 
to sign' and how much responsibility advisers had to take for making this notation. Pearce's 
(1993) report rejected the idea that it indicated the adviser approved of the contents of the brief. 
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Other ministers were far more dependent on their advisers' evaluations, either 
because of a lack of time or a lack of knowledge. It was surprising how often 
ministers admitted to not reading the briefs themselves. Minister Black said: 
Advisers need to be able to grab a big brief and condense it to a short note. 
This is a very useful role ... because often there is just so much detail that it is 
not really necessary to know and you simply have no time to consider it 
yourself. 
Minister Purple admitted: 'I didn't have the time or space to read all the 
documents that came to me. So I relied heavily on rigorous scrutiny by my 
staff. I wouldn't sign anything they hadn't read first.' Minister Grey admitted 
to being heavily reliant on his advisers' scrutiny of briefs: 
Ministers haven't got time to read all the pieces of paper that come to them. 
You rely heavily on your staff and put a lot of trust in them. . .. They read all 
the briefs and give you a short precis on what's in it and what points to look at . 
... I had to read all the minutes of course, but they'd tell me what they were 
about. I couldn't possibly have operated effectively without my advisers 
working there.2 
However this was of great concern to some public servants in the study. Public 
Servant 9 was not happy about ministers' dependence on advisers to 'interpret' 
the department's work: 
The classic bureaucrat's concern is that the actual advice gets through, the 
advice in its original form as opposed to a potentially distorted shorthand 
version of it. I think that is the trouble, there is so much paper ministers need 
to read, that more and more they are dependent on advisers' summaries .... I 
suppose our desire is that all angles get represented, that the thing is presented 
in its complexity not just with some particular features pulled out. 
Public Servant 7 felt it was dangerous that departments could not see or 
comment on the accuracy of the adviser's notes: 'They often get it wrong 
through ignorance, lack of experience ... and no one ever knows'. He claimed 
that occasionally when he had seen advisers' notes to the minister he had been 
'horrified at the mistakes and errors'. 
From the adviser's point of view it was crucial that their comments be removed 
from briefs before they were returned to the department. They did not want 
the department to know where they had opposed its recommendations. 
Adviser 32, a long time adviser from the public service, said: 
2 This created problems for Minister for the Environment Ros Kelly when she signed off on a 
booklet for schools, the content of which she later discovered she did not agree with. It had to 
be pulped. 
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Departments are always suspicious of what you are saying to the minister of 
course .... The department always knew I put my own advice to the minister on 
top of theirs and they never knew what my advice was. They knew I was smart 
enough never to let that be revealed. 
Yet others preferred to be 'up front' with the department when they took a 
different position and rang to inform them they would be opposing their 
recommendations. They felt this transparency kept trust in the relationship 
(AlB, AlO). 
Another complaint expressed by public servants was that some advisers 
scrutinised departmental documents too closely. Public Servant 4 complained 
that with one long time adviser, he could exchange six to ten telephone calls a 
day about documents. He was critical of her approach: 
She at times behaved more like a public servant than an adviser and would 
want to query very fine details of program matters which, really, she didn't 
need to involve herself in. [It was] partly because she was such a subject matter 
expert, and had often more corporate memory than the people in the public 
service .... I don't think really think it is a good use of an adviser's time, nor 
appropriate given the division of roles, to get too much into details of program 
administration- that is fundamentally a role of the public service. 
However he did see some positive outcomes to her approach: 
While at times that seemed excessive, and occasionally irritating, because I had 
a division to run, on balance I appreciated that level of contact because it meant 
that we did have confidence that the minister's office knew precisely what was 
going on .... They knew our views, and we knew their views. There was never 
anything hidden or misunderstood. 
He stressed that most advisers he dealt with lacked the expertise to delve into 
that level of detail, and he added: 'I suspect that public servants by and large 
would react unfavourably if they did.' Yet a public servant's power to restrict 
an adviser's involvement was limited. Another FAS who worked with the same 
adviser tried, and failed, to cut her out, as the adviser recalled: 
He said to me 'you know too much'. It used to irritate him that I would ask 
questions [about briefs]. Often he tried to get things up around me but of 
course they always landed back on my desk- if it's your area of policy, it 
always comes to you (A14). 
From the other side, advisers were often critical of the number of mistakes they 
found in the department's work. Adviser 19 complained that: 'They can all put 
up duds and very often do .... In all the areas I look after there's a real problem 
with quality. They send up so much poor work, with so many mistakes.' 
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Ministers too complained about this. As small mistakes could be very 
damaging to a politician, carefully checking for errors was something they 
relied on their advisers to do.3 
It was extremely difficult for advisers who felt they could not rely on the 
department to do competent work. Adviser 4 dealt with a section which she 
said was 'completely incompetent- it was like McHale's navy!' She gave the 
example of an information booklet the minister was going to launch, which 
came to her for final clearance with 93 errors in it. She ended up performing a 
management role, working on early drafts of letters and minutes, and even 
writing the funding guidelines, but she said: 'I don't blame the bureaucrats ... as 
the area was basically unmanaged.' 
The power of the gatekeeper 
The role of gatekeeper, or intermediary, in the flow of information between the 
minister and the department gave advisers considerable leverage in their 
dealings with officials. They could get things decided or attended to. They 
could delay or block documents going to the minister. They could be an 
advocate for the department. They could stand over ministers to get papers 
signed. The gatekeeper role created an exchange relationship with public 
servants. Adviser 1 explained: 'They had to trade with me, they had to do 
business with me, if they wanted to get things through.' 
The smooth passage of documents through the ministerial office was a benefit 
advisers could exchange within their relationship with the department. The 
consequences of the paperwork not flowing well could be significant. Public 
Servant 3 described these as: 'Costs, frustration, confusion- forever updating 
briefing material ... delays in lodging cabinet submissions .... It can be, and is, 
very, very significant.' Departments needed the cooperation of advisers and 
therefore had incentives to create good relationships with them. It meant that 
advisers could demand to be informed and involved in the department's 
activities. Thus some advisers had created a relationship with the department 
where they were regularly consulted on program matters and gave clearance of 
proposed actions at very detailed levels. 
3 A junior minister (who was often under attack in Parliament) cited the example of the absence 
of the word 'not' in a question time brief. 'If I had read that in Parliament as the department had 
written it I would have been dead. Politically dead' (Red}. 
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Orienting the department: the adviser as surrogate 
The second role advisers had within the minister-department relationship was 
to orient the department to focus on and understand the minister's agenda. 
There were three main aspects. The first was communicating the minister's 
decisions and directions to the department. The second aspect was clarifying 
and reinforcing the minister's agenda within the day to day work of the 
department. The third aspect was taking minor decisions on behalf of the 
minister as his or her surrogate. This role grew over the Labor period, 
according to one long time public servant: 
1 
a 
there's much more contact with advisers and less with ministers. You 
go back to the last of the Fraser or the of the 
Hawke cunr.,.,.,,.,..,,nt 
minister or 
advisers: 
department You should able to what does the minister mean or 
how would the minister respond if this happened or how do you think the 
minister would view this? 
every issue. 
don't have to actually get to the minister on 
Part this role was helping to communicate and clarify the minister's agenda 
for the department. Adviser 7 felt this was important for those lower down in 
the hierarchy who may have this withheld from them by higher officials, 
because 'information is power'. He felt he provided a 'translation point' for 
'big picture'. 
Also very useful to public servants was the adviser's ability take minor 
decisions on the minister's behalf or resolve issues without reference to the 
minister. An adviser to a :minister with two cabinet portfolios explained: 'The 
minister doesn't want to know unless it's a big issue '(A17). This depended on 
relationships between ministers and advisers working well, and there were 
perils if they were not. Public servants could find that 'the minister doesn't 
actually know what you're doing and you think they do' (P06). 
To public servants it was crucial to know if an adviser was an effective 
surrogate: that when they spoke for the minister it reflected the minister's views 
and when they directed the department, it was with the minister's authority. 
1 
to come back to me and say the minister wants to in this 
to hear that and I'm that .... I don't see 
when I spoke to A47 and he 
the minister .... Ministers ... 
to know what's 
their minister. So 
me an answer the answer that I was 
these because trust these 
minds. 
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The role an adviser is ambiguous and difficult without not ~enr"\"<Ari'" 
what their area of policy responsibility is. . .. When end up having two or 
three, each with parts of responsibility, it can be very confusing as to what the 
minister actually wants you to do. Over the last few years there's been lots of 
conversations with other division heads about not knowing what the hell we're 
meant to do . ., as a result of having conflicting messages from different 
advisers. 
A key issue for public servants was whether they could trust that the views and 
directions expressed by the adviser actually reflected the minister's views and 
directions. Because they were communicating directly with ministers, it 
was always something that was present in their thinking. They made constant 
assessments of how dose the adviser was to the minister, how in tune with the 
minister the adviser was and how confident the minister was in the adviser. 
They felt this was something that could be picked up fairly easily. 
An adviser who could be trusted as reflecting the views of the minister was 
'really valuable' (P05). Public Servant 1 recalled an example of this type of 
adviser: 'You knew that if A44 agreed to something, it was 99.9 percent likely 
that the minister agreed to it, because they had a very special relationship - if 
A44 was convinced, the minister was convinced.' In these cases the adviser's 
directions were clearly authoritative. 
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Minister Bronze's offices were never happy. They were always riven 
conflict and I had some very painful experiences early on, where I was 
assuming that they were talking to each and they weren't. And the 
adviser was becoming more and more assertive with me, basically because I 
was the only person she could talk to. I assumed that she was in the loop in the 
office, and that she was speaking with her minister and the issues I was raising 
with her, and we were talking about, were going back to him. I ended up 
getting carpeted by him. Because we were doing things that he wasn't 
approving. 
There were several reasons why this occurred. The adviser was low status in 
the office and had been 'frozen out' by the senior adviser, and the minister had 
not made dear what his agenda was. He was a minister whose advisers 
thought the way they would impress him and gain favour, was 'by turning the 
furniture over'. He actually did not want to 'tum the furniture over' in this 
area, but had never made that dear to the adviser. Public Servant 6's strategy to 
deal with the situation was to go around the adviser and form a direct 
relationship with the minister: 
1 
I said to him, "Well you and I obviously need to spend some time together and 
talk. So I understand what you're after. So can the deal be if I ring and say I 
need to speak that I get time?'' and then it worked quite well. The relationship 
with that adviser wasn't then very good. So I had to do a lot of work to draw 
her back into the process. ... By forcing a relationship between me and the 
minister I actually then created a relationship between the minister and that 
adviser. 
Accepted surrogates? 
An adviser who is giving directions to the department is exercising power. 
Advisers reported that departments only accepted that exercise of power 
conditionally. The authority an adviser needed to direct the department had to 
be established and constantly reinforced, and it could be undermined. Adviser 
1 said a minister could seriously undermine an adviser in meetings with the 
department if he or she did not treat them respectfully or said 'something 
different': 
They watch body language in meetings. It gets down to that. If a minister in a 
meeting has a go at one of his advisers that can be the death of that adviser. 
The department will just watch and they'll get the message, and that can set 
you back two months with the department. 
If the adviser was not accepted by the department as the minister's surrogate, 
the job could be very difficult. For some advisers, being accepted as 
authoritative was an ongoing struggle. They were ever alert to how public 
servants responded to them. Many felt their authority was unstable and had to 
be constantly reaffirmed. 
Senior advisers could reinforce or undermine an adviser's authority with the 
department. One assistant adviser told of her difficulties in a situation where 
the senior adviser actively undermined her authority. In her experience any 
gap in authority could be used by the department as leverage: 
Every so often she'd swoop in and do deals with the department which would 
undermine me. Usually it was when the department was having trouble with 
me - if we were disagreeing over something and had been fighting for a while -
the PAS would call the senior adviser and she'd give up my position. It made 
things very difficult with the department. Often she would do it with complete 
ignorance of the facts .... She'd give in, without finding out from me what the 
story was (A04). 
She felt that this was all part of the senior adviser's tactics, which were to 
concede on policy at times to keep a good relationship with the FAS, because 
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advisers felt that they performed a 'lightning function within the 
relationship between the :minister the department. By this they meant 
criticism was deflected away from the :minister and 
1994). In this sense the adviser could become the focus 
themselves 
the department's 
negative feelings thus preserve the relationship between the :minister and 
the department from being tainted by resentment and conflict. This could be a 
difficult part of the job of adviser. An adviser who worked for a demanding 
minister felt she often had to 'wear ... the department's anger and their pressure 
being taken out on me' (A14). Others said that public servants 'liked to blame 
advisers' for decisions which they were not happy with, believing they 
persuaded the minister not to follow the department's advice. It could be more 
palatable to take this view rather than accept that their advice might have been 
rejected by the minister. 
Delegating to an adviser the power to direct the department could also free 
:ministers to focus their time and energy on higher priority issues. Public 
Servant 7 recalled a minister who wanted to be 'insulated' from many of the 
matters in the portfolio to allow him to focus on a small number of key issues. 
Public Servant 7 had sent up several briefs to the :minister on a matter, which he 
discovered had been delegated entirely by the minister: 
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A crisis arose and ... I went over and started an oral briefing with the 
expectation that he'd absorbed this over a period of some months because we'd 
got instructions back as to what his views were and it suddenly turned out that 
he had never seen any of the pieces of paper we'd put up to him. And all the 
instructions were in fact the instructions of his principal adviser .... The minister 
picked things up very, very quickly in the few minutes we had before the 
meeting with the Prime Minister but it was quite a shock. 
In another example, an adviser 'ran' a policy area in close collaboration with a 
senior public servant, because the minister's main focus was elsewhere in the 
portfolio. Adviser 14 exercised the minister's full authority and the department 
accepted her as the minister's surrogate. She was a consultant who had advised 
three different ministers on one subject area for more than five years. She had 
extensive subject matter knowledge, drawn from working in the public service. 
The public servant she worked with, Public Servant 4, was a F AS who had also 
previously worked as an adviser. Theirs is an example of a close and positive 
relationship between a public servant and an adviser, where they managed the 
policy area together. It was a very effective arrangement for the minister who, 
according to Public Servant 4, 'saw himself, correctly in my view, as a key 
player in economic policy for the government. So for those very understandable 
reasons ... his focus was on the other side of the portfolio.' Public Servant 4 saw 
this as quite appropriate: 
He basically delegated his relationship with the department to Adviser 14 .... 
He was able to do that ... because he had an extraordinarily experienced adviser 
in Adviser 14. And basically without ever saying it explicitly, he said to 
Adviser 14 and me, 'OK you run [the policy area], and I'll put my energies into 
the rest of it'. So he entrusted us, in effect, as a trusted senior public servant 
and a trusted adviser, to keep that set of issues bubbling along without causing 
him too much trouble .... What I am talking about was never explicit, it was 
always implicit, that what he was looking for was to be able to be comfortable 
that that part of his portfolio was operating smoothly without him having to 
keep a close eye on it all the time. 
Adviser 14 found this a difficult situation to be in: 
Basically the minister and the rest of the office works on [-] and I'm the one 
who carries the rest. When the minister came into the portfolio he made this 
very clear to me. He said 'You have to just keep the policy rolling and keep 
everyone off my back.' ... It was difficult because the lobby groups were angry 
that they had no access to the minister and neither did the department really. 
They just had me .... I was very lonely and frustrated. Even I couldn't get in to 
see the minister about things. He really wasn't interested and I had to run 
everything. 
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The adviser did not just 'keep the policy rolling', she negotiated a package of 
new policy in the Budget, working closely with Public Servant 4: 
I was always on the phone to P04 saying we had to push it and take the 
proposals further. Then after I'd done it all I'd go and tell the minister what I'd 
done .... If he didn't approve of what you'd done he'd tell you. And at times 
you'd have to put your case to him. But basically he left it to me. 
What made this work was the extremely close and trusting relationship 
between Adviser 14 and Public Servant 4. Yet this was not unusual according 
to Public Servant 4: 'It is not uncommon to have that degree of close working 
relationship between an adviser and a senior public servant. I had a similar 
relationship to A14's with me, when I was an adviser, with other people in the 
department.' 
Public Servant 4: A cooperative approach 
Public Servant 4 exemplifies a particular response to working with advisers - a 
cooperative approach. (This was one of four distinct approaches to working 
with advisers amongst public servants in the study).4 He and the adviser had a 
shared commitment to the policy agenda and mutual respect. They worked 
cooperatively in developing policy and in operating programs. Their 
relationship was not competitive, in fact Public Servant 4 felt it was a 
relationship 'between equals' where 'she was just as happy to defer to my views 
on certain things as she was to try and impose the view from the office'. There 
was a clearly understood distinction between the two roles: 'The line was 
always drawn at the political.' Otherwise the roles were shared, with Public 
Servant 4 accepting a high level of involvement by the adviser in day to day 
program administration. 
Mobilising the department: the adviser as driver 
The third role advisers had within the minister-department relationship was 
mobilising the department. Mobilising the department to work on the 
minister's key projects or to deliver major policy change is a crucial part of 
directing government and delivering a partisan agenda. While ministers were 
obviously critical in inspiring or driving a department to deliver on that 
agenda, advisers had an important role in day to day mobilisation. 
4 The other three (responsive, competitive and powerful) emerge later in the chapter. 
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Bakvis listed mobilisation as one of the seven categories of executive 'needs' 
that advisers fulfil (1997:86). He described mobilisation in the following way: 
If ministers are to make headway in achieving some of their goals then the task 
involves mobilizing the bureaucracy, or at least critical segments of the 
bureaucracy, to get them onside. Here advisers can play a critical role, if only 
by not alienating key bureaucrats (1997:96). 
He felt mobilisation was one of the four needs which political staff have a 
strong ability to meet compared to other advisory units such as think tanks, 
kitchen cabinets or management consultants (1997:122). The mobilisation role 
of advisers has not been explored in Australian studies even though, as Bakvis 
suggests, it is one of their most important tasks.5 
Some advisers in this study saw mobilisation as a crucial part of their role and 
their daily work. They described it as 'finding a way that the department is 
willing to work on your agenda'. How to achieve this was something they 
readily discussed; it had great moment for them. Whether they were successful 
in this endeavour was critical in being effective advisers. How they sought to 
mobilise the department was seen as an important part of their skill and style as 
an adviser. 
By contrast public servants did not generally mention this element of the 
adviser's job. They did not see themselves as needing to be mobilised, and 
tended to describe themselves as responsive to the minister's agenda. However 
some did discuss instances when their own departments or other departments 
actively resisted the agendas of ministers and advisers. Most ministers 
mentioned their use of advisers to counter resistance by the department or to 
address problems in responsiveness. 
Preliminaries: understanding the department 
Before advisers could successfully mobilise the department they needed to 
understand the department and its agenda or agendas. Minister Red explained: 
A very critical part of the adviser's job is to have a very good working 
knowledge of the people you are working with in the bureaucracy and where 
they are in their own personal history. Because all of them are running another 
agenda .... The advisers need to be like ferrets. 
5 It is also a major contribution to policy making, and thus will also be briefly discussed in 
Chapter Seven. 
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They also needed to understand the forces working against achieving the 
agenda. Adviser 7 felt that to mobilise the department successfully 'you have to 
have a good understanding of the ways the bureaucracy can delay, defer, 
shelve, compromise and do deals ... to subvert or slow down your reforms .... 
They have a million and one subtle ways of dudding you and you'll only know 
that you've been dudded at the end but by then it's too late.' There were several 
strategies for mobilising the department. 
Selling the agenda 
Advisers had an important role in persuading public servants of the merits of 
the minister's agenda. This was described as 'selling' the agenda to the 
department or 'massaging ideas through the department' (Orange). In this way 
advisers could provide the energy or momentum to 'kick off' the department's 
work. Some advisers described this as 'enthusing' public servants about the 
agenda. Public Servant 3 saw this as the most effective way for advisers to 
operate: 
It's a lot more effective where an adviser works in close cahoots with an 
influential person in the department to try to get that person on side and agree 
that it's a good thing to develop - "let's do this" - rather than saying "prepare a 
submission on this, that and the other". 
Driving the agenda 
A 'pushing' or 'driving' role was a very important part of the approach of many 
advisers. They saw it as their role to push progress on key matters and to stay 
on top of the timing and direction of major initiatives. 'Pushing' and 'driving' 
were words that were frequently used by advisers in their discussion of 
relationships with public servants. Yet this could take some skill: advisers 
needed an ability to push the department to achieve things often in unrealistic 
timeframes, without alienating them too much. 
Developing a shared agenda 
A third way of mobilising the department was to create a shared agenda with 
the department. It was possible to engage the department's commitment to the 
minister's agenda by ensuring that agenda also met some of the department's 
objectives. While this could work well there were also often tensions inherent 
in a shared agenda. 
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Adviser 7 was a senior adviser to a reformist minister. He had been an activist 
before working as an adviser and had an enthusiastic approach to policy 
reform. He saw mobilising the department to achieve the minister's reforms as 
his most important task. He put a high priority on 'driving' and 'inspiring' the 
department, and on 'pushing them to be bold': 
To be able to drive the department you have to be very clear as to what you 
want and where you can push it. So I would make a list of people in the 
department and I would ensure I rang them regularly and asked them where 
are you up to, how's it going, when will it be ready and so on .... If I want to 
force the pace I might say we will meet with the minister on X date to review 
where we are up to. There's nothing like a meeting with the minister to get 
bureaucrats working .... I think that if you make it clear to them that you want 
to achieve something then they feel a change in their job satisfaction and 
motivation. The department has been driven hard (some working up to lam 
recently) but I think they feel alive- they see there is an opportunity to do 
something and I tell them it is only here and now. I try to inspire them .... To be 
involved in real reform is a powerful motivation I think. 
Engaging responsive individuals, disengaging opponents 
In a less responsive environment one mobilisation strategy was to engage 
responsive individuals and disengage or neutralise those who were not 
responsive or who were opposed to the minister's agenda. Some ministers and 
advisers were quite deliberate about operating through selected responsive 
individuals within departments. Adviser 17 (who worked with a department 
which several interviewees described as unresponsive6) explained how he 
selected a few key officials to work with: 
That would be my approach- to deal with one person I might have confidence 
in or know, and they could then go and talk to [others]. I try to develop a good 
relationship with key individuals because they will work for you a lot better if 
they are enamoured to you [sic]. I think you'll get a better result if you (I use 
the term advisedly) charm people ... to ensure what you want is implemented. 
A reign of terror doesn't work with the bureaucracy. 
He described how he would go about 'charming' individuals: 
6 For example A32 reported the minister's office having to write cabinet submissions because 
the department refused to accept direction; and Minister Green described his personally 
exhausting attempts to get them to accept his agenda rather than pursuing theirs (in Chapter 
Five). 
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Make them feel important, keep them advised, thank them if they do a good job 
and make your point if they stuff up without severing the relationship. And 
recognise that there's a difference between the way you think and the way they 
think .... Most of the time, the minister's office will win. It's a question of how 
you go about winning and not rubbing it in. 
While having an active minister caused tension with the department, it also 
created opportunities for individuals, as Adviser 7 explained: 'The people who 
are good and you work with, you can really empower them. And you can 
easily kill off the duds. You just reject their stuff and say "this is not what we 
want".' 
Some advisers had a deliberate approach to those public servants they felt were 
not responsive- they froze them out. Adviser 19, who had a rather abrasive 
manner in his dealings with the department, reported times when he worked 
with junior public servants and cut out their superiors. He described his 
approach to those he called 'dead wood' and 'dills': 
I haven't got time to stuff around with dubbo public servants [sic]. If I meet 
someone who is unnecessarily obstructive or they don't have the horsepower 
intellectually I just cast them aside. I don't talk to them. I look around them 
and usually find one person in every section who is creative and responsive 
and I deal with them. I search for the value, I don't respect the hierarchy. Of 
course they hate that and I've gotten into trouble a few times with it, but 
nothing I'd call trouble. I haven't got the time to do it any other way .... If you 
want feel-good, cosy, chatty relations with the department that's fine but that's 
not our objective. Our objective is good policy outcomes and there's not 
enough time or energy to gladhand the department along the way. 
A public servant said he was 'hated' in the department. 
Public Servant 2: a responsive approach 
Public Servant 2 exemplifies another of the four approaches amongst the public 
servants interviewed: a consciously responsive approach to ministers and 
advisers. He was a F AS who had previously worked as an adviser. He not 
only worked cooperatively with advisers but actively pursued close 
relationships with them. His style, and the trusting relationships he forged 
with several advisers, created many opportunities for him to pursue what he 
called 'things that make a difference'. 
He worked closely with Adviser 17 and Adviser 32 to deliver a major new 
policy initiative. He described how the reform came about: 
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Adviser 17 ... said to me when I was over there on some other issues, ... "look we 
need a bit of an agenda, we need a few positives, because the minister's getting 
all this garbage tipped on him right, left and centre. Everythlng in the portfolio 
is a negative". I said to him, "look that is a happy little coincidence". ... I ran 
this idea at him, and he liked the sound of it, so then we talked to the minister, 
and he wanted a much bigger plan built up around it, not just [the initiative], 
but how does it fit in with everything else and so I did that for him and he 
thought it was a great idea and we just moved from there .... And for the 
minister it became a very positive thing that he could work with. 
There were great benefits for Public Servant 2 in this situation: 'I never had any 
trouble getting access to the minister. I could always talk to him about this, and 
it always mattered to him ... and he wanted to see it nurtured.' However he 
attracted suspicion in what was a conservative department. There were many 
who, he said, 'saw this as being maybe a bit close to the minister's office - ... 
"This guy, he's away with the minister, you know (grrrrr)" .'7 
Two philosophies underpinned his approach. As a public servant he felt driven 
by the idea that 'you're here to make a difference'. This drove him to want to be 
involved in major policy changes that required close involvement with 
ministerial offices and with ministers (whose engagement and political 
authority was needed to effect policy change). He also saw ministerial advisers 
as a positive force in government, and was an advocate of a 'competition of 
ideas' model of the relationship between public servants and advisers. He 
appreciated and even relished intellectual competition with advisers on policy 
issues: 
Ministerial advisers ... can ask the question of you, it can be answered, it can 
lead to a genuine couple of minutes debate on something. The minister is far 
better informed as a result of that. ... It is also a good test for the intellectual 
validity of the idea. You can put down on paper a very good case for 
something, easily punctured by one or two questions it evaporates. Not 
punctured by those questions the minister signs, "I agree" ... three months later 
the policy is seen to be a crock because those basic questions weren't asked and 
answered .... I've tended to get pretty helpful questions asked and answered .... 
I am a big supporter of the competition of ideas. 
He had a conscious approach to working with advisers and building trusting 
relationships with them. He anticipated their needs and was seen to be 
responsive: 
7 Yet someone with his access to the minister's office could be valuable to a department. He 
reported that when there had been breakdowns between some senior public servants and 
advisers he had been able use his own relationships and credibility to raise issues for the 
department. 
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You adjust to their needs. It is the job of the bureaucrat to anticipate what the 
agenda of the adviser is and why they're doing what their doing. It's the intent 
all the time. It is not so much so and so wants this, you give it to them, but 
you're analysing why do they want it, what does it mean for my working 
relationship with them? How can I best pick up something in the future, 
anticipate their needs, and be seen to have done so, so that they will see you as a 
person who's like that? Some people like to have stuff offered to them, other 
people don't. Other people will deeply resent that feeling that you're going to 
run them - ''I'm not working to your agenda son". So you've got to read them. 
This section has described how advisers in the study worked to engage 
departments. Advisers performed the roles of supervising, orienting and 
mobilising, which were crucial to political control and to the minister's capacity 
to impart direction to government. Advisers had accrued considerable 
administrative authority in their role as gatekeepers in the flow of documents 
between departments and ministers. This role empowered them and created an 
exchange relationship between advisers and public servants. Advisers also 
acted as the minister's surrogate in communicating with and directing the 
department. While this had benefits for the minister and the department, there 
could also be problems where advisers were not effective or accepted 
surrogates. Finally advisers had a crucial role in mobilising the department to 
deliver the minister's agenda. This involved persuading, driving and 
selectively engaging and disengaging senior public servants. Having described 
the roles advisers played in working with departments, the thesis now turns to 
a broader analysis of the relationship between advisers and senior public 
servants. 
ADVISER-DEPARTMENT RELATIONSHIPS: 
AN AUSTRALIAN MODEL? 
While writers in the 1970s emphasised friction, overlap and clash between the 
new partisan advisers and public servants (Smith 1976, RCAGA 1974), more 
recent analysts of the relationship between advisers and departments have 
tended to portray their interaction as positive, and based on clearly defined 
roles (Dunn 1997, Hollway 1996). This has been described as an 'emerging 
Australian model' of political-bureaucratic relationships (Davis 1995), in which 
ministerial and bureaucratic functions are distinct and complementary. 
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This 'model' has two key features: that relations are generally harmonious; and 
that the roles of advisers and public servants are essentially complementary. 
Dunn's study of political-bureaucratic relations in the 1990s found that 
relationships generally worked well. Concerns and criticism occurred, but not 
often (1997:89-92). The relationship worked well because both advisers and 
public servants recognised their roles as complementary and accepted the value 
of each other's contributions (1997:89-90). He concluded that: 
Because of these common beliefs in mutual responsibilities that recognise a 
politics-administration dichotomy, the division of labor between ministerial 
staff and the department does seem to be better defined and more accepted by 
both sides than is the case in some countries (1997:93). 
Hollway also bases his notion of a positive partnership on the idea of 
complementary roles: 
At base, the roles are not the same. They are different but complementary .... 
They should be partners, not adversaries or competitors .... Departments ought 
not to view ministerial staff as rivals but as creative collaborators .... The 
interests of the public service, and good government, lie in not resisting this 
role but accepting it as legitimate and value-adding, and then establishing with 
the people involved a partnership which is both intimate and proper (1996:135-
148). 
The advocacy evident in Hollway's comments indicates that there is a 
normative element to the notion of complementary roles and that perhaps this 
notion is not as well accepted by public servants as Dunn's research suggests.8 
Davis sees the distinction in roles as stark: he sees advisers as working in the 
'political' domain only, while public servants play roles in the 'policy' and 
'administration' domains (1995:28).9 Dunn's concept of a politics-
administration dichotomy is more complex: some areas are better left to 
advisers (partisan politics), some are better left to departments and 'others they 
engage in jointly' (1997:92). For Dunn the key distinction is between the 
partisan competence of advisers and the neutral competence of public servants 
in Australia. He draws interesting lessons for US public administration from 
observing how these elements combine in policy making. 
8 As noted earlier Dunn's study is based on interviews with departmental secretaries and 
(mainly) senior advisers. Most of the day to day negotiation and joint work between advisers 
and public servants is conducted at a lower level: between public servants at an FAS and AS 
level, and advisers with policy responsibilities. This may partly explain why Dunn's respondents 
view the relationship more positively than the subjects in this study. 
9 He uses this distinction in discussing policy making and executive coordination at a state and 
national level (Davis 1995, 1997; Bridgman and Davis 1998). In his state level analysis the 
exception was the Premier's Office staff who crossed all three domains. 
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This thesis argues rather than being complementary and harmonious, at its 
heart the relationship between advisers and public servants is competitive and 
conflictual, and cooperation must be negotiated. While it is often cooperative 
and works well for ministers, this is because the parties are successfully 
managing the essential competition and tension inherent in what is a 
relationship of control. Dunn emphasises the positive aspects of the 
relationship between advisers and public servants in Australia, but (following 
Hedo) he sees it as 'conditionally cooperative', conditional on mutual 
performance (Hedo 1977:193). He emphasises what he sees as the 
fundamentally positive basis for cooperation, rather than the processes 
negotiating cooperation. In contrast to Dunn's broad analysis, this study 
focuses on the day to day negotiation of these tensions. 
Interviews with public servants and advisers engaged at the political-
bureaucratic 'coalface' elicited more than occasional reports of tensions and 
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conflict, as has already been evident in this chapter. While there were reports 
of cooperative and harmonious relationships, this did not indicate an absence of 
tension. Rather, they were relationships in which the essential tensions existing 
between players were managed or minimised. 
Public servants did not describe cooperative relationships as typical, but rather 
as possible. Public Servant 7 said: 
I think in some situations you've got a very effective harmonious working 
relationship, both trying to serve the one minister from slightly different 
perspectives but you work together, and in other cases I think there is mutual 
resentment. 
Public Servant 8 saw tension as common in these relationships, and cited what 
he saw as a rare example of an adviser who managed the relationship 
positively: 
More often than not- from a bureaucrat's perspective - ministerial advisers are 
usually rude, cajoling, directive, difficult people. They are under extreme 
pressure, frustrated with the pace of bureaucracy, they tend to give you a hard 
time and demand things in time frames that you are really not that comfortable 
with. Whereas someone like A48 is one ... that never ever yelled or screamed or 
demanded - he always asked politely and people respected him and therefore 
worked very hard for him. 
Public Servant 3, a very experienced FAS who had previously worked as an 
adviser himself, described his relationship with four ministerial offices he dealt 
closely with between 1990 and 1996. Only one of the four offices had a 
relationship with the department he could describe as 'pretty comfortable' and 
even that had tension within it. This was caused by some 'difficult' advisers, 
who were 'playing games' that were not accurately relayed to the department 
and that sometimes ended up in 'shock and horror'. 
He said the other three minister's offices had poor relations with the 
department. One minister, whom the department greatly respected, had staff 
who were 'real problems'. They created barriers and hoops the department had 
to deal with between the minister and the department, and 'didn't actually 
advance policy one iota'. He commented that 'some of the smartest ministers 
have some of the worst staff'. Another minister, who was 'a nice bloke' but 
weak and ineffective, had an office which had 'quite uncomfortable' relations 
with the department. There were many tensions, largely caused by one adviser 
who was seen as running unwinnable agendas which were actively resisted by 
the department. With the fourth minister, there was 'a huge problem' in 
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relations between his office and all the senior people in the department. There 
was a complete breakdown in the relationship, caused by a falling out between 
the minister and the department. 
From the adviser's point of view, while tension and conflict may occur over a 
relatively small number of issues, these were often the most important issues. 
While there were thousands of cooperative interactions and much praise for the 
neutral competence of departments, advisers were often preoccupied with the 
struggle to dominate on key issues of contention. The frictions they 
experienced and how they dealt with these, or avoided these, loomed large in 
their interviews. Tension was at the heart of the relationship between advisers 
and public servants, and much energy was absorbed in managing this essential 
tension so that relationships were productive. 
Tension in the relationship between advisers and public servants 
Most ministers, advisers and public servants in the study saw tension between 
advisers and public servants as inevitable.10 Even in good relationships there 
was underlying tension, because of the fundamental nature of the adviser role. 
Minister Black stated: 
I believe tension is inevitable. If the adviser is prepared to challenge the 
departmental advice, then there will inevitably be tension with the department. 
But this isn't a bad thing because this is one of the most significant roles an 
adviser has. If they don't do this, it becomes a 'Yes Minister' situation. 
Ministers did not see tension between their advisers and public servants as a 
problem; in fact most saw it as positive and healthy, referring to it as 'healthy 
suspicion and creative tension' (White). However the tension had to be 
managed, or there was a risk of it getting 'out of control' and things going 'off 
the rails' (White). There were five main sources of tension in the relationship. 
Sources of tension 
The first source of tension derived from the fact that advisers stood in the way 
of a direct relationship between the minister and the department. Their very 
interposition in the minister-department relationship caused tension for public 
servants. Advisers' roles as gatekeepers and surrogates could cause difficulties, 
10 There were 2 public servants (P05 and P07) and one minister (Blue) who did not see it as 
inevitable. 
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as described earlier in the chapter. The inescapability of their relationships 
with advisers could be deeply frustrating for public servants. Generally senior 
public servants would have preferred a direct relationship with the minister. 
The second source of tension between advisers and public servants related to 
the fundamental nature of the adviser's role: to challenge and contest the 
department's advice. This role could create much negative energy, as Adviser 4 
explained: 
The adviser has the unenviable task of havmg to point out the department's 
failings all the time. Therefore it is very hard for them to feel good about their 
interactions with you. And there are 7000 of them and one of you. So there is 
an incredible amount of negative energy directed at you .... You are seen as 
criticising the professionalism of hundreds of people. 
While this tension was difficult for the advisers and public servants involved, it 
was seen as having good outcomes for ministers, as Minister Purple explained: 
I think tension between advisers and departments is inevitable and I think it's a 
good thing .... That tension is terribly important .... If it isn't there how do you 
get the rigour into what we're trying to do? There has to be rigour there. 
Part of the problem, according to advisers, was that public servants felt they 
were being criticised by people less expert than themselves. The department 
considered it had 'intellectual ascendancy' over the policy issues, but did not 
always win contests with the ministerial office, as Adviser 17 said: 
Most departments are full of intelligent people, with technocratic knowledge, 
who've worked on these areas for a long time. They'll always probably think 
that they know best .... You have to accept some degree of tension in terms of 
the intellectual ascendancy over what we're doing .... They always think 
they've got it but they won't always get their way. 
Thirdly, a fundamental source of tension was the difference in the perspectives 
and imperatives of the two parties. In his study of the relationships between 
political appointees and career bureaucrats in the United States, Heclo (1977) 
described a mismatch between the knowledge, experience, values and 
timeframe of public servants and political executives.ll Whereas career public 
servants generally had a preference for gradualism, indirection, political 
caution and a concern to maintain their relationships (1977:143-146), political 
appointees were more likely because of their short tenure to demand that 
11 The political executives Heclo studied were political appointees in the bureaucracy, rather 
than political advisers. However the dynamics between partisan and non-partisan bureaucrats 
in his study are relevant to the relationships between career bureaucrats and partisan advisers 
in Australia. 
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changes occur quickly, to prefer direct confrontations, to demand 
responsiveness and to disregard the self interest of the public servant 
(1977:153). Minister Yellow saw the clash of the different perspectives of 
advisers and public servants as having benefits for both parties: 
I actually think it is quite healthy. I don't see tension as a catastrophic outcome. 
I think it means that the advisers have to think twice sometimes about cracking 
the whip quite so hard. If the department is telling them "look you can't 
actually do that and this advice won't be forthcoming in ten minutes, it's going 
to take further detailed work", that's a reasonable brake on perhaps the over-
enthusiastic jejune. But equally from the department's point of view I think it 
helps sometimes to have people with a slightly different point of view 
questioning them about policy initiatives and drawing their attention to others . 
... Because the advisers are more likely to be having their ears hammered than 
the department is, they are more savvy about the immediate impact of the 
decision. So I think that's a useful exchange. 
The different time perspectives of the two groups were a particular source of 
tension. Public servants in this study reported that they were always given less 
time than they would have preferred in providing advice and briefings and that 
this caused tension, as Public Servant 2 explained: 
By definition we'd always prefer more time .... When we're doing very big 
issues, but you're forced to do them extremely rapidly, you're in grave danger 
of stuffing them up .... It is not a question of you should cut no comers, you are 
always cutting comers. Timing is vital .... Things often had to be done swiftly, 
but they had to be done right .... The tensions, such as they are, will tend to 
arise from that. I'll often want more time to be able to do things to ensure there 
are no stuff ups, than they are able to give me. 
Short term tenure made advisers impatient. Failure to meet what public 
servants felt were unrealistic or dangerous timetables could be perceived as 
resistance by ministers and advisers. Public Servant 4 recalled an example of 
such tension in the relationship between Minister Scarlet and his office and the 
department: 
There were some difficulties, partly relating to the minister's driving nature, his 
impatience for outcomes in areas where outcomes aren't quickly achieved .... 
He was impatient to move forward and like a lot of impatient ministers 
reluctant to accept sound advice about where there were speed limits on 
change and occasionally misinterpreting advice about speed limits on change 
as resistance to change .... Partly also because of unrealistic expectations. 
Advisers being seen to pursue unrealistic agendas. Egging the minister on to 
pursue unrealistic agendas. 
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The intense pressure, and interdependence, could provoke anger 
frustration. an environment so stake, a lack sensitivity 
or a personality could cause tension. Servant 9 explained 
'from time to time tempers do get frayed. both sides. You occasionally 
might be short, very short1 and you usually apologise afterwards.' She 
described Adviser 351 whose lack of sensitivity caused tension in his 
relationship with the department: 
Very thoughtless, very aggressive, very demanding I am afraid. He was rude, 
swore at people, demanded things, slammed the phone down- was very 
unpleasant to deal with and this was counter-productive for his working with 
the department. He was hated by the department. Really all he had to do was 
say he recognised the pressures people were under, or say Tm sorry to ask you 
for this but .. .'- these little acknowledgements go a long way. But he didn't do 
that. 
Advisers saw it as a real skill to be able to push and demand within unrealistic 
timeframes and yet maintain positive relationships. Having the right 
personality to handle interacting under pressure was seen as important by 
ministers in evaluating their staff. However the difficulties in the relationships 
between advisers and public servants were mainly structural, not personal. 
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Advisers were very conscious approach to this At times 
the issue dominated discussions, and they talked often about experiences they 
had learnt from and how they had developed their approach. Many were open 
about the negative aspects of their approach problems it produced. 
Advisers faced a dilemma: tensions arose from their very existence within the 
relationship between ministers and departments; the roles they were required 
to play in the relationship (supervising, directing and mobilising); the 
incompatibilities of the relationship itself; and the environment in which it was 
operating. Somehow these tensions had to be managed so that relationship 
was productive. 
There was also a major counterpressure in the adviser's they were 
responsible for both the quality of the relationship with the department, and 
1 
its productivity. Advisers felt they would have failed if they had good relations 
with public servants but the minister's agenda was not being delivered. 
However they would also be very likely to fail to achieve that agenda by 
asserting themselves too strongly within the relationship. Being too assiduous 
in pursuing control could weaken their power by souring relations with the 
public servants whose services they depended on. They needed skill to balance 
the contradictory pressures inherent in this situation. 
In his study of the relationships between career public servants and political 
appointees in the US bureaucracy, Redo (1977) describes this as the 
fundamental problem of political control. He defines as 'statecraft' how 
political executives choose to act in their relationships with bureaucrats 
(1977:155). He claims the real test of a political executive's statecraft is 'his 
ability to institute the changes he wants without losing the bureaucratic services 
he requires' (1977:181). The problem arises from the fact that political 
executives not only need cooperation from the bureaucracy to achieve their 
objectives, but active help and services. It did not take active resistance on the 
part of public servants to obstruct the executive's agenda, a passive or 'obedient' 
approach could achieve the same outcome. Therefore the challenge for political 
executives was how to secure the active pursuit of the executive's agenda on the 
part of the bureaucracy. This required sophisticated 'statecraft' on the part of 
political executives: building effective relationships with bureaucrats and the 
strategic use of those relationships in the pursuit of political goals 
(1977:154-234). Advisers in this study faced similar problems and challenges. 
In this study, ministers had high, and often contradictory, expectations of how 
advisers would work with senior public servants. Many ministers wanted their 
advisers to operate positive relationships with the department, while at the 
same time they expected them to ensure the department did what the minister 
wanted. Adviser 1 felt: 'If something isn't working, if the department's not 
delivering, the minister will rightfully ask the adviser to explain. The 
responsibility and the burden to deliver are enormous.' It was the adviser's 
responsibility to get the department to deliver, yet to ensure this, they often had 
to be aggressive and demanding in pushing and directing the department, the 
opposite of good relations. Some advisers felt this to be a great source of 
pressure in their relationships with ministers, as they could be criticised for 
either not getting the department to deliver or for creating conflictual relations. 
They felt this was a source of leverage for departments in their dealings with 
advisers. Public servants were certainly aware that ministers evaluated 
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power struggles 
Relationships between advisers and senior public servants in the study often 
involved game playing, bargaining and power struggles. Adviser 1 felt her 
relationship with senior public servants was all about game playing: 
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Advisers' main resource in bargaining department was their access to 
political authority and their political relationships, what Hedo has described as 
'live political connections' political superiors and to sources of external 
power Advisers were particularly empowered by their proximity to 
the minister. They could often draw readily on the minister's authority to 
reinforce their position. Advisers reported bringing in the minister cases of 
dispute or lack of performance by the department (though there were limits on 
the use of this tactic and it ultimately indicated the failure of their own 
authority). Public Servant 3 saw this as a source of power for advisers: 
1 
At the end of the day, they'll always be stronger than the department is, and 
they'll always be able to escalate things to a minister whereas the department 
can't escalate it to a minister as easily. And the minister will always support 
their own staff ahead of the department, always they'll be loyal to their own 
staff before they're loyal to the department. 
Their closeness to the minister meant that if the adviser was convinced of the 
merits of a proposal, this would increase the chances that the decision maker 
would be convinced. In this way, they could be crucial in getting bureaucratic 
proposals onto the minister's agenda. Public Servant 8 saw this as a reason to 
get advisers 'on your side': 
I think they are pretty much the key to it all- if the minister's not interested in 
your issue, as a bureaucrat, it's really hard to get things going. So I would say 
in terms of the shared role you are most effective when you've got ministerial 
advisers on your side and they probably play more than fifty percent of the 
role .... I think that ministerial advisers are the ones that really kick things 
along, really get things moving. 
Another 'live political connection' was to the Prime Minister's office. Adviser 7 
said that 'something magic happened' when he told the department the Prime 
Minister's office was interested in his policy ideas. 
Advisers' access to political authority could also enable them to be powerful 
advocates, and this provided another incentive for cooperation. Adviser 22 
recounted several examples of his advocacy on behalf of a statutory authority 
he had responsibility for, which he saw as a form of 'pay back' for them 
allowing him to become heavily involved in their work: 
I give my areas a lot of loyalty - backing them in Budget priorities and backing 
them in organisational fights .... I take up things on their behalf with other 
ministers, with other departments, with other advisers. ... I had lunch with 
[one group] yesterday and they actually thanked me for all the good things I'd 
done for them .... They got a $14 million Budget boost last time, because I 
pushed their case. That's the first increase they'd had in living memory .... So 
that's how I pay back and get their loyalty because ... I really do go in and 
defend their areas and try and deliver extra resources and extra policy 
development. 
Public servants were well aware of the power relationship that framed their 
interactions with advisers. They were very conscious of advisers' need to feel 
'in charge'. Public Servant 5 said the key to managing a relationship with an 
adviser was to 'Talk talk talk. Go and see them. Grovel.' Public Servant 6 had 
a conscious way of managing his relationships with ministerial advisers - he 
ensured they felt in control: 
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they know is a stupid thing to do. Or they can put something through in a hell 
of a hurry knowing that an adviser wouldn't have the time to look at it in 
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Another subtle tactic advisers talked about was undermining or subverting the 
minister's agenda by under-resourcing. Adviser 4 found herself in this 
situation. She worked for a junior minister and responsibility for a policy 
initiative which was small in money terms but high on her minister's political 
agenda. She felt the department was not fully committed to the objective as 
they not see it as substantive in policy terms'. She believed that senior 
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of problems in the department, I still wore the responsibility for it .... It think 
this is an example of how working as an adviser has the potential for a negative 
impact on your career .... If you can't fix the it is your problem .... 
There is a great danger of damaging your reputation .... All the fuckups and 
mismanagement by the department, the under-resourcing, come back to the 
ministerial office. We take the it all. 
A more subtle, yet very powerful tactic, was passivity, or simply obeying. 
According to Hedo the power of senior bureaucrats did not typically derive 
'from refusing to do what superiors want, but from withholding positive help': 
12 By this she meant they did not act to 
uncommon for ministers' programs 
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It is a power that can consist simply of waiting to be asked for solutions by 
appointees who do not know they have problems .... Because most political 
appointees require considerable help in government, higher civil servants 
normally need do little by way of harmful actions in order to prevail. All that is 
usually necessary is for officials to fail to come forward with their services 
(1977:171-3). 
An adviser who had worked in several different portfolios, Adviser 18, 
recounted the difficulty he faced in Defence, where he said some officials would 
only obey: 
They give something to the minister ... it is 'what's your decision, X or Y'? And 
I'd say 'well I want to talk about whether Z is really an option' and they'd say 
'we'll do Z if that's your decision' .... It would be 'just order us to do 
something' .... There's no to and fro about the best decision .... And so then you 
make some decisions that you're concerned about because you don't get an 
opportunity to bounce things off the people who should know more than you 
do. They just refused that. 
Public Servant 2 referred to this as 'playing the Sir Humphrey game'. He felt 
there were many 'cunning ways' of obeying but not doing what the minister 
intended: 
The minister says "do this" and because the minister is not as familiar with the 
complete detail of every part of the initiative, you can give him literally what he 
asks for without giving him the intent behind what he's seeking. 
Information wars 
Power struggles between advisers and public servants were often played out in 
battles over information. Some advisers described their relationships with 
public servants as an ongoing 'information war'. Information is a very 
powerful resource within government. It is one of the most valuable resources 
that departments have in bargaining with political executives. Information is 
also a strategic resource for advisers. 
Advisers had important sources of their own information, from their 
relationships within the ministry, Parliament and with external groups, which 
could supplement the information they were given by departments. This 
information was something they could exchange with public servants. They 
also had several sources of strength in helping ministers to extract information 
from the department. 
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Struggles over information occurred even in relationships which were generally 
described as positive. Adviser 19 described his struggles while working for a 
minister whose relationship with the department was 'amicable' (POl): 
He got the department fired up to do work for him. The department was very 
responsive to his concerns. But they still tried to bluff him all the time by 
information control and information management. So it was my job to counter 
that and keep a close eye on the department. The Deputy Secretary had a 
modus operandi of information control and power through dispensing 
information. I had to really be on the ball all the time to manage him. The 
adviser's job was to realise what the gaps were and be always pulling out the 
gaps to provide leverage for the minister. 
The Deputy Secretary controlled a key policy area and according to Adviser 19, 
'always held back information from minister's offices .... We had good relations 
with him. We'd just discover things later that we hadn't been told and we'd fit 
it in to the jigsaw and realise he withheld it from us, trying to keep us out of the 
picture.' He felt the Deputy Secretary did this to 'hold the balance of power in 
his court', so he would become indispensable and not easy to bypass. It was 
one of the most difficult situations for an adviser to handle, and all he felt he 
could do was to 'try to be smarter than them, using logic and first principles' 
and to 'ask the right questions'. Adviser 1 said that 'the withholding of 
information is the most powerful tool, ... the worst thing that they can do to 
you'. She felt her role was often one of 'trying to squeeze information from an 
organisation that doesn't want to give it to you'. 
One tactic to detect if information was being withheld was to have multiple 
lines of communication into the department, as Adviser 27 explained: 
If I ring ten different senior officers one day and get different signals then I 
register that something odd is going on that I need to get to the bottom of. . .. 
Something is happening which I don't know about and is being kept from me. 
Yet unlike many advisers in the study he felt comfortable with information 
being 'managed around' him: 
There's a lot of information that I know the Dep Sec manages around me, that 
never gets to me and probably if I did know about those things I'd manage 
them differently. But that doesn't worry me, because that's the art of being a 
good senior public servant. 
Public Servant 7 admitted to alerting advisers when he felt the department was 
actively opposing the minister's agenda: 
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not meet his objectives, to the annoyance of the senior public servants she 
was working with in Canberra. Her independent sources information were 
vital in the minister's pursuit control over the program; they were also a 
powerful weapon in forcing greater openness in her relationships with the 
Canberra bureaucrats. 
Adviser 1 stressed the value that her networks with community groups had in 
strengthening her hand and providing leverage with the department in the 
struggle to obtain information: 
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adviser who worked one policy area a long of time herself 
on no group felt it captured her; she faced criticism from 
quarters: 
I was accused of taking a lobby group's point of view. At the same time that 
lobby group said I took another lobby group's point view. And the other 
lobby group said I took a departmental point of view. I felt that was a good 
sign (A14). 
Ironically cooption could be the product of attempts to assert control- by 
becoming deeply immersed in the details of programs and policy 
13 There were also dangers for public servants in being seen as too close to the minister's 
office. Heclo described the problems career bureaucrats seen as too close to political 
appointees as jealousy and identification (1 
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The brighter they are the better it works basically. And that intelligence is not 
all just about IQ - it's a combination of political astuteness and an ability to 
understand policy. When they come together, it means an adviser is actually 
going to add value. ... One of the things that rapid turnover means is you 
spend a lot of time dealing with opinionated, ignorant people with high levels 
of intelligence, in the minister's office .... People who have a lot of ability but 
know nothing about the area that you know about, and who tend to think 
you're just trying to slow them down, when actually what you're trying to do is 
educate them about the realities of the situation they're dealing with. 
He was able and willing, where necessary, to run the 'politics' of the policy area, 
a role normally left to advisers. recounted how in working two 
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to take something to cabinet and I knew that the Prime Minister would go 
off his brain about and those agencies would go off their brain. . .. Those 
people the Prime Minister's office, Finance Minister's office, and Treasurer's 
office] when the shit hit the fan would know that it was only professionalism 
that stopped me from saying to them 'Minister Orange is about to do something 
that you're going to really hate' because they know I work for him, not for 
them. That's what I mean by propriety .... You've got to be careful- you've got 
to be very careful. 
Public Servant 1 also had a competitive style in working with advisers and 
exemplifies the fourth and final evident among servants in the 
study. 
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Public Servant 1: a powerful approach · 
Public Servant 1 displayed what can be termed a powerful approach to working 
with advisers. He was a very experienced FAS in a highly technical area of 
policy. He had extensive delegation powers in his position. He had been in his 
job for eight years and had never worked as an adviser. He had previously 
worked with dominant advisers and ministers who had had significant 
influence on policy making in the portfolio, but in the relationship being 
studied (with Minister Yellow, Adviser 19 and Adviser 27) he was very 
powerful. This was partly because the minister did not exert much authority in 
the department and was not committed to an agenda of major policy change. 
She also stood back from relations with the department, and delegated these 
almost entirely to her staff, which reduced their political authority in dealing 
with the department. 
Public Servant 1 was unworried by the presence of advisers. He was able to 
repel directions which he did not support and to keep the scope of their 
activities within bounds he felt comfortable with. He described Budget 
discussions with the advisers, which involved 'hosing down' their ideas: 
They would start out with some concepts about what we should be doing, we 
would start with what we were doing and we would identify difficulties with 
some of the things they wanted to do and the reality of the system, and 
eventually we would come to some slight variation to what we were doing. 
Basically helping them come to the view more radical reform was not going to 
be successful. 
He had problems with Adviser 19, but had no difficulty asserting his authority 
over him, as he recalled: 
In one discussion with [an industry group] they told me what I was saying was 
not what the minister's office had told them. I told them that if they didn't 
believe I was speaking for the government that I would walk out. They 
naturally gave in and I went back and told the office that I would not accept 
that sort of contact. I just made it clear to the office that they either let the 
department do it, or they could do it themselves .... That stopped after that. 
He felt advisers were useful in their relationships with lobby groups and other 
ministerial offices, particularly during Budget formulation when they could 
play a critical role in massaging these relationships to get proposals accepted. 
However, he said: 'I don't think ministerial advisers have altered the way we 
work terribly much.' While he acknowledged Adviser 27 as 'an interested and 
active person and persuasive with Minister Yellow', he had no sense of 
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of people wouldn't believe that goes on. The thing is it is always ambiguous, 
and they can say it was the best advice they could provide at the time, so you 
can never pin it down as straight malice. 
His negative language and views are matched by those of Public Servant 3 who 
worked in one of the departments Minister Pink was responsible for. He 
claimed Minister Pink 'had a falling out with virtually the SES officers in the 
department' and communication with him was only writing. The 
department was restructured Public Servant 3 was moved to run a new 
division which looked after all Minister Pink's programs: 
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The objective was to isolate his influence on the rest of the portfolio. He was 
causing such mayhem that the decision was that he had to be kept to one 
division, and I was it. 
From his point of view the problems in the relationship were mainly to do with 
the minister's approach. He described them as follows: 
He was mad. ... Some of the things I've actually seen him do, if he wasn't a 
minister he would have been committed. I think misplaced aggression - his 
type of aggression- is just an absolute waste of space and turns an entire 
organisation into either neutral or negative .... He thought that we had so many 
program dollars at our disposal that we weren't using them wisely and we 
should have been able to make a difference .... He intervened frequently in the 
most detailed way in changing program arrangements and rules .... I don't 
think he had any concept about infrastructure, he thought he could make a 
decision today and it would happen tomorrow .... I think he hated public 
servants with a passion .... His office was mad too. 
Yet he also admitted the minister had grounds for frustration with the 
department, because it withheld information: 
It used to really worry me .... I thought that some of our people had been pretty 
careless really in not keeping the minister informed about pretty big problems 
in some areas .... Certainly I would err on the side of telling ministers things 
rather than not telling them things, whereas they would do the opposite .... The 
other difficulty in all this is, the secretary of the department became almost 
paranoid about him because he really felt that the minister was going to ensure 
that he got sacked ... you know if these things had become public the portfolio 
wouldn't look very good at all. 
In this sense the minister was perceived as a threat to the department, and the 
department responded accordingly. The struggle for political control that was 
at the base of this terrible relationship was confirmed by outsiders. Public 
Servant 7 was from another department but also worked closely with Minister 
Pink. He observed that: 
He had strong reservations about their competence. Reservations which I think 
others shared .... I think that he took the view that they did not share the 
government's agenda .... Was there a real problem with the way the departments 
responded to him? Oh yes! The advice that they were preparing was not 
consistent with the minister's policy objectives. For example I was given 
instructions by departmental officers ... which I believed were contrary to the 
wishes of the minister. 
This public servant had a positive view of the minister's staff, in contrast to 
Public Servant 3's view of them as 'mad': 
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Most of his staff were I thought particularly capable .... My dealings with his 
office were very positive. But in the relationship between his staff and 
departments I think there was mutual resentment. That was in part a reflection 
of the fact that he as a minister was not happy with the advice he was getting .... 
And the department didn't like the minister and didn't like the staff. 
For an adviser, engaging a department that was fighting the minister was very 
difficult. Adviser 6 felt his main resource was his political connections: 
I can go to the political level to neutralise the department. A good relationship 
with someone in the Prime Minister's office can cut out the department 
completely. A bad relationship with the Prime Minister's office conversely 
empowers the department. 
1bis situation represents an extreme, where there was active resistance to the 
minister's direction and his authority. Though there was at times much 
negative language in the way advisers and public servants talked about each 
other, most described more potentially productive relationships than this. 
CONCLUSION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ADVISERS 
AND DEPARTMENTS 
The three main roles advisers played within the minister-department 
relationship were supervising, orienting and mobilising the department. The 
basis of this work was their position as gatekeepers within the department's 
relationship with the minister and their role as surrogates of the minister. This 
work had several important outcomes. It could drive high levels of 
engagement between the department and the political executive in government, 
by creating incentives for public servants to involve advisers and ministers in 
their work, and by providing leverage and opportunity for ministers to obtain 
information about the activities of the department. By expanding and 
preserving the minister's authority, advisers could increase the minister's 
capacity for political control. 
However the performance of these roles, and advisers' very existence within the 
minister-department relationship, caused tension between advisers and public 
servants. Tension was typical of the relationship, and was considered by most 
respondents to be inevitable. Managing the tensions and creating productive 
relationships with public servants was a challenge for advisers. There was 
contradiction in the 'twin tasks' of controlling and making positive use of the 
bureaucracy (Heclo 1977:6). 
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There were elements of cooperation and interdependence in the relationship 
between advisers and senior public servants. However competition was also at 
its heart. Overall the relationship between advisers and senior public servants 
was characterised by negotiation and bargaining within overlapping and 
competitive roles; rather than by harmonious relations based on 
complementary roles (Davis 1995, Hollway 1996) or by the stable achievement 
of political control by ministers (cf Campbell and Halligan 1992). 
This chapter examined how advisers in the study engaged with departments. It 
challenged the dominant image of political-bureaucratic relationships as 
harmonious and complementary. The next chapter examines how ministerial 
advisers engaged in policy making. This is the second element of the steering 
policy role. 
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This chapter argues 
significant the 
making functions. However advisers also perform distinctive roles 
policy making, arising location within executive. chapter 
brings both aspects together to conceptualise the full extent the policy role 
played by advisers at this 
AND POLICY MAKING 
'Policy' can be defined as both authorised decisions by ministers and cabinet 
and also the ongoing structures, routines and resource allocations that express 
policy positions (Colebatch 1998). For the purpose of this thesis 'policy' is 
defined as 'whatever governments choose to do or not do' (Dye 1981:1), 
keeping a focus on government decision making. Policy is made not simply 
the decision making undertaken by authorised decision makers such as 
1 
ministers and cabinet. 'Policy making' also refers to the process leading up to 
the decisions, in which policy is shaped through complex interactions - often 
involving contest and negotiation -between many actors both inside and 
outside of government. 
Traditional accounts of policy making which describe policy ideas as being 
framed in the bureaucracy, receiving approval of the minister and going to 
cabinet for endorsement, before being transmitted to officials for 
implementation, have been challenged by the large body of writing about the 
horizontal linkages between policy actors, who interact in complex ways to 
shape policy outcomes. These have been referred to as policy communities or 
policy networks (eg Marsh and Rhodes 1992i Coleman and Skogstad 1990). The 
concept of a 'core executive' has also been suggested to describe executive 
decision making as a complex process of group interaction (Dunleavy and 
Rhodes 1990). 
In his description of the policy process, Colebatch (1998) identifies two 
dimensions to policy - a 'vertical' and a 'horizontal' dimension. The 'vertical' 
dimension refers to the interaction of authorised decision makers and 
subordinate officials, encompassing the processes of ministers and departments 
working together in policy making, as well as hierarchical decision making in 
the minister's office and the cabinet (1998:37-39). The 'horizontal' dimension is 
concerned with policy activity across organisational boundaries, with 
relationships among policy participants in different organisations and the 
structure of understandings and commitments between them (1998:39). 
This distinction between different dimensions of policy activity is a useful one 
for the purposes of this chapter: it distinguishes between work conducted 
between ministers and departments and that which involves ministers 
interacting with other policy actors in a complex set of relationships involving 
interest groups, cabinet colleagues, senior departmental officials, backbenchers 
and other political parties. 
General literature 
While Australian policy text books often list advisers as one of the group of 
actors involved in the policy process, their roles are often seen as limited to 
offering alternative policy views to those provided by the public service, 
political scrutiny of proposals, political strategy and media presentation ( eg 
Bridgman and Davis 1998). Some writers exclude advisers altogether from the 
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'policy domain' of government and see them as operating solely in the 'political 
domain' (Bridgman and Davis 1998, Davis 1995). In some texts they are more 
active participants in policy making but the nature of their involvement is 
unclear. For example Colebatch discusses advisers as policy actors in this way: 
An important change in the practice of government in recent years has been the 
much greater part played by aides to the leaders .... These people are 
particularly active in policy work, but since their role is relatively new and 
unstructured, they do it in a variety of ways (1998:93). 
These ways are described as 'maintaining good relations with organised 
interests', promoting the partisan agenda in the policy process, writing expert 
opinions as an alternative to the department and 'a succession of ad hoc 
activities - "trouble shooting" ' (1998:94). 
There has been little exploration of the policy roles of partisan advisers in 
comparable political systems such as Britain and Canada, largely because they 
are not seen as having the importance in policy making that Australian advisers 
have. In Britain and Canada, partisan advisers have been generally judged not 
to play significant policy roles (Plowden 1991; Young and Sloman 1982; 
Kavanagh and Seldon 2000; Bakvis 1997; Campbell1998). This thesis argues 
that Australian advisers are distinctive in their emphasis on a partisan policy 
role.1 
The centrality of policy to advisers' role conception 
In his detailed study of advisers Walter (1986) found policy work to be at the 
heart of the adviser's role. He found that Hawke advisers saw advising the 
minister on policy to be their most important task. Eighty-six per cent of his 
subjects stated that advisers' contribution to the policy process was either 'very 
important' or 'important' (1986:136). He suggested that the first Hawke 
advisers were more policy-oriented than their predecessors (1986:32-3). 
Thus at the beginning of the Labor period, policy work was central to advisers' 
conception of their role. This was also very much the case at the end of the 
Labor period. When asked to describe the role of the ministerial adviser, 
Keating staffers in this study almost always talked about policy. They saw no 
separation between politics and policy; they were indistinguishable, and their 
job involved both. They described the role of the adviser as 'facilitating the 
1 This point shall be returned to in the Conclusion. 
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government's decisions on policy' (A08); 'to generate policy development; to 
generate ideas, energy and commitment from the department to an agreed 
agenda of reform' (A02); and as 'to work on[-] policy- its development and 
implementation' (A22). It would be a surprise to most advisers in this study to 
be told they do not inhabit the 'policy domain' with ministers and public 
servants. Most of them did not see themselves as 'political' advisers in its 
narrowest sense, but as 'policy' advisers -partisan policy advisers. 
Previous studies of advisers: describing the policy role 
Though he sees advisers as important providers of policy advice to ministers, 
Walter (1986) emphasises the primacy of the department's role in policy work. 
He down-plays advisers' role in generating policy ideas and policy 
development (1986:147-8). Mostly, advisers prompted the department to work 
on policy issues, which one adviser he interviewed referred to as 'poking sticks 
into the ants' nest' (1986:149). Walter states that it was only in 'extreme 
circumstances' that advisers took more interventionist roles in policy work with 
the department (but when they did this could be 'crucial') (1986:149). 
However in Walter's study we do glimpse a broader policy role for advisers. 
Advisers could spark ideas; extend policy options; direct attention to items on 
the policy agenda; play a 'catalyst' role; or mobilise the department (1986:138, 
152-154). The making of Budgets could also be a time when advisers could 
influence policy. However Walter generally stresses the limitations of advisers' 
policy work: he sees the adviser as 'for the most part a bit-player in a group 
enterprise' whose contributions are difficult to trace (1986:160-161). Yet he 
argues they can be influential and are a third force in policy making alongside 
bureaucrats and politicians (1986:5,187). 
Dunn's (1997) study of the Keating and Howard governments explores both the 
vertical and horizontal dimensions of policy making. Dunn sees advisers' main 
role as assisting ministers to provide political direction to departments and to 
achieve political responsiveness from departments. He describes the way 
advisers work with departments in shaping policy, by directing departmental 
work; evaluating policy proposals; overseeing policy development; and 
monitoring the implementation of policy (1997:78-93). Advisers help 
departments and ministers to work together on policy, thus facilitating 'the mix 
of strengths that bureaucrats and politicians can bring to policy making in a 
democracy' (1997:108). 
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policy roles, depending on 
(1995:155). 
Ryan also found that advisers exerted considerable influence on the policy 
process and believed that they were 'the driving force' in about half the 
decisions surveyed (1995:155). Ryan concludes that ministerial advisers 'exert 
enough power and influence over the policy process to be considered 
formidable actors for the purpose of public policy analysis' (1995:156). 
However his focus on power limits his exploration of the nature of advisers' 
policy roles. 
In Halligan and Power's 1992 study of political-bureaucratic relations we 
glimpse another area which advisers may play a distinctive role in the policy 
process: in their relationships with interest groups. They refer to advisers 
'managing networks political interaction' (1992:83). However they do not 
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explain this role and refer only to its impact on the power and autonomy of 
senior officials. 
The literature on the policy role of advisers thus emphasises the primacy of 
departments in policy work, with advisers not routinely generating policy ideas 
or being involved in policy development, though they have become more active 
in policy implementation (Walter 1986, Dunn 1997, Ryan 1995). However it 
also suggests some important policy work outside the minister-department 
relationship. Dunn suggests an important brokering role within the executive; 
Ryan detects a significant role in setting policy agendas; Halligan and Power 
refer to advisers 'managing networks of political interaction'. However these 
roles have not been conceptualised nor fully explored. 
Studies of the Hawke-Keating period (1983-1996) suggest that advisers became 
increasingly important in policy making during this time. Campbell and 
Halligan's study of political-bureaucratic relations during the Hawke years 
(1983-1991) found that: 
Over time ... the policy capacity of the ministerial office was strengthened. 
Policy had become much more of a top down process; the political directions 
emanated from the political executive and the minister's office, not the 
department, was often the pivotal actor in the process (1992:204). 
This view has been echoed by the writings of some practitioners (Fitzgerald 
1996; Hollway 1996) who emphasise the growth in the policy role of advisers 
during the Labor period. Sandy Hollway (a former career public servant, 
secretary of two departments and Keating adviser) stated that : 
Ministerial offices are as important now in big policy, big program design ... as 
departments. More selectively to be sure, differently to be sure, but as 
important in their own way. If departments not only generate some creative 
ideas but also do the bulk of the hard, slogging work ... ministerial staff can be 
crucial in choices about prospective lines of work, sifting options, running an 
ever critical eye over what is put forward, tossing out ideas (in both senses) and 
navigating propositions forward through the political labyrinth in Parliament 
House to a point where decisions are made (1996:134). 
He also stressed their joint policy roles with departments: 
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[There are] two important realities. The first is that analysis, policy advising, 
program design and even the larger questions of program implementation are 
often handled iteratively as both a minister and a department feel their way 
forward together on complicated matters. Second, much of this process is not 
these days handled personally by a minister but with and through his or her 
personal staff .... The system works best when both the ministerial offices ... and 
the departments work together to generate good ideas and translate them into 
good public policy (1996:133-4). 
Some former practitioners argue that the growth in the role of advisers in policy 
making has been accompanied by a reduction in the policy role of senior public 
servants. Vince Fitzgerald (a former secretary of two departments) expressed 
concern that ministers and their advisers had enlarged significantly their 
involvement in policy development and that this had resulted in 'the taking of 
roles ... which were previously the preserve of public servants' (1996:121-123). 
This presented a challenge to what 'had long been an article of faith, that the 
public service had the major role in policy advice' (1996:120). He counselled 
against the 'monopolisation' of the 'higher levels' of the policy advising role by 
advisers (1996:130) and stated that: 
It is still true that most of the ground work for policy development ... must 
necessarily be done by departments. While ministerial advisers have become 
involved down to these levels, it is at the more strategic levels of policy 
development- the defining of the issues and objectives, the development and 
consideration of major options etc -that I perceive the balance to have shifted 
most towards ministerial advisers (1996:122). 
Recent studies of departmental secretaries reveal a perception that they face 
strong competition from ministerial advisers in policy making (Weller 2001; 
Halligan et al1996). They refer to the policy field becoming 'extremely 
crowded' (Halligan et al1996); having to 'compete for the policy attention of the 
minister' and 'fight for [a] position at the table' (Weller 2001:105); and facing 
competition for ideas at the technical as well as political level (Weller 2001:100). 
Though it was not the view of all, one secretary in Weller's study believed that 
public servants were no longer 'the initiators of policy thinking': 'We are there 
to give effect to policies and programs that are devised by others' (Weller 
2001:103). 
Thus the views of practitioners suggest that the role of advisers in policy 
making grew over the Hawke-Keating period and is more complex and 
important than has been suggested so far by the literature. 
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This chapter, then, considers two issues. First, in relation to the 'vertical' 
dimension of policy making, which refers to ministers and departments 
working together, what were the policy roles played by advisers in the Keating 
period? Were departments still mainly responsible for the work of generating 
ideas, policy development and policy implementation or was it the case, as 
some practitioners have suggested, that advisers were now significantly 
involved in this work? Second, in relation to the 'horizontal' dimension of 
policy making, recent studies have suggested that there may be some 
distinctive policy roles for advisers, which exist outside the important ongoing 
policy work that advisers do with departments (Dunn 1997, Ryan 1995, 
Halligan and Power 1992). The second part of the chapter explores and 
conceptualises these policy roles. 
Views of public servants, ministers and advisers 
Public servants in the study echoed the view that departments had lost their 
monopoly on policy advice in the Labor period. However Public Servant 4 did 
not describe a loss of policy role, but rather a loss of policy authority. He said 
that since 1983: 
Ministerial offices have become significant policy powerhouses in their own 
right, replacing a situation where effectively all of the policy expertise resided 
in the department, if you go back to Fraser years. I suppose there has been a 
diminution in the policy authority of the department, but not a diminution in 
its policy role, if you can understand the distinction. There is now an 
additional source of input, an additional source of interpretation, which stands 
alongside the department and in a good relationship works with the 
department. But the department is no longer the sole source ... of policy advice, 
as it was. 
Public Servant 3, who worked as a ministerial adviser in the Fraser years, saw 
the policy role of advisers in the Labor period as very different in the Keating 
period: 
They have a very different role to what they had when I was there. Very, very 
different. There's now an expectation that they have a significant policy 
advising role, that the department is only one of the sources of advice, and I 
think that's perfectly appropriate. Perfectly appropriate. fve seen with my 
current minister and his adviser, quite significant changes, positive changes 
being made by using the skills and the knowledge of the adviser, as well as our 
own expertise and knowledge. 
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There's been nothing done that I didn't want and all the things I wanted have 
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At the other extreme was an assistant adviser, Adviser 6, who down-played the 
influence of advisers in policy making. He felt advisers were boxed in, that 
there was not much room to move policy making. His experience was in 
working for a junior minister with very strained relations with the bureaucracy, 
whose lack of authority meant he had very few policy successes. The minister 
reportedly could not delegate, and allowed hls advisers very little scope for 
creative policy work. 
Many advisers felt their capacity for influence in policy making varied over 
time. Adviser 41 also stressed the variation between different offices: 
2 Public Servant 3 commented that Adviser 15 was 'pursuing his own line' but that was 'not 
negative in any way' as he was sensible and had a bureaucratic background. 
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Advisers can be tremendously influential in policy making. I actually believe 
whole programs or particular projects can appear because of the direct 
influence of a particular adviser. At some times it's a little bit dangerous the 
extent to which an adviser can influence the development of a program or of a 
policy. There is enormous capacity for advisers to have an enormous influence. 
But that would vary between offices. Perhaps not so great in our office ... [the 
junior minister's] staff had a much greater capacity to determine policy. 
As seen in Chapter Five, the behaviour of advisers in this study varied greatly. 
How line advisers engaged in policy making was part of their classification as 
'very active', 'active' or 'passive/reactive' (along with how they engaged with 
departments). Thus a significant role in policy making was possible, but it was 
not played by all advisers at all times. The policy role that this chapter now 
describes is that which the 'very active' advisers played, and which the 'active' 
advisers played at some times on some issues.3 It therefore describes what was 
possible at the time, the boundaries of the policy role. The chapter first 
considers the policy role in the vertical, and then horizontal policy dimensions, 
as outlined in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Policy roles of advisers 
- vertical: shared with departments 
- generating ideas 
- policy development 
- policy implementation 
- horizontal: independent roles 
- agenda setting 
- linking ideas, interests and opportunities 
-mobilising 
- bargaining 
- delivering 
THE VERTICAL DIMENSION OF POLICY: 
ROLES SHARED WITH DEPARTMENTS 
Most of the advisers in the 'active' and 'very active' group reported working 
closely with senior public servants in generating policy ideas, policy 
development and policy implementation. They saw these roles as shared with 
the department. 
3 The 'active' group were distinguished from the 'very active' group in that they reported being 
active on some issues at some times, whereas the 'very active' group tended to be continuously 
active in pursuing policy change or policy agendas. 
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Generating policy ideas 
Many 'active' and 'very active' advisers saw initiating policy ideas as a 
fundamental aspect of their work as adviser. For example Adviser 15 stated 
that one of the two key elements of the adviser's role was to 'provide an 
injection of new ideas, different approaches and new perspectives, ... [to] get 
new things off the ground'. Adviser 19 described the role of advisers as 'to 
generate ideas, test them out and run with them'. Adviser 18 explained: 
That's the valid role now for advisers, to be ... coming up with new ideas of 
their own. The department is not the only generator of new ideas and new 
programs and new initiatives. The ministers and their offices take on that role 
as well .... Certainly Minister Ivory encourages us to both come up with new 
ideas and to give our advice on things that the portfolio is putting to us. So it's 
both initiating and being part of the creative process as well. 
Most ministers saw this as part of the adviser's role and what they expected 
their advisers to do.4 Minister Orange expressed a clear expectation that his 
advisers would come up with new policy ideas: 
They [had] an essential role in being hooked into industry and consumer 
networks and feeding in ideas for new policies and new directions .... An 
adviser has to have listening points out in all directions and be getting good 
solid information coming from as wide a range as possible, so that they can 
actually analyse all that, put it all together and come up with new ideas, rework 
solutions to fit problems, or create new ways about putting new policy up. 
Minister White consciously recruited 'people who think ahead with ideas and 
things that we could do'. Some ministers were forthright in their desire for new 
policy ideas to come from partisans. Minister Red held this view: 
The only place for policy is the minister's office .... I think if we have 
departmental-led policy it's very different from ministerial office-led policy and 
it is the Labor caucus and the Labor ministry that ought to be driving policy 
and implementing it .... Good policy in government ... ought to come from what 
was promised in election speeches, it ought to come from what was won 
through Labor conferences to establish policy .... And then having agreed what 
the policy position is, you then ask the department to produce the documents. 
That advisers were often the source of new policy ideas was attested to by the 
fact that some public servants complained about this. It created work for them, 
4 Only two ministers (Minister Blue and Minister Crimson) stated that they did not seek policy 
ideas from their advisers. Nor did they seek them from the department; they were the 
generators of ideas themselves. Both had written books on their portfolio policy areas. 
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policy change which the public service could not meet: 
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known in the media and I don't think the bureaucracy has the skills to handle 
that day to day continuous 'what are we going to do today?' push and it needs 
to be generated by ministerial staff, and that's where it is. 
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Advisers could be conscious of the pressures they created for the department 
by generating new ideas. One 'very active' adviser acknowledged: 
You might have a good idea in the office so you ring the Assistant Secretary 
and say 'can we have a brief on this tomorrow please?'. Then you'll have 
another good idea to ring through, then another and another. So the 
department is often put under pressure by advisers (A15). 
Adviser 8 recognised how 'overwhelming' it must be for the public servants she 
dealt with as: 'I tend to go into a room and say "here's these ideas, here's some 
more ideas, what about this idea, what about that idea, could we do this, what 
would be the political position on that?".' 
Advisers usually sent their ideas to the department to be developed. In this 
sense some advisers described themselves as 'creating the seed of an idea' (A34) 
or as being the 'flint spark that sparks off an idea' (A26). Departments could 
react in various ways to the new policy ideas that advisers initiated. Adviser 14 
described three ways that departments could respond. In the first way the idea 
was absorbed by the department: 
It can disappear. They say they are working on it and it has to go through a 
long policy process. It disappears for a long time but then it may slowly float 
back up to the top. The department may then send it to you after they've 
worked it through and its basically your idea in a policy guise. It has become 
their idea. 
The second way was where the minister's office was more directive: 
The adviser puts an idea forward to the department in a more committed or 
forceful way. Then the idea gets labelled by the department as a 'minister's 
office idea' and it has a very negative ring about it. So they may work on it 
reluctantly but as time goes on they begin to own it. Then it develops a 
momentum of its own and you no longer have to fight for it. 
The third way was where the idea could be taken up by an influential and 
responsive public servant. She described an example of this process: 
One Christmas quiet period I went over to the department and talked to the 
Dep Sec and some others about an idea I had for new policy. They were 
adamant that it couldn't happen. It would result in substandard [services]. They 
just said 'no, no, no!!' ... I spoke to the minister about it and he took it very 
seriously and said he wanted it to happen. Next thing we know one of the First 
Assistant Secretaries came over (one who was very innovative) saying he had 
this idea ... Basically he decided to run with the idea so presented it as his. He 
was the type of bureaucrat who likes to work towards the minister's agenda. 
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Another 'very active' 
In the office I work in we start a lot of work, we write a lot of stuff ourselves 
rather than wait on the department to produce the material for us. So if there's 
a new policy direction it isn't unusual for our office to write the first policy 
paper and then send that to the department and say we want more work done 
or what do they think about this (AOl). 
Advisers who did this described it as very hard work and as 'literally crafting 
the agenda' (A07). This was seen as a way of keeping control of the idea its 
original formulation and of forcing the department to engage in detail with the 
5 Adviser 14 had advised ministers on the same policy area for over five years and was 
acknowledged by public servants as having had significant influence on the policy agenda over 
this period. Some policy initiatives were described as 'hers'. Another adviser said that all the 
changes that had occurred over the last five years 'had a bit of her blood in it' (A40). 
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idea. It could also enable the idea to gain some momentum and authority 
before it was exposed to the department, as Adviser 1 explained: 
The risk is if you do have a big new idea and you let the department in too 
early on, it could jeopardise it, because they're a powerful little group, the 
senior departmental people, a few phone calls ... give it the kiss of death and it 
will never see the light of day. 
Thus, in contrast to earlier research, this study found that advisers could play 
significant roles in generating policy ideas. It was an important part of the role 
conception of many 'active' and 'very active' advisers, and many ministers 
expected this of their advisers. Many advisers saw this as a role they shared 
with departments. 
Developing policy 
Developing policy can be understood as the process of moving from an initial 
policy idea or policy problem to a proposal for a decision. Policy development, 
or policy formulation, has been described as 'a process of defining, considering, 
and accepting or rejecting options' (Howlett and Ramesh 1995:122) and as 'the 
setting of objectives and the means to achieve them' Gohn 1998:204). It includes 
the crucial elements of analysing and designing policy. 
Some public servants expressed a sense of ownership of policy development 
work: 'I think the department feels strongly that it has the responsibility to 
pursue the policy development, no matter where the idea is generated from' 
(P03). Some advisers also commented that 'the department likes to own policy 
development' (A14). There could be resistance to advisers being involved in 
policy development, as Public Servant 5 indicated: 
What you're after from the minister and their office is direction, not policy 
development .... If you've got people in minister's offices who want to develop 
policy, the details of it, they're not serving their minister. There are hundreds 
of people who can do all that sort of rubbish for them. What they should be 
doing is trying to make sure everything is headed in the right direction, not that 
some particular policy is developed well. 
Yet interviews with ministers, advisers and public servants in this study 
indicated that the ministerial office was at times an important locus of policy 
development. Many ministers and advisers saw advisers' work in policy 
development as a crucial part of ensuring ministerial direction over policy in 
the portfolio. 
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Advisers could play critical roles where the minister was not happy with the 
policy work of the department. 'This could be because the department was 
running a different agenda or because of problems with quality (Silver, Gold). 
In such cases the policy competence of advisers could be crucial in enabling 
ministers to pursue their objectives, by reducing the ministers' reliance on the 
department for policy development. 
However advisers and ministers in the study also reported that advisers could 
be routinely involved in policy development, jointly with the department. 
Many advisers were aware that the department's role of developing policy 
ideas into submissions gave it considerable advantages in shaping policy, and 
were committed to ensuring they countered this, as Adviser 15 explained: 
Generally in terms of political control ... you are always reliant on the 
department to produce the papers and write up or develop the ideas. ... This 
gives them the chance to frame the discussion how they'd like to. Then you're 
reliant on the advisers to say ''No, we don't want it this way, we want it another 
way" and keep pushing and pushing. 
Adviser 30 reported being routinely involved in overseeing and steering the 
department's policy development work. She said: 'You may find out the 
department is heading off down a particular track and you have to say to them 
"No way Jose". It's about steering and guiding policy in a way that meets our 
agenda.' Advisers could also be involved in what she called 'refining and 
focusing' policy development. 'This meant responding to the department's 
initial work at an early stage. Minister Black saw this as the most important 
point for advisers in policy development: 
If [the advisers] had an idea or I had an idea -or the department did- I found a 
good way of crystallising our thinking on it would be to ask the department to 
do a memo on the issue, giving options .... It's then you talk to the adviser and 
get them to consider the idea and ask them if they have a different view. That 
is a critical point for the adviser in policy making ... - taking the department's 
work and refining it, or making judgements on it .... We'd sit down and go 
through that document and discuss the policy questions. It was at that point 
that they were very important in providing policy analysis and policy 
innovation. 
As well as steering and refining the department's policy work, advisers could 
be more deeply involved in policy development. They could work closely and 
iteratively with the department in jointly 'working up' policy proposals. 'This 
was seen as desirable by some public servants, such as Public Servant 4, who 
said: 
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It is desirable that subject matter experts who are advisers should participate 
with the subject matter experts in the department in the development of policy 
from its early stages. That way not only is there a high level of understanding in 
the minister's office of the detail of the policy, but there is a high level of 
ownership, and there is also a degree of confidence in the department that it is 
truly reflecting the will of minister. 
However he felt that advisers who were not subject matter experts were not in a 
position to 'participate on an equal footing' with the department. Adviser 28 
stressed that to be able to be deeply involved in policy development with the 
department required 'assiduous contact' with senior public servants and much 
effort: 
It requires a lot of effort, a lot of talking, a lot of time. ... And a lot of reading .... 
You've got to know what you're talking about, you've got to know the detail of 
these issues before you can really become a valued interlocutor on them. 
A 'very active' adviser, Adviser 15, explained how he worked jointly with the 
department in writing policy submissions: 
I've trained the department ... to send me over something quick and dirty, 
informal. Then let's work on it together .... I can say "that's the direction we're 
going". Then they're on track from the start .... The way I work (and most 
advisers do I think) is that all subs go through a few drafts between the adviser 
and the department .... It's better if they write what you want them to write. 
Some advisers wanted deep engagement in the development and consideration 
of options that occurred within the department. They felt to influence policy 
they had to be 'involved in all the interchange'. This could involve 'pulling out' 
divergent views from different areas of the department and 'picking apart' 
positions which were cohering within the department, to 'keep a richness in the 
policy debate' (A27). Adviser 7 stressed this was crucial in shaping policy 
outcomes: 
To be a good adviser you have to go down and be in it. You've got to know 
what all the options are. Otherwise if you come in at the stage where they've 
developed their preferred option, it is likely to be the lowest common 
denominator. 
Such an approach clearly clashes with any desire by departments to 'own' 
policy development. Yet not all advisers were involved to such a degree. 
Those termed 'passive/ reactive' were not deeply involved in policy 
development. 
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I've been involved in a few exercises where advisers have and 
made I've done that a of times with advisers in the Finance 
Minister's and Treasurer's offices. I think there are skills am,ongst 
rn<:1nr!<Y<: and devise an 
u.u<au.,. But it's not done very 
some expressed 
not advisers were 
saw it as a fundamental of 
Advisers' work in implementation involved steering, lifting technical decisions 
up to political ensuring that implementation happened in the right 
way, ensuring it happened at alL Some advisers reported being involved 
in drafting guidelines for new programs and pilot projects, attending 
departmental workshops and other detailed implementation activities. 
Advisers who took a strong interest implementation had several aims. Some 
felt it was important to ensure that political advantage flowed from the 
implementation of decisions; especially that political capital was gained from 
funding choices and funding processes. Some advisers felt that being involved 
implementation was an important part of delivering policy outcomes. Their 
1 
to 
r~~"''"'"'"'""'''"'i- ... I consider !.mplE!ml<!nt:atton 
an adviser. An adviser must be mcmiitor.ing 
au''" ... '"""'Y essential because what we're on about is outcomes, not 
of paper. To do a for a minister 
to care about outcomes. And to ...,..,,"''rrl,u•o outcomes really 
down into the detail of a very dose eye on things. And 
pressure. 
My work in implementation involves speeding up things, 
making sure things are going in the right direction and removing blockages. A 
lot of advisers ignore implementation, or don't put much energy into but I 
am really committed to it, probably because of my knowledge and experience 
in the bureaucracy. I believe the greatest threat to good ideas is the 
bureaucracy. They can kill off good ideas so easily. They can not do anything 
and let time kill it. Or they can do things the wrong way. I believe to really 
deliver something, good ideas need to be implemented in the right way .... You 
really have to be right on the ball, you have to be a real tiger with it and a lot of 
it's unpopular work, behind the scenes - that is where you really make things 
hum and happen. And happen in the right way. 
Adviser 41 felt paying attention to implementation was 'imperative': 
As a long time bureaucrat I've seen numerous instances of departments 
thwarting ministerial intentions and governmental desires by simply not 
producing, just not doing it. Receiving directions and then ensuring that 
nothing happens .... What is politics after all? Politics is all about implementing 
the policy. 
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Advisers could also be drawn into implementation issues by client or lobby 
groups who saw them as a channel to ministers to complain about the 
department's activities. Minister Red commented that community groups often 
sent her the message through her advisers that 'you know how you think it is 
happening, well it is not.' The ongoing operation of programs could also be 
very political. This was especially the case with Commonwealth-State 
programs, where advisers reported being drawn into the detail of 
administrative conflicts, which often had to be resolved at a political level. 
Thus advisers who looked after joint programs often played very active roles in 
implementation. 
Some advisers also saw implementation as providing opportunities for further 
policy development. Adviser 22 recalled when he took over responsibility for a 
small program and discovered the agency that administered it 'wanted to 
spend its money largely on studies and stuff rather than doing it'. Against 
strong resistance from officials ('they were basically very unhappy, but we 
dragged them kicking and screaming') he forced a change to more practical 
action: 
When I took over looking after it ... I said ... 'if you want to get some additional 
money ... we're going to have to start delivering some high profile points on the 
board.' And the only way to do that is to forge stronger links with reality and 
with stakeholders and what the community want. 
His strategy for changing the implementation 'paid off' when new money 
flowed into the program: 
That came out of these building blocks that we'd created earlier. This is an 
example of where you can use implementation to drive further policy 
development .... The reason we got that new money in my view is because we'd 
made that fundamental change in the delivery of the stage 1 and got the profile 
and the points on the board and ... got the stakeholders on side and it was 
hugely popular. 
Thus implementation could be very political and 'very active' advisers could 
place great stress on it in their understanding of their policy role. 
Conclusion: the vertical dimension of policy 
Many of the advisers in the 'active' and 'very active' group reported working 
closely and routinely with senior public servants in generating policy ideas, 
policy development and policy implementation. They saw these roles as shared 
181 
with the department. This was possible because some had considerable policy 
competence (particularly as policy specialists), because they saw this as part of 
their role as 'partisan policy advisers', and because their ministers expected it. 
Public servants appeared to accept their involvement in this work, but there 
were also tensions. Some public servants felt a sense of ownership about policy 
development and program management. 
THE HORIZONTAL DIMENSION OF POLICY: 
INDEPENDENT ROLES 
The study also found that there were important policy roles played by advisers 
at this time which were distinct from their work with departments. It was in 
these roles that advisers believed they could be very influential in government 
and could make a real difference in policy outcomes, even though they were 
not decision makers. These policy roles are distinct because they belong solely 
to advisers. They occur within the 'horizontal' dimension of policy making 
(Colebatch 1998). It is this work that the second part of the chapter 
conceptualises. 
A typology of distinctive policy making roles 
There are five aspects to 'very active' advisers' work in this arena of policy 
making. They derive from how advisers themselves talk about their work. All 
five could be important in shaping or influencing policy outcomes. Advisers 
believed that this work could be critical in whether policy change occurred at 
all. The five roles were agenda setting; linking ideas, interests and 
opportunities; mobilising; bargaining; and 'delivering'. 'Delivering' refers to 
bringing the four other roles together in consistently working towards the 
achievement of a policy objective. 
1. Agenda setting 
Agenda setting is policy work in which political actors are often seen as pre-
eminent (Kingdon 1995). Ministers are the key players in agenda setting, but 
advisers are critically placed to provide input to their thinking in having access 
to both political and technical information, and being linked into relationships 
with key players both inside and outside of government. Their role arises from 
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their proximity to the minister; their partisanship; and their strategic location 
'thin t 6 WI governmen . 
Advisers could help the minister to craft the agenda by coming up with ideas, 
searching for ideas to fit the agenda and lifting ideas onto the agenda. This 
could be seen at Budget time, when ministers decided the themes or priorities 
for their portfolio budgets. Advisers helped ministers to draft major speeches 
and key policy statements setting out future policy directions for the portfolio. 
Advisers also played important roles in developing election commitments and 
election platforms, which set the agenda for the next tell?- of government: 'The 
time when you came up with ideas is during an election campaign. Then you 
have the time and the freedom and you can do it all yourself- write it and cost 
it on the back of an envelope!'(A34). 
Public servants commented on the importance of advisers in this sense. They 
were 'the key to it all' (P08) in terms of getting the minister interested in or 
committed to a policy proposal. Minister Brown stated that advisers 'have a big 
influence on the agenda and the public perception of the agenda'. 
Advisers were not only important in helping ministers to craft the agenda, they 
also did important work in agenda management. This involved understanding 
the array of interests and ideas within the policy area and how to steer amongst 
them to achieve the minister's objectives. Advisers were well placed to play 
this role because of their links into the policy community and their work in 
managing the minister's relationships with interest groups and stakeholders. 
Advisers often liaised directly with interest groups and had much contact with 
them. They were often those with first hand knowledge of the agendas of 
individuals and groups and how hard and soft their positions were. 
'Very active' advisers could also influence agendas as policy advocates within 
government. Adviser 8 was an adviser who was extremely active in agenda 
setting as a policy advocate. She had worked for a lobby group for seven years 
before she became a ministerial consultant to the minister in charge of that 
policy area. She maintained good links with lobbyists in that policy 
6 Much agenda setting literature is about how groups external to government get policy ideas 
onto government agendas, and stresses the importance of resources, public opinion and the 
media (Cobb and Elder 1983; Cobb and Ross 1997). Advisers' work in agenda setting is largely 
internal to government, about crafting the formal agenda as opposed to the public agenda 
(Cobb and Ross 1997:7). Advisers talked about agenda setting where they were helping to 
create formal agendas with little reference to the public or the media except as a negative force 
(cf Kingdon 1995). The interests amongst which they pegged their agendas existed within 
government and within policy communities: their work was about processes internal to the 
policy community and internal to government. 
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community. (Links with and understanding of interest groups could be highly 
prized by ministers in recruiting staff.) While still an activist she had convinced 
the lobby groups to put a particular policy issue ('policy issue A') onto their 
agenda for the next election. As an adviser she convinced her minister to put 
policy issue A on the government's agenda for the next election. She was now 
developing a package of measures to address policy issue A: 
Basically I've put together a one-and-a-half page draft of ideas, things that we 
can do on the ... issue. I wrote it up, put all my ideas down, then sent it to the 
department for comment and tried to generate some ideas within our office. 
And I've sent it around to other people. I've already sent my ideas out to the 
Prime Minister's office, [and] other ministers' offices. 
In her time as an activist she had developed good links with the NSW minister 
and the head of the NSW department. She went to Sydney and talked to them 
about her ideas, and hoped to come up with a joint proposal that would 
advance the agenda nationally by showing other states what was possible in 
this area. 
In another area she was trying to change the balance of the government's whole 
agenda on policy issue B. This involved talking to other ministers' offices about 
why the agenda needed to change; and asking the department to do a study 
which gathered data to show the need for a more balanced approach and the 
implications of pursuing the current agenda.7 She was having many 
discussions with an adviser in the Prime Minister's office and asking experts 
from outside of government to speak to this adviser to convince him of the need 
to change the government's agenda. The Prime Minister's adviser had forced 
other departments to make some concessions, but she saw this as a long term 
project that would require much pushing to achieve agenda change. She was 
strongly motivated to affect the government's policy agenda: 'Working in the 
non-government area and working here are both part of one agenda, moving 
the agenda forward and having an impact'. 
2. Linking ideas, interests and opportunities 
Linking ideas, interests and opportunities in policy making was often described 
as where advisers as individuals could have great impact on policy outcomes. 
'Very active' advisers tended to be energetic in pursuing this type of policy 
work. It had two elements. The first entailed recognising policy opportunities 
7 This was also a weapon to undermine the position of the department dominating the debate. 
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in government. The second involved making links between ideas, interests and 
opportunities. 
Adviser 22 described his approach in the following way: 
Working on policies and looking for new policy initiatives is a bit like surfing in 
that you watch the waves and you see the right wave and you jump on it and 
go for as long as you can ..... It's looking for those opportunities to get your 
policy agendas, and some of your ideas into contemporary government. 
To be successful in this, advisers emphasised the importance of both timing and 
opportunity: 
Timing is everything. Opportunity is everything. Opportunity is everything. 
Opportunities will open up and then they'll close. Forever. And if you are not 
in sync with that, you will be frustrated .... If you want to influence policy you 
must be there at the right time (A07). 
They also needed an ability to see and make links: 
ASO you could say has a lot of power over policy because he has the capacity to 
draw together and integrate everything. He sees links in things (A15). 
Advisers could link ideas and opportunities; or interests and opportunities. 
They could also create policy opportunities. 
Linking ideas and opportunities 
One aspect involved linking the minister's ideas into broader agendas within 
government. An example of this was finding out that an issue was high on the 
agenda of the Prime Minister's office at that time, and finding a way of getting 
the minister's ideas linked into that agenda. It could be finding out there was a 
major policy package being put together within government and getting 
funding for some projects into that package. Adviser 30 described the process 
in this way: 
On the proactive side, there is a requirement to recognise opportunities with 
policy, in a political sense. Say the government wants to spend some money, 
it's my job to think "what projects can we push through here?". Or where a 
debate is focused on a particular area there may be opportunities to progress 
issues. You've got to recognise where you can push things. 
Adviser 1 gave the following example: 
185 
For example someone decides we're losing on forests, we need another 
environmental issue, let's ... move the whole agenda onto the urban 
environment. That's a political consideration, and you need a policy to fulfil 
your political motives, and you put something together and suddenly it 
becomes the government agenda. That's the most exciting thing about being an 
adviser, when you can achieve that. 
Adviser 22 cited several examples of where he had seized political 
opportunities to get policy ideas in his portfolio endorsed. In one case he used 
the opportunity of the Prime Minister making a major policy speech to get two 
initiatives announced as government policy. One was a policy which his 
department had been trying to get off the ground for months and had been 
caught up in inter-departmental negotiations. The other was the development 
of a National Charter which had been opposed by elements within the portfolio 
and which looked like it was not going to succeed. After the Prime Minister's 
speech, there was no longer any argument about whether these initiatives 
would happen - it was just a matter of discussing how they would be done. 
Solutions were not necessarily 'pre-made'. At times advisers could sense an 
opportunity to advance policy in an area and then search for or craft a policy 
idea to fit that opportunity. 
Linking interests and opportunities 
Advisers reported using their personal relationships or contacts to bring about 
powerful alignments of interests which could impact on policy outcomes. They 
often called this 'bringing players together'.8 
In one example Adviser 15 had responsibility for an industry where he saw big 
opportunities that were not being taken up. Contracts in the area always went 
to foreign companies. The department's agenda was to put many little players 
together to form a consortium to tender for the big contracts, but they had not 
managed to win any contracts yet. The adviser had the idea that what was 
needed was one big Australian player, but the department 'wouldn't buy the 
idea'. So he rang the NSW Minister and spoke to him and his chief of staff. 
(His chief of staff was a former colleague; he had worked with him in another 
federal minister's office). He put forward the idea that they could use a state-
owned company as the basis for an Australian company in this area, by putting 
8 Networks of relationships and contacts were a very important resource to active advisers and 
were consciously cultivated. They referred to this as 'keeping up strategic contacts ... the more 
contacts you've got the more effective and powerful you are' (A22). 
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I a lot of time "this is up, if you 
want to influence it you need to to X and you need to to them at X 
time." ... I often to in the sector and say "these issues are on the 
"'~'>~:uua, you need to talk to X if you want to influence our minister -this is how 
you should go about it". I'll tell them who the are to talk to in the 
minister's offices. I'd say "this will cut 
been there are a :range of 
to influence to your :reform up is X". 
d. 9 stu 1es. sense some advisers displayed an 
this issue has 
person 
cre<atl!1tg opportunities policy Some 
active' and ex1pel~ie11cE!d advisers displayed a mastery of policy process which 
could very useful pursuing policy objectives. 
This linking role can seen grow out advisers' location government. 
as 
They operate within political worlds both within government (the ministry) 
and outside of government (with interest groups and other political parties). 
Their location gives them two critical resources which enable them to play the 
linking role: information and relationships. They have access to information 
about agendas that are rurming within government and opportunities that are 
9 reviews not only could structure the policy debate, but also create opportunities and 
momentum for policy change, both within the policy community and within government. One 
senior adviser explained her use of policy reviews in agenda setting: 'I ve had a bent for some 
time about how [--] is done .... I set up a reference to a Parliamentary Committee ... which has 
just reported. I wrote the terms of reference for the review and because I was unhappy with[--] I 
put that into the terms of reference' 
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emerging, as well as knowledge of the positions and interests of key political 
players and stakeholders. Their position in government also means that they 
are linked in relationships with key players both within the executive and the 
wider political environment, through which strategic alignments could be 
made. 
Advisers' descriptions of their work are reminiscent of Kingdon's (1995) work 
on agenda setting in which he describes the critical step in making policy 
change happen as the coupling of problems, solutions and political 
opportunities. He claims this 'coupling' work is done by 'policy entrepreneurs', 
and is most effective when a 'policy window' is open. Thus individuals can be 
critical in bringing about policy change. 
In some ways the policy work of advisers echoes Kingdon's descriptions of 
'policy entrepreneurs' .10 However his 'policy entrepreneurs' seem more passive 
than advisers describe themselves. While his entrepreneurs wait in readiness 
for policy windows to open (due to forces beyond their control) (1995:181), 
'very active' advisers appear more likely to be on the hunt for open windows or 
working to 'prise windows open'. 'Very active' advisers described their role as 
less about reacting to political developments than about pursuing, seizing or 
creating opportunities for policy innovation. 
3. Mobilising 
Mobilising was a very important role for advisers, one which could be critical in 
whether policy proposals succeeded or not. There were two elements to the 
mobilisation work that advisers did in policy making. The first involved 
providing energy or drive to ensure that proposals were 'kickstarted', stayed alive 
and progressed through the policy process. Advisers referred to 'driving the 
agenda and cracking the whip over it'; 'really putting the pressure on to get 
things happening' and 'keeping working on the certainty of the idea'. Public 
Servant 8 said: 'I think that ministerial advisers are the ones that really kick 
things along, really get things moving'. 
The second element of mobilisation involved building political support or political 
will both inside and outside of government. It could involve lobbying other 
ministers and their advisers to get support for a new policy, or working to 
1° Kingdon defined policy entrepreneurs as 'advocates who are willing to invest their resources 
- time, energy, reputation, money -to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in 
the form of material, purposive or solidary benefits'(1995:179}. 
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neutralise opposition to the minister's proposal, or mobilising political will to 
resist a change being imposed on the portfolio. Advisers referred to this as 
'working the political system really hard' (A22). Public Servant 6 commented 
that 'I think that's a very important role and ... in fact that's one of the things 
they should offer.' 
Both departments and ministers also had a role in building support. Often 
advisers and departments worked together to mobilise support at different 
levels of government, as Adviser 1 explained: 
If you've built up really good relationships with senior levels in the 
department, you can say ... 'you cover this Dep Sec, that Dep Sec, that FAS, that 
secretary ... use all your networks, do it today'. At the same time I'll be 
covering that adviser, that senior adviser, that parliamentary secretary. You are 
trying to influence all sources of advice to the other cabinet ministers. 
Ministers appeared to be too busy to meet more than occasionally with key 
players. Advisers did most of the 'leg work' (A01). Even where ministers 
talked, usually their advisers had met first.ll 
Advisers described three stages to mobilisation. The first was to get political 
support for an idea or proposal, sufficient to get it 'off the ground' and into 
development. Adviser 1 explained her approach: 
You've got to be very persuasive, articulate and have dogged determination. 
You can't afford to go away .... I've always taken the approach of blitzing 
people. You work out in your head who are the key players, in the different 
constituencies, the real head honchos. You come up with an idea. You write it 
down ... and you get the minister's commitment to it. 1his is ... before you even 
talk with the department. Then there is almost a two month period when 
you're blitzing all these key people, outside and inside the government. In 
other ministers' offices, in key departments. So eventually there's so much 
power ... there comes a point where it turns .... You're trying to build political 
will inside the government and community will outside the government. It's a 
way of surrounding the bureaucracy, and then you crunch in on them. And 
suddenly it's too big to fight. Too big for them to fight. 
A very important part of building political support entailed lobbying the 
powerful advisers in the three central ministerial offices (Prime Minister's 
office, Finance Minister's office and Treasurer's office). Minister Black 
explained why this was important: 
11 This work is analysed in more depth in Chapter Nine. 
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There is an inner circle of advisers who are very powerful. ... You had a small 
group of advisers, who tended to be the coordinating departments of PM&C, 
Finance and Treasury, and they were close to each other and it was hard to get 
things past them if they didn't agree. 
Securing the support of the Prime Minister's office could be critical in 
succeeding with policy, as Adviser 1 said: 
They know as soon as they give any small sign of affirmation you are going to 
take it and run, so the PM's office are very careful .... It's so important to get 
that tick because our current PM and his office are so fundamentally powerful 
in the building. Anything that gets the tick usually happens. ... I've generally 
learnt the hard way that you don't bother proceeding with anything new unless 
you've got those key offices behind you because they'll dud you every step of 
the way. 
While it may not be possible to persuade advisers in the Finance Minister's 
office and Treasurer's office to support the proposal, they could be neutralised 
or 'have their teeth taken out' by anticipating their positions and being ready to 
counter them. 
The second stage of mobilising was keeping up pressure on the department to 
do the work necessary to develop the proposal. This was referred to as 
'pushing' or 'driving' the department (described in Chapter Six). 
The third stage of mobilising involved securing support in cabinet for the 
minister's submission and winning the funding needed to realise the policy. 
Advisers could play very important roles in lobbying and positioning with 
other ministerial offices before cabinet. One minister described this work as 
'the bread and butter' of the adviser's job (Orange). Another saw it was 
'exceptionally important' (Black); for another it was 'crucial' (Purple). Advisers 
saw this as a fundamental part of their role: 
[Lobbying other advisers] is incredibly important. When the minister goes into 
cabinet, most often the decision is made before he gets there. ... It's important 
that I know what's going on and have sought to influence what will happen. I 
have to give him a clear idea of the support he can expect, what he should 
change when he gets there and who will oppose him .... Nine out of 10 times 
agreements are struck between advisers before it goes to cabinet or in meetings 
of ministers. For example on the [-]Statement [about to go to cabinet] ... I 
could tell you now 90% of it will definitely get up; 5% will probably get up and 
what 5% is in doubt (A07). 
This work could also be important to public servants, as Public Servant 1 
explained: 
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is dose to finalised then minister's office can 
role in with other ministers' offices. ::itltchmg 
to go to cabinet or that cut across 
role in that. There are 
you can win at a ministerial office level. 
Keating style of 
negotiations or pr,ep;anng to 
Tiris 
within government It that ministers are too busy to 
it frees ministers negotiations. Advisers reported it was 
often extremely times when ministers were available to meet 
and for any length Most ministers delegated sufficient authority to 
their advisers to be effectively involved in negotiations. Minister Orange 
described his expectations: 
Advisers are essential in negotiating policy- offices talk with authorisation and 
move it along, towards agreement. Usually getting the agreement of the 
minister as they go. Advisers rarely do it all alone, but it depends on the level 
of delegation allowed. 
Minister Grey saw it as 'a last resort' that problems would be resolved 'minister 
to minister'. Public servants also had this expectation: 
12 This work will be discussed in Chapter Nine. 
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A lot of things can be resolved ... between advisers in ministers' offices. I mean 
if departments can reach agreement, and advisers can reach ·agreement, it is 
frequently not necessary to actually engage the ministers, except in ratification 
of the final outcome (P04). 
Underpinning this work were clearly understood ways of interacting and 
authority structures between advisers, which enabled matters to be resolved. 
Critical to the processes of bargaining and negotiation was the strong authority 
of advisers in the three central offices (Prime Minister's office, Finance 
Minister's office and Treasurer's office). As will be seen in Chapter Nine, these 
advisers played the roles of arbitrators between different interests. They had 
the task of forging consensus within the ministry where possible and of setting 
the parameters and boundaries of policy exercises. 
While it is important to note that advisers were not decision makers in these 
interactions, their bargaining and negotiations could be decisive in shaping the 
policy options on which ministers decided. 
One example was where the government was developing a package of policy 
measures which covered a wide range of portfolios. As part of developing the 
package a group of advisers was convened in which six line ministers' offices 
and the three central ministers' offices were represented. The advisers' group 
played a critical role in defining or shaping alternatives for the package. It was 
operating at the same time as an interdepartmental committee (IDC) was 
working to develop options for the package. The advisers' group saw its role as 
to directly influence the work of the committee, effectively ruling proposals 'in' 
and 'out', and directing that certain options be developed. Adviser 1 who was 
in the group recounted: 
It was an IDC process, which advisers have no faith in .... So at the same time as 
the IDC was running- you'll often find this - a team of advisers was running 
parallel. I guess it's a safety net because you're not quite sure what is coming 
out of the IDC so you're running your own little show. All the advisers that 
were putting together the[-] package were sitting around the table and [I] 
finally convinced them to have an[-] component. 
The convenor of the group, Adviser 8, stated: 
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It's usually not a visionary or a vital package that comes out of an IDC. So by 
setting up this group of advisers that would run parallel to the IDC I wanted to 
try ... to get the ministerial advisers' discussions to influence the IDC so that 
stronger positions would then be taken in the package. So on the things that we 
got agreement on in our meetings then messages were sent back to the 
departments that this is what the advisers wanted in the package. And ... the 
things we didn't get agreement on well nothing was done about those. 
Advisers were also involved in bargaining with other political players (such as 
interest groups and other political parties) which could influence the shape of 
policy outcomes. They often reported having significant input to policy 
decisions because they were in the place where political negotiations were 
happening: 
An example was in the [-] negotiations when the government had to decide 
whether to agree or not agree with the Greens. The reason why I was able to be 
so influential was that I worked very quickly and I was in the minister's office 
where it was all happening. I produced a paper which became the blueprint for 
negotiations with the Greens and heavily influenced what was decided. I had 
influence because the negotiations involved both politics within Parliament 
House and public or community politics (A06). 
Adviser 33 gave an example of a major cut which was proposed by Finance to 
the department. His minister managed to convince the ERC that the proposal 
would not get through the Senate because the major interest groups had the 
support of the Opposition and Democrats who would oppose the legislation. 
The minister was told he had a year to come back with a package which would 
get through the Senate, but which also delivered major cuts. 
The department was at the centre of the process in drafting and costing the 
various options considered. However the shape of the final package was very 
much the outcome of negotiations over a long period with interest groups -
selling the idea that the cuts had to be made and figuring out what trade-offs 
were necessary to gain their support - and with advisers in the three central 
offices. These advisers had to be convinced that the package went far enough 
financially; that the sweeteners in it were necessary; and that it could be 
delivered politically. These negotiations shaped the package before it went to 
cabinet. The minister - his credibility and positioning - was obviously critical in 
all these negotiations. However they were mainly conducted through 
numerous conversations between the adviser and key political individuals. 
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5. Delivering 
'Delivering' policy was a term used frequently by very active advisers to 
describe what they saw as their ultimate or most important role in policy 
making. This concept should not be confused with the traditional notion of 
'policy delivery' which refers to policy implementation. What advisers referred 
to with this term was bringing all four tasks together (agenda setting; linking; 
mobilising and bargaining) and being consistent and constant in working 
towards the achievement of a policy outcome or policy objective. 
Some advisers said it was what their ministers expected of them; it was the 
adviser's responsibility to deliver the minister's agenda. Adviser 1 said: 
Advisers are meant to ensure and deliver on the implementation of the 
government's agenda .... The first year I basically responded to the minister's 
agenda. What he wanted to get up, I went and delivered. He wanted a 
National[-] Strategy- we delivered it. He wanted a Commonwealth[-] 
program, we delivered it. . .. Enormous expectations are placed upon you to 
deliver. 
Minister Orange expressed the concept of 'delivering'. He said that while it was 
important to have advisers who could understand or analyse policy, what he 
was really looking for was people who were 'good at making things work'; 
who could 'bring it all together and get it through the process' _13 
Advisers described 'delivering' as doing whatever it took to ensure a policy 
proposal got from the stage of its inception to a decision: guiding it through the 
processes of government; removing blockages; driving things along; 
negotiating with other players. Adviser 22 referred to this work as 'creating the 
means' of achieving policy outcomes. Advisers were well placed to do this, as 
many of the key players and processes they had to get through were at the 
executive level. 
Some advisers felt that this work was very influential; that if they had not been 
there looking after the policy idea - keeping it 'on the boil', smoothing its 
passage through the bureaucratic and political environment- then it would 
have foundered. They saw themselves as important in bringing policy ideas to 
their conclusions. This work was done in conjunction with departments and 
ministers, but those who were most focused on 'delivering' saw themselves as 
those responsible for seeing things through to the end. 
13 Hallway referred to this as 'navigating propositions forward though the political labyrinth in 
Parliament House to a point where decisions are made' (1996:134). 
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Adviser 41 described his role in 'delivering' a package of policy reform, and 
believed his work was critical to the achievement of that reform: 
I believe we in the office played an incredibly important part in achieving the [-
-1 Statement .... We provided the energy and the constant affirmation that this 
was a vitally important project that simply had to be achieved .... It is a project 
that I think but for the drive and the commitment of the minister's office it 
simply would have just meandered along and would not have been achieved. I 
believe the fact that there was somebody in the minister's office that said 'look 
I'm the person in this office that accepts responsibility for achieving this 
particular part of the minister's agenda and it's simply got to be achieved' 
actually led to its achievement. 
A public servant from the department described Adviser 41 as having 'quite a 
significant influence on policy' (P07). There were several aspects to his work in 
delivering this policy reform for the minister. First, once the minister had 
decided it was part of his main policy agenda, the adviser was involved in 
planning the strategy for bringing about the policy change. This involved 
choosing a policy mechanism, in this case a review committee: 
This was a mechanism for focusing and giving us something to run with .... Get 
your committee, get your report, ... hold consultations in a public way if you 
can to give yourself a profile. Get Prime Ministerial support, get the money, 
implement it .... Right at the outset we had discussions on the way to do this. 
And we agreed that this was a mechanism. We developed it and refined it as it 
went along. 
A critical part of achieving the reform was getting the Prime Minister's support 
for the proposal, which entailed persuading the Prime Minister's advisers of its 
political and policy merits. This happened early in the process, before the 
department had begun work on the policy proposal. Adviser 41 felt that: 
The Prime Minister's office were very important to the fact that the[-] 
Statement happened .... Without a tick from the relevant senior advisers and 
principal adviser within the Prime Minister's office the[-] Statement would not 
have happened. 
Another aspect of his work was mobilising the department to work on the 
agenda: 
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There were times when we cajoled and cajoled and cajoled. And asked ... 'is it 
fully understood that this is really important and this simply must be done?' ... I 
think initially they were disbelieving, they didn't think we could pull it off, they 
didn't think it was possible, it had never been done and wouldn't be achieved . 
... There was an enormous well of disbelief and incredulity in the department 
about the [-] Statement. They thought it was just a pipe dream. But we just 
said 'look we're doing it' and the department did it. 
The final stage of his work to deliver the policy reform involved lobbying ERC 
ministers, through their staff, to get agreement to fund the policy package. This 
was a difficult process: 
I think it was generally accepted that no new policy would get up unless it was 
vitally important to our re-election ... And so basically we set out on a major 
selling program trying to sell the [-] Statement as very good policy and 
consequently as very good politics. I was just adamant that it was really good 
politics .... I left lots of the meetings and briefings that I delivered with that 
feeling that well it is great but so are a million other things. 
The ultimate success of the statement was testimony to the minister's skill, 
vision and commitment, but also to the adviser's work at every stage of the 
policy process. His personal commitment and sense of responsibility for 
guiding the proposal through the necessary processes was vital. 'Delivering' 
the policy reform required enormous energy, ingenuity and persistence. 
Adviser 22 exemplifies the influence 'very active' advisers could have on policy 
outcomes, by operating through a network of 'horizontal' relationships. He 
brought to completion a major policy initiative which involved interests both 
inside and outside of government. He said 'I've been driving this agenda and 
cracking the whip over it for over a year now .... It's almost become a passion.' 
First he came up with an idea and brought a number of interests together. He 
had responsibility for a program which had a small amount of money to buy 
land for a certain purpose, but there was not enough money in the program to 
achieve its objectives. He identified a community group that also wanted to 
buy land in the same area for another purpose and had some money but not 
enough to achieve its aims. By making a coalition with this group and getting 
them to align what they were intending to do with his program objectives, they 
were able to greatly increase the amount of land that could potentially be 
bought, achieving two different objectives at the same time. 
However for this to occur, there were other major stakeholders who had to 
agree, whom he brought together to build what he called 'a coalition of 
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interests' in the proposal. He also had to smooth things over, because all three 
had different agendas. The stakeholders then drove the issue themselves 
outside of government, but his job was to help them at strategic times: 
I've been telling them the timetable, and been telling them how much they need 
to go for and really been working hard on the detail. I've organised meetings 
between them and the minister at strategic times ... I've briefed the PM's office. 
All the sort of usual things you do as an adviser, just working the political 
system really hard. 
As well as creating the idea and bringing the stakeholders together, it was his 
job to get more money. This was extremely difficult, but as the government 
swung into a pre-election period, circumstances became more favourable. 
Getting the money involved convincing an adviser in the Prime Minister's office 
of the value of the proposal. This was a person with whom he had a close 
relationship.14 
The department did not play much of a role in developing the proposal. The 
adviser did a lot of work himself, looking at property lists and maps with the 
help of a good friend in the department, who helped him 'on the quiet': 'just so 
we know that we've got all the arguments and the facts there so we can keep 
the issue going and unblock problems.' 
One problem he encountered was that someone senior in the department was 
hostile to the idea. He worked hard to bring this person around. This involved 
asking key individuals to lobby him: 
It's been a real process of working on him. . .. Know[ing] where he stands, 
know[ing] what his arguments are. Work[ing] up alternative arguments. 
Let[ting] people know what he's doing and work[ing] around him .... [We] got 
him in a pincer movement .... He's been brought along [now] which is good as 
he will have to deliver on it. 
There seemed to be no doubt in Adviser 22's mind that if he had not been 
working away constantly in the background on the proposal, driving it along, 
linking it to opportunities and unblocking problems, it would not have 
happened. Overall his assessment of his impact was this: 'I don't want to say 
it's totally my idea but the means that all this will occur is really mine.' 
14 Because this was a pre-election period 'it doesn't have to go anywhere near cabinet!' (A22). 
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Conclusion: the horizontal dimension of policy 
This section conceptualised the distinctive policy roles played by 'very active' 
advisers in the Keating government. Their policy work went beyond the work 
they did with departments in generating policy ideas, policy development and 
policy implementation. Based on their own descriptions of their work, the 
chapter outlined a typology of five distinctive policy roles: agenda setting; 
linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilising; bargaining and 
'delivering'. This work could be important in shaping policy outcomes. 
The thesis does not suggest that advisers were more important policy actors 
than either senior public servants or ministers, nor that these five policy roles 
were more significant than the work advisers did in assisting ministers and 
departments to work together in policy making. It described the roles 'very 
active' advisers could play within the horizontal dimension of policy without 
exploring questions of relative influence. 
CONCLUSION: 
HOW ADVISERS ENGAGED IN POLICY MAKING 
This chapter has explored how 'very active' and 'active' advisers engaged in 
policy making. Policy was central to advisers' work and their conception of 
their role. There are signs of a shift in the role of generating ideas towards 
ministerial offices. In the Keating period 'very active' advisers generated new 
policy ideas, and could be closely involved in policy development and policy 
implementation, jointly with departments. The role of advisers also grew over 
the Labor period to include important policy work performed outside the 
minister~epartment relationship. These distinctive policy roles - agenda 
setting; linking ideas, interests and opportunities; mobilising; bargaining and 
'delivering'- could greatly increase the capacity of ministers to direct policy in 
the portfolio, to pursue policy goals and to innovate. 
Advisers' distinctive policy roles grow out of their location within government. 
They exist at the intersection of the horizontal linkages of policy actors such as 
interest groups, policy specialists, senior departmental officials, cabinet 
ministers and other stakeholders which come together in policy making. Their 
location gives them two important resources : information and relationships. 
They are involved in a minister's overlapping relationships with other policy 
actors and are conduits for information within these relationships. With 
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sufficient skill, expertise and delegation from the minister they could be very 
effective players within these interactions. 
This chapter addresses the problem expressed in the some of the literature that 
advisers appear to be powerful policy players, but it is not clear what it is that 
they do (Ryan 1995; Colebatch 1998). Advisers' distinctive policy roles in the 
horizontal dimension of policy are difficult to observe and articulate but are 
crucial in modem complex policy making. The thesis provides a conceptual 
framework with which to view the policy roles glimpsed in other research 
(Ryan 1995; Dunn 1997; Halligan and Power 1992). 
These findings have two main implications. First, advisers cannot be viewed as 
peripheral actors in policy making. The work of 'very active' individuals 
located so close to decision makers could have an effect on policy process and 
policy outcomes. Advisers could be important state policy actors with 
distinctive roles in policy making, which extend far beyond analysing the 
department's work and injecting a political perspective into policy advice. This 
work largely occurs within the 'horizontal' dimension of policy, where various 
players interact across organisational boundaries. 
The second implication of the findings relates to ministers' involvement in 
policy making. Through their distinctive policy roles, 'very active' advisers 
could enable ministers to engage with the complexity of the policy process. 
They could enhance ministers' capacity to influence policy as it is shaped 
through multiple interactions of policy actors in different organisations. Some 
ministers in the study had high expectations of what their advisers would do 
for them in policy making. Active and skilful advisers who could perform 
these roles could be vital to a minister's pursuit of policy objectives in 
government. 
This broadens our understanding of advisers' function as a mechanism of 
political control. If political control is understood as being able to effectively 
steer government, then it requires an ability to devise, develop and deliver 
partisan policy goals. As partisans, advisers can contribute to the executive's 
capacity to steer government not only in their policy work with departments, 
but also through distinctive policy roles played within the 'horizontal' 
dimension of policy making. 
One of the problems of political control can be seen as engaging in the 
complexity of modem policy processes. The literature which sees the problem 
of modem leadership as a loss of capacity at the centre of government (referred 
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to as 'hollowing out of the state' (Weller, Bakvis and Rhodes 1997)), views the 
executive as ill-equipped to deal with modern government, which is 
characterised by overlapping networks, fragmented policy structures and 
multiple policy actors. Others argue that policy making has become more 
difficult as 'policies and interrelationships become more complex, and as the 
electorate fractures along multiple fault-lines' (Davis 2000:241-2). Thus the 
policy role of advisers can be seen as developing in ways which meet the needs 
of ministers in pursuing political control, by enabling partisan engagement in 
modern complex policy making. 
Some of the most important policy work explored in this chapter was the 
bargaining and negotiating that occurred amongst ministerial offices. The next 
two chapters explore this work, the networks between advisers which underpin 
it, and how it functions as a coordination mechanism within the executive. 
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Eigh~ 
Networks and inner circles: 
Advisers' coordination role 
The fifth aspect of the role of advisers in the Keating years was coordination. 
Ministerial advisers performed a significant role in coordinating within the 
executive. This occurred at two levels: within the ministry (between 
ministerial offices) and within a portfolio (between senior and junior ministers). 
Their coordination activities ranged from keeping channels of communication 
open and information flowing within the ministry, to consultation, negotiation 
and even, at times, de facto decision making. The three central ministerial 
offices (the Prime Minister's office, the Treasurer's office and the Finance 
minister's office) played special coordination roles. (These are explored in 
detail in the next chapter). 
Advisers' coordination work was very important to the government because 'a 
government's ability to determine political direction and priorities depends on 
its capacity to function collectively' (Campbell and Halligan 1992:17). This role 
could ensure that ministers were acting in accordance with whole of 
government agendas and that conflict between ministers was resolved 
appropriately. It was also important to the executive's dominance that the 
resolution of internal conflicts and cross-portfolio issues was done by partisans, 
rather than the bureaucracy. 
This chapter describes how the networking that occurred between advisers 
operated as a coordination mechanism within the executive. It first discusses 
coordination in government. It then identifies particular features of the Keating 
period which shaped the coordination role of advisers. It then examines in 
detail the networking that advisers did with other advisers. Finally it identifies 
three features of this networking that enabled it to operate as a coordination 
mechanism within the executive. 
COORDINATION IN GOVERNMENT 
In parliamentary systems of government, coordination is seen as 'a primary 
political virtue, espoused by executives and practised through a complex array 
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of agencies and routines' (Davis 1997:145). In the complexity of modern 
government, coordination involves managing diversity and conflict within the 
executive, and attempting to achieve some central direction and overall 
cohesion in what government decides to do. There is no simple process for 
achieving coordination within the executive; it is an ongoing process of 
negotiation, contest and attempts to exercise control. 
Australia's Westminster style of government provides strong centrifugal forces 
and fragmentation within the executive. Ministers have individual 
responsibility for departments, and their reputations rest on achieving certain 
objectives and goals within their own portfolio. These objectives often involve 
spending money. There is thus a strong pull towards individual political 
imperatives amongst ministers. To resolve policy conflicts and prioritise 
competing claims there is a need to shape and enforce a 'whole of government 
view'. The fundamental bases of conflict within the executive mean that they 
require 'active, political forms of management' (Painter 1987:10). 
Campbell (1998) sees the relationships between ministers as one of two 
'gearboxes' which a government needs to engage effectively if it is to have the 
capacity to govern. The political executive needs to achieve 'coherence through 
collective deliberation' (1998:228). Thus coordination within the political 
executive is vital to the pursuit of political control. Executive coordination is 
also seen in the literature as increasingly difficult to achieve (Rhodes 2000d). 
Advisers have been described as one of three executive coordination 
mechanisms, the other two being cabinet and strong central bureaucratic 
agencies (Davis 1997). However the coordination role of advisers is often seen 
as confined to the 'political domain' and concerned with what is termed 
'political coordination' (Davis 1997). Policy coordination is seen as the role of 
cabinet and central bureaucratic agencies. Yet the role of cabinet as the main 
executive coordination mechanism for both policy and political coordination 
has been seen by some as in decline (Smith Marsh and Richards 1993:584-587; 
Campbel11998). The complexity and pace of modem government has placed 
enormous pressures on the cabinet workload which threaten to make cabinet 
unworkable as a decision making forum. This has resulted in attempts to 
reduce cabinet deliberations to only the most significant or high level issues. 
The trend towards reducing cabinet business has led some British writers to 
suggest that the coordination role of cabinet has moved elsewhere (Smith, 
Marsh and Richards 1993:585). Smith, Marsh and Richards (1993) suggest that 
the likely candidates for assuming the role of coordination within the executive 
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are the Prime Minister, the Cabinet Office and the Treasury, but that there is 'a 
lot more room for investigation into these issues' (1993:587). 
In Australia, the cabinet system underwent important changes in its operation 
in the late 1980s under Hawke which, according to Campbell and Halligan, 
increased its effectiveness because it enabled cabinet to focus on strategic policy 
problems (1992:76-77). In 1987 a new cabinet was created, based on portfolio 
(or senior) ministers assisted by junior ministers, in which all departments were 
represented. Because there were fewer portfolios and larger departments, more 
was resolved within portfolios than ever before, rather than coming to cabinet 
(1992:77). The amount of cabinet business in the Hawke period was 
substantially lower than in the Fraser period, and there was a marked decline in 
the volume of cabinet business after 1987.1 According to Codd: 
The volume of business being dealt with in cabinet and its committees ... has 
been substantially reduced, with a counterpoint increase in the extent to which 
ministers take decisions themselves, either singly or in a collective fashion 
through more informal consultation with colleagues (1990:14). 
Page (1997) has suggested that the result of these changes has been 'the 
development of a network of structures and procedures which have changed 
the collegial nature of cabinet and the balance of forces operating in and around 
it' (1997:133). 
The trend towards reducing cabinet business which began under Hawke, was 
taken even further under Keating, according to ministers in this study. In the 
Keating period more things were resolved outside of cabinet, often between 
two or three ministers including one or more of the three key ministers (Prime 
Minister, Treasurer and Finance minister). 
This chapter argues that such informal decision making was only possible 
because of the work of advisers. Through their informal relationships and 
networks, ministerial advisers provide an arena for policy coordination which 
overlays and surrounds that of cabinet. Painter (1987) uses the notion of 
'arenas' in analysing coordination processes. He states: 
Arenas are settings for competing teams and players to come together for 
contests .... They exist within and around formal structures and procedures .... 
Each arena embodies 'rules of the game' both formal and informal (1987:10-11). 
1 Page (1997) reports that 'compared with the figures for 1985-86, by 1989-90 the numbers of 
cabinet committee meetings held and papers submitted to cabinet had halved, while the 
number of decisions taken was reduced by one-third; by 1994-5 the numbers had declined 
further' (1997:129). 
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The relationships between advisers were an important arena for policy 
coordination in the Keating period, one which was vital to the effective 
operation of cabinet (the ministerial forum for coordination) and which 
operated alongside the bureaucratic arena. The networking between advisers 
in different offices could reinforce, modify or negate the policy coordination 
done by central agencies at the bureaucratic level. Thus the informal 
interactions between advisers were an important adjunct to the cabinet system 
at this time. 
Both ministers and public servants in the study saw this work as an important 
part of what advisers contributed to government, and expected that advisers 
would perform this role. It was work that ministers did not have time to do 
themselves but it was vital to the effective operation of the government. 
Fundamental to this function was the role of advisers in the three central 
ministerial offices (Prime Minister's office, the Treasurer's office and the Finance 
minister's office); as well as a dear power structure amongst advisers and 
unwritten rules of appropriate behaviour. This chapter explores the structures, 
relationships and practices underpinning the work advisers did together in 
executive coordination. 
ADVISERS WORKING TOGETHER: THE KEATING PERIOD 
IN CONTEXT 
The contact between ministerial advisers has been a question of interest to most 
of the main studies of Australian advisers. Early studies suggested such 
contacts constituted 'an informal infrastructure' that could serve the interests of 
the ministry as a whole as well as the interests of particular ministers (Forward 
1977:164; Smith 1977:153). Forward (1975, 1977) and Walter (1986) asked 
advisers to rank the degree of contact they had with staff of other ministers. 
The results of those surveys appear in the table below: 
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'medium' and 
have 
develop more extensive 
Making such comparisons is as is more significant is what occurs 
within those contacts (is it merely social or does it involve negotiation and 
bargaining on policy matters?). earlier quantitative studies are opaque 
this sense; it may be that what occurred the 'limited' contact reported by 
Hawke staffers was of more significance than the more 'extensive' contact of 
earlier cohorts. In fact, there may not be such a difference between Walter's and 
Dunn's findings, if it were known what occurred within the adviser contacts 
Walter detected. 
A view of changes in adviser networking over the Hawke-Keating period was 
provided by two advisers of long standing this study, Adviser 32 and 
2 The categories were not numerically defined. The emphasis is on breadth of contact but it is 
not dear what this means. Later, it is seen that most Keating advisers had very t"' .. ''"'t"''.n 
contacts- not necessarily broad. 
relationships 
or ...... ~_ ... _.,._.., 
also meant advisers 
contact was more functional, there were many whom one not see. 
was particularly case on either side of the economic and social policy 
divide. who in an economic revealed the 
this divide in recounting a story about a friend who worked in a social policy 
portfolio: 
I was on the phone to an old friend and I said 'where do you work?' and he said 
'I work for Minister Lilac'. Which is the next door office. He was on the other 
side of the wall from me as I spoke to him! I was horrified to discover he had 
worked there for the whole three years I had worked in Minister Amber's office 
and I had never met him. That's next door. That's sad. 
Thus according to two advisers long standing, in Keating period there 
was less social contact between staff, but more deliberate 'networking'. This 
3 long time labor adviser Patti Warn commented that 'the layout 
defies easy socialising and militates against the useful exchange 
(1996:161 ). 
new Parliament House 
gossip and information' 
was partly because staff had more time to do it and also because it was 
necessary to counter the isolating effects of new Parliament House. 
Features of the Keating period 
Several features of the Keating period also drove the development of a policy 
coordination role for advisers. 
As mentioned earlier, the trend towards reducing cabinet business which began 
under Hawke was taken further under Keating. More things were resolved 
outside of cabinet, and networking between advisers became the means of 
informally resolving matters between ministers. Keating also had a very 
dominant style within cabinet and the ministry. Knowing his view on a matter 
or influencing that view was crucial, and therefore interaction with staff in his 
office was important, and they were particularly powerful. Because his style 
was to concentrate his energies on a list of key policy issues, his staff managed a 
large number of policy issues of lesser interest to him. 
The Keating period was also characterised by 'feverish' policy activity (Keating 
in Gruen and Grattan 1993:xxiii). The challenge for the government was to 
produce policy initiatives to counter the impression that the government had 
run out of ideas. The Keating government was 'driven' by big policy initiatives, 
attempting to gain political momentum by generating policy momentum 
(Watson 2002:524,642). Keating himself espoused a 'culture of continuous 
initiative' and felt the 'crime' in politics was inaction and 'not doing enough' 
(Watson 2002:145,506,689). The second Keating government also had to balance 
the need to deal with a large deficit and to fulfil the many promises that had 
been made in the 1993 election campaign, in a period of severe economic 
downturn (Edwards 1996). There were therefore major pressures within 
government between spending and economic portfolios, and considerable 
policy activity, particularly cross-portfolio policy initiatives. There was thus a 
strong need for advisers to help ministers to balance competing pressures and 
determine priorities, to undertake creative policy development and to 
determine the timing, shape and cost of major policy statements. This policy 
coordination work was performed through the networking advisers did with 
other offices. The rest of the chapter explores in detail the structures and 
practices involved in networking. 
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'NETWORKING' 
The term advisers use for their work with other advisers is 'networking'. It 
encompasses forming and maintaining links and relationships, and using those 
relationships to transmit information, consult, and negotiate policy decisions. 
The networking advisers did was seen as very important by advisers, ministers 
and public servants in the study. It was what advisers were expected to do. 
Views of ministers 
All ministers interviewed valued highly the networking their advisers did. 
They saw interoffice relationships as 'exceptionally important' (Black). Minister 
Purple saw these relationships as one of her most important resources: 
The networking advisers do for you is crucial. ... They've got to know each 
other and be able to work easily together .... They had to have a minister who 
could network. Working this place is as important as working the bureaucracy. 
Minister Orange described the networking advisers did as 'part of the bread 
and butter of this place really, very much .... Cups of coffee and all that sort of 
thing ... telephone calls, it's all very important.' He felt it benefited ministers in 
their relationships with each other: 
It gives ministers the chance to not have their relationships clogged up with 
minutiae .... They ... make sure the crap [is] dealt with at an adviser level and 
sorted out there as best as possible, rather than becoming an issue of contention 
and arm wrestling or ego bashing between ministers. 
Minister Yellow stressed that the networking advisers did was important for 
the government as a whole, saying 'the whole of government depends on those 
links being strong and easy', and to the extent that they were not, 'then 
government becomes dysfunctional'. 
Views of public servants 
Public servants, though at times threatened by it, saw the value in the 
networking advisers did, and it was part of their expectation of what advisers 
would do. Public Servant 6 commented: 'that's one of the things they've got to 
do.' It was useful to help them gain access to information, as a Finance official, 
Public Servant 5, remarked: 
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Advisers play a really important role within Parliament House. The linkages 
between minister's offices are important for the ministry, to keep them across 
what's going on. It's really important for departments ... because we can't go to 
another minister's office and find out what they're thinking. Our minister's 
office can go and talk to them and provide feedback to us about what's going 
on and then we can provide a better service because we know what's 
happening .... It's just keeping the communication open so the whole of 
government is moving in one direction. It's a coordination role. 
The informality of advisers' interaction could also speed up the processes of 
government, as Public Servant 4 explained: 
It was a way of accelerating the processes, and a way of managing the processes 
so that there was a shared understanding of the priority of particular issues .... 
If there are good relationships between ministerial offices ... then an enormous 
amount can be achieved quickly that would otherwise take a much longer 
period of time, through much more formal processes. 
He reported that there was 'a very good network' between the offices of the 
Prime Minister, Minister for Finance, Minister for Education and the Treasurer, 
and this was of great value for their departments: 
We had a very good relationship there between the relevant advisers and could 
facilitate a great deal of decision making quite quickly. And that was 
unquestionably advantageous to the departments, because it means you could 
get coordinated responses without necessarily having to go through a full 
cabinet process .... If the adviser in the portfolio minister's office can walk 
across the corridor and talk to the adviser in the Treasurer's office and say, 'look 
this is really important can you just talk to Ralph about it and see whether he's 
comfortable with it', that is so much faster than going through the bureaucratic 
processes. 
The advisers' network was also used to resolve log jams and difficult policy 
issues that departments could not handle. Public Servant 2 was strongly of the 
view that this was a role for advisers: 
Warring departments should not waste the time of ministers, and advisers 
should settle issues between themselves. Now that's, in my view, highly 
appropriate. If it is a contest of wills between 'I can convince my minister to 
write to your minister and say do so and so', and then someone on the other 
side of the fence says 'I can convince my minister to write back saying get 
stuffed', the problem with that is that no one's actually debated the issue and 
got an outcome, so if it can't be done by departments then it could and should 
be done by ministerial advisers. 
Public Servant 4 recalled using the 'advisers' network' to resolve log jams 
between departments: 
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For most advisers networking was functional and largely influenced by the 
needs of the portfolio. Thus their main contact was with adjacent 
conflicting portfolios and with the three central offices (Prime Minister's office, 
Treasurer's office and Finance minister's office). For a smaller group, 
networking was a conscious part of style as advisers and they cultivated 
as wide a group of contacts as possible. Advisers referred to these people as 
'networkers'. 
4 One was involved in managing a program within the department concentrated on her 
relationships with community groups. Another was a subject matter expert who provided 
technical advice to ministers, and was not involved in policy negotiations at all. The third 
was a senior adviser did not network much and admitted it might be seen as one of his 
'weaknesses'. His staff however did do a lot of work with other advisers. 
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Networking was particularly important to staff who worked for ministers who 
were isolated factionally or not good networkers themselves. It was a very 
important role for staffers of ministers who were not powerful in cabinet, those 
whose portfolios were the targets of spending cuts (and therefore were often 
fighting battles in cabinet) and those whose portfolios involved a lack of clear 
authority, who needed the support of other ministers to achieve policy 
outcomes (eg the Environment minister or Aboriginal Affairs minister). 
Minister Orange, a junior minister in a spending portfolio who had a weak 
status in cabinet, relied heavily on his advisers' relationships with other 
advisers. He recalled how one of his staff, a partisan from the public service 
who was 'an exceptional talent', cultivated a trusting relationship with a key 
adviser in the Prime Minister's office, Adviser 38. Through the advocacy of 
Adviser 38, Minister Orange secured funding for a major new policy initiative 
which neither he nor his department were powerful enough to win. For such 
ministers, the relationships their staff had with other offices were a crucial 
resource. Adviser 38 commented that: 
Advisers can be exceptionally talented but their ministers might be low status 
or pretty awful. Often those people ... would come to me and we'd get the 
ideas up by another route. The good advisers ain't the ones who shout their 
names from rooftops. They're the ones who understood how within their 
strengths and weaknesses of their position they could use other people and 
network and make it happen. 
A 'community' of advisers 
While ministerial advisers were a collection of individuals working for 
individual ministers, they were also a community, in the sense of being a group 
with a common framework, operating with a common set of understandings, 
and ultimately working towards a common purpose. I use 'community' in the 
same way that Heclo and Wildavsky did in their classic study of actors in the 
British expenditure process: 
Community refers to the personal relationships between major political and 
administrative actors - sometimes in conflict, often in agreement, but always in 
touch and operating within a shared framework. Community is the cohesive 
and orienting bond underlying any particular issue (1974:xv). 
While Redo and Wildavsky wrote about long term relationships between 
career public servants, their identification of 'kinship' and 'culture' in the 
'village life in Whitehall' is relevant to the relationships between advisers in this 
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study. Kinship was 'who matters most? and how are they related?' and culture 
was the standards that told them how to act towards each other (1974:1,14). 
There were shared understandings of both 'kinship' and 'culture' amongst 
advisers in this study. 
The community of advisers in this study consisted of multiple informal 
communication networks. Interactions were only occasionally group processes. 
Usually it was work conducted one on one, through intensely personal links. 
As well as information exchange, these conversations contained the 
fundamental elements of political contest: weighing argument and political 
strength, persuading, manoeuvring and fighting. Advisers felt that the quality 
of the individual they were dealing with made a difference to the ease of 
negotiations and to their outcome. 
These conversations mattered. Much was at stake. At the end of the day, the 
minister could always choose to take the fight to cabinet, but the attitude of 
other minister~ in that meeting could depend on the salesmanship, doggedness 
and social skills of the adviser in the talks that had gone beforehand. 
To enable advisers to undertake these interactions, certain things were 
necessary. They must build and use relationships. They must play the game 
according to its unspoken rules. They must have a good reputation, or if not, 
sufficient authority to win without one. Information must flow to those who 
need to know and those who must be involved, and discussions must be 
decisive. Decisions must be made according to the priorities and objectives of 
the government as a whole. 
The milieu of the ministerial wing 
A cut-throat environment 
Positive and trusting relationships with other advisers were important in 
operating within what was frequently described as a cut-throat environment. 
Advisers were generally suspicious and competitive, as Adviser 1 commented: 
'People are so suspicious of one another .... The longer you are there the more 
closed you become and careful and paranoid.' Adviser 19 had a very cynical 
view of other advisers: 
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The dynamics of Parliament House are not based on camaraderie. Advisers are 
generally self-interested, opportunistic and into information manipulation. By 
self-interested I mean obsessed with their minister's cause .... I don't look for 
friendships but I am courteous. Some are more altruistic in their motives, but 
all are opportunistic. I have a low level of trust and that's out of seeing what 
they do. 
One senior adviser who came from a lobby group, Adviser 7, found it 'a 
particularly vicious environment'. On his second day in the job he 
inadvertently cut into a telephone conversation between two advisers who 
were talking about him: 
I was being shafted, based on rumours and untruths. I was very shocked. 
People seek to undermine you even before they've met you. If you come here 
with any reputation then you have to go through a time of testing and 
backbiting, then after a while you become part of the furniture in the place. 
You can't afford to be a shrinking violet here or you'll get rolled over .... It is 
very competitive .... You have to carve out your sense of what you're prepared 
to put up with and build alliances. 
Getting access to other advisers could be very difficult. Often they did not 
return your phone calls. Adviser 6, an assistant adviser to a beleaguered junior 
minister, explained the importance of good personal connections in getting 
access to other offices: 
If you don't know other advisers they can be incredible hostile when you 
approach them at first. It's all about the ethos of protecting your minister and 
not giving anything away. Good personal connections can get you over that 
and get you into the loop very quickly. I didn't consciously [develop contacts] 
-but it is very necessary .... I tend to socialise with people from Parliament 
House. These social contacts give me an entre into other ministers' offices. It 
makes it easier to get over the first hurdle. It means you are taken seriously and 
not fucked around at the gate. 
There were a range of personalities within the community of advisers, some 
easy and some not so easy to deal with. Adviser 19 commented that: 'Some are 
good, friendly and trustworthy, some aren't. Some are very ruthless.' Adviser 
20, who was in a powerful position in one of the three central offices, gave this 
assessment of the advisers he dealt with: 
I generally see people as competent or incompetent. There are the utterly stupid 
and obstructionist and others who are on the ball and easy to do business with. 
Among those who are competent there are the players and the non-players. The 
players are those who are in the political game. 
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Hierarchy 
Though interactions were generally fluid and personal, there was a hierarchy 
amongst advisers based on their title (consultant, senior adviser, adviser or 
assistant adviser). Some people ignored the hierarchy but not all did. Some 
said they could not get access to senior advisers in other offices if they were an 
assistant adviser or an adviser, and that they either had to take their senior 
adviser with them or get the senior adviser to take up the matter to be listened 
to, as Adviser 1 explained: 
There's definitely a hierarchy. If you're at a lower point in the hierarchy, it's not 
appropriate for you to speak to someone who is right at the top of the 
hierarchy. When I was an assistant adviser I wouldn't have dared speak to the 
head of the Treasurer's office or the head of the PM's office, I wouldn't have 
even smiled at them! If I had needed something from their office, I would have 
gone to someone much lower. They're so arrogant- and they let you know 
they're not going to waste their time with you. So you just don't put yourself 
through that humiliating experience! 
Yet she stressed that good personal connections could cut across the hierarchy: 
Some people can ignore all of that and pick up the phone and go straight to the 
top and argue their point. I was too nervous to do that, in the first year, but 
then you build up relationships and you can cut across it if you have good 
relationships. 
Ways of operating 
Informal, verbal, brief, reciprocal 
Advisers had a clear idea of how to operate in this environment. Contact was 
informal and verbal, and involved phone calls, dropping in to see people 
('sticking your head around the door'), meeting over coffee, perhaps dropping 
off a piece of paper for someone to look at. Things were kept short: 'you don't 
talk too much' (A01). It was not done to waste people's time or to harass them 
more than was necessary. There was no time to put much on paper even if they 
wanted to (which they usually did not). 
Advisers worked hard to build up a rapport with important people. The 'rules' 
for lobbying powerful advisers were to be polite, brief, talk to them face to face 
on their turf (where they felt most comfortable), and try to bring the issue to 
their attention as early as possible: 'Never at the last minute, 24 hours before 
something goes to cabinet. That just won't work' (A28). Adviser 1 felt it was 
possible to build up a relationship with powerful advisers 'which really pays 
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off'. An adviser to the Treasurer confirmed that she talked more with advisers 
she respected and passed them more information (A34}~ 
Reciprocity was very important. If someone helped you, you would also like to 
help them if you could. People sometimes felt they were 'owed favours'. This 
provided leverage. Though 'of course', Adviser 26 said, 'those in the central 
offices were smart and tried never to owe anyone anything'. Trust was 
important. People who could not be trusted were considered dangerous. A 
long time adviser, Adviser 33, described the networking behaviour of advisers 
he could not trust: 
There were those who you couldn't trust. Thankfully there weren't many of 
them, but there were some who were lazy and would not consult, or they'd tell 
you one thing and they would tum around and do the opposite. They were 
quite dangerous from a government perspective, they took on their traditional 
constituents' view or were lazy, dishonest and incompetent. 
By contrast he described advisers who networked positively: 
At the other end of the spectrum I think are advisers who really do consult 
well, they work hard and understand the issues, they listen and try to take a 
constructive, creative approach to policy development or resolving issues. 
Operating through known contacts 
It was important to communicate through known contacts. One senior adviser 
stressed: 'Always make the initial approach through a contact in the office' 
(A28). Working through known contacts ensured access, which was otherwise 
not guaranteed. Advisers usually had a contact in every office they dealt with. 
It might be someone they had dealt with in the past, someone they had a 
rapport with, even someone they met at a party. They then worked through 
that contact, even though that person may not be the one who was dealing with 
the matter. They could find out nuances and agendas from their friendly 
contact. It helped to get an idea of how best to approach the person they had to 
deal with, for instance they might be told that: 'so and so is dealing with that 
but just be aware of this' (A22). The friendly contact may then pass on the 
message to their colleague that you were to be trusted. This could be useful if 
you were relatively junior or from another faction. 
Advisers talked 'shop' endlessly, and it was considered acceptable to raise work 
matters with staffers met in the corridor, at parties or at the gym. Advisers 
were opportunistic and pragmatic in the use of their relationships in 
networking. 
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The power of reputation 
Reputations were common currency around the ministerial wing. Adviser 1 
commented on the power of reputation: 
If you're in you're in, if you're out you're out. A lot of that's to do with 
personality, factional allegiance. Sometimes even the very best people can't 
achieve in Parliament House, not for want of trying or lack of skills as an 
adviser, but because they either work for a minister who is on the nose, or not 
in, or someone somewhere along the way doesn't like them. It's such an 
incestuous building, most people have a personal entanglement with someone 
who knows someone. 
If an adviser could help someone they may drop everything to do so, to gain a 
reputation as someone who 'delivered'. Some offices and individuals had 
reputations for not returning phone calls. In the case of one office this was seen 
as very detrimental to their status in the ministry - they put themselves outside 
the loops of information and help others could provide. Some advisers had to 
work hard to build a reputation for trustworthiness, as Adviser 8, a former 
activist, explained: 
I found that advisers had a natural suspicion of someone who came from 
outside of government. I was fairly unknown to them. But they knew that I 
was set in the mould of [an activist] and I was not to be trusted .... I had to 
really work hard to develop relationships with people in other offices and after 
twelve months I think I've got some good contacts and I can speak easily to 
people in a lot of ministerial offices. And the fact that I can do this now has 
made my job a great deal easier. 
She described the reputation she had worked hard to establish and how it 
spread: 
They know that I'm a straight shooter .... They know that what I agree on I will 
do. And after you deal with a few people and they have good dealings with 
you, word travels. Of course some people I will never be able to work well 
with. But the more contact you have with people who have initial animosity 
but are able to say 'well I worked together with her and we were able to get 
good outcomes' ... then if you can get a linkage with one person that will link 
you into others. 
Adviser 1 felt that powerful advisers could destroy your reputation if you did 
something they felt was wrong: 
They could certainly put you on the outer to the point where nobody touched 
you. . .. You know who is not favoured in the ministerial wing, you know who 
has made a big mistake really quickly. 
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Kessel's communication structure records 'those links between individuals who 
spend time together and share information with one another' (1984:232). Using 
interviews with White House staft he found the communication channels in the 
Reagan White House were centralised and hierarchical, with much of the 
communication flowing to a central coordinating group (1984:238-240). He also 
5 Kessel's methods have been taken further Link 
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described an influence structure which identified those staff who were able to 
exercise power over other staff members. 
To explore the communication structure which underlay coordination routines, 
advisers in this study were asked to describe their communication networks/ by 
listing which offices they had most contact with. 
There were a few formal networks. There was a parliamentary tactics group, 
which had a core of five advisers: one from the office of the Leader of 
Government Business in the House, one from the office of the Leader of 
Government Business in the Senate, one from the Treasurer's office, one of the 
Prime Minister's political advisers and the director of the Ministerial Media 
Group. This group coordinated parliamentary strategy and was a core group, 
as one of its members, Adviser 26, explained: 
then we'd basically add on people that we needed like Industrial Relations or 
Health or Communications or whatever and we'd pull people in and we'd talk 
about tactics for that day. Overall strategy was set by the big chiefs- attack, 
defend, whatever - and then we work out the best way to do that. 
There was a wider question time group where all offices were represented, 
which met after the Whip's meeting on parliamentary sitting days to exchange 
political information. There were also meetings of senior advisers from all 
offices, chaired by one of the Prime Minister's advisers, which discussed tactics 
and reported on the main action of the week ('basically what the PM is doing 
this week' (AOS)). 
There was a formal network of women policy advisers from most offices, which 
was brought together to collate information about what Labor was doing for 
women across all policy areas and to create policy ideas. It was chaired by one 
of the Prime Minister's advisers and met several times between 1993 and 1996. 
This was an interesting group because it was outside the usual functional 
linkages and cut across the major policy and political divisions between 
advisers. Some women who were in the group when it was established in 1993 
said it was the first time they had made contact with some advisers on the other 
side of the social/ economic policy divide or who worked for ministers from 
other factions. 
Apart from these formally constituted groups, there was a range of informal 
networks associated with policy issues. Most of the advisers reported being 
part of networks which comprised advisers in adjacent or linked portfolios; the 
senior or junior minister's office; and the three central offices. The social policy 
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network and economic policy network were quite distinct. The social policy 
network, for example, consisted of the main offices involved in social policy 
plus designated social policy advisers in the Prime Minister's office, Treasurer's 
office and Finance minister's office. It was headed by the Prime Minister's 
social policy adviser Mary Ann O'Loughlin who, it was said, 'sometimes called 
a "council of war" about a social policy issue'. (She was praised by many in the 
group for her coordination work). There was also a network of advisers from 
various offices brought together to discuss environmental issues, chaired by the 
Prime Minister's environment adviser. 
Apart from these highly functional networks, there were factional networks 
which were basically loose alliances, as Adviser 1 explained: 
You know the parliamentarians who are in your faction and they know you .... 
You know their staff. There's things you'll say to them because they are in the 
same faction that you won't share with other offices. There's a closeness and 
camaraderie between offices in the same faction and similarly there's suspicion 
between offices from different factions. 
Advisers also had personal networks based on people who socialised together, 
who had worked together in minister's offices in the past or who knew each 
other through their activities within the ALP. These advisers generally wanted 
'to facilitate good outcomes for each other'. There were several advisers who 
had all worked in PM&C who 'helped' each other. Some very experienced 
advisers had good links with others who had also 'been around for a while'. 
One long time adviser commented: 'The longer you've been around the more 
extensive your networks are' (Al5). 
Figure 1 shows five examples of advisers' communication networks. It reveals 
how functional these networks were and how they related to the needs of the 
portfolio and to the particular role of each adviser.6 
Adviser A worked for the Minister for Defence, Robert Ray. Her 
communication network comprised advisers in the junior minister's office 
(Defence Science & Personnel) and in the adjacent portfolio (Foreign Affairs). It 
also included advisers in the Prime Minister's office, Finance minister's office 
and Treasurer's office. 
6 It should be noted that the figure is indicative only and overlaps which may have complicated 
the figure are not detailed; for example that some left wing ministers were also in social 
portfolios. 
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FIGURE 1: ADVISERS' NETWORKS 
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(foreign affairs) 
PMO= Prime Minister's office 
FMO= Finance minister's office 
TO = Treasurer's office 
Adviser B worked for the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Leader of 
Government Business in the Senate, Gareth Evans. He had a special role in 
assisting with the minister's parliamentary responsibilities. Thus his 
communication network comprised the other members of the parliamentary 
tactics group and the three central offices - the Prime Minister's office, Finance 
minister's office and Treasurer's office. 
Adviser C was a policy adviser who worked for Brian Howe, the Minister for 
Housing and Regional Development and the leader of the parliamentary left 
faction. Her communication network involved the social policy network which 
comprised the social policy advisers in the advisers in the Prime Minister's 
office, Finance minister's office and Treasurer's office, as well as staff in the 
offices of the Minister for Health, Minister for Social Security and Minister for 
Employment, Education and Training. Her communication network also 
included the staff of left wing ministers. 
Adviser D was a policy adviser in the office of the left wing Minister for 
Environment, Sport and Territories, John Faulkner. The breadth of Adviser A's 
communication network indicates that this portfolio had an interest in what 
happened in a range of other portfolios and the need to consult widely to gain 
the support of other ministers. His network included advisers in the Prime 
Minister's office, Finance minister's office and Treasurer's office, as well as 
advisers in the economic portfolios of Resources; Industry, Science and 
Technology; and Primary Industry and Energy. It also included advisers in the 
social policy portfolios of Employment, Education and Training; Health; and 
Housing and Regional Development, as well as advisers working for left wing 
ministers. 
Adviser E had political responsibilities in the office of the Minister for 
Industrial Relations and Transport, Laurie Brereton. His communication 
network differed from the other examples. Brereton was a member of the NSW 
right wing and had strong connections with the Prime Minister. Therefore 
Adviser E's communication network comprised only the other offices of NSW 
right wing ministers and the Prime Minister's office. This reflected Adviser E's 
role and the influence of his minister with the Prime Minister. Adviser E had 
ready access to the Prime Minister's office where he felt he could negotiate 
about matters his minister was pursuing, without needing to bargain with the 
Finance minister's office or Treasurer's office. 
These networks reveal the importance of the three central offices (Prime 
Minister's office, Finance minister's office and Treasurer's office). Like the key 
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These relationships did not always work well, and coordination was not always 
achieved. Advisers referred to 'tension, resentment and bad blood' between 
some senior and junior minister's offices (A27). Public servant 3 commented on 
'huge problems' in one portfolio, where 'the communication on many occasions 
was zilch between the staff of the respective ministers'. This was particularly 
difficult in one case where senior minister, junior minister and 
parliamentary secretary were three different factions. Public Servant 6 
commented: 'In this portfolio that has been a very fraught area .... If you can get 
it to work it's a huge help. If it doesn't work you have to find other 
[coordination] mechanisms.' 
NETWORKING AS COORDINATION 
Three features of the networking between advisers enabled it to operate as a 
coordination mechanism. First, there were high levels of delegation between 
many ministers and their advisers, which enabled advisers to act as effective 
proxies. The limits of delegation were understood. Second, there were 
commonly understood 'rules of operation' in advisers' interactions which 
(where adhered to) kept the group operating effectively. Third, there was a 
well-understood power structure between advisers, with a small group of 
advisers having considerable authority and licence to direct other advisers. 
This meant that adviser level networks could be used for more than simply 
communication and consultation: they could be used to negotiate outcomes and 
to settle disputes. 
Delegation 
It was understood by ministers and their advisers that as much as possible 
executive negotiations should be done by advisers, acting as the representatives 
of ministers. Adviser 26 explained that this was because ministers 'were busy 
being ministers': 
Sometimes they would meet themselves ... but that was pretty rare, largely 
because they just didn't have the time and secondly unless it was really really 
sensitive and complicated it didn't need their personal involvement. 
Ministers usually 'set the parameters' or gave 'riding instructions' for advisers' 
negotiations. They were usually only brought into negotiations themselves as a 
last resort, as Adviser 4 explained: 
Ministers don't have the meeting if the deal is done - they only meet if it is not 
able to be stitched up by staffers ... or if there was a need for more pushing and 
shoving. Mostly it was advisers who slugged it out. 
Not all ministers were highly delegating (as seen in Chapter Five). A few were 
said to be 'very hands on' and 'extremely controlling', which constrained their 
advisers in negotiations. Much depended on the minister's personality, 
seniority and busyness. Advisers to busy ministers often had far more 
autonomy, as one explained: 
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The minister is comfortable in delegating a lot of the decision making to you as 
long as you keep her in touch when the major decision points come up. But 
generally she doesn't want you bothering her with information. So I ensure I 
bring her in at all the important decision points (A19). 
The time pressures on some senior ministers were immense, with one adviser 
admitting that 'basically I always assume that he's always busy .... Usually I 
simply can't find time to brief him on most things' (A08). 
For advisers to operate as effective delegates they had to know their minister's 
mind and faithfully reflect the minister's agenda. They had to have a clear 
understanding of the parameters and objectives of the negotiation. Most 
advisers saw no problem with this as they were close to the minister, had ready 
access to him or her and were immersed in the policy issues. Adviser 6 said: 
'You absorb the minister's position very strongly ... I know what he will do on 
an issue, what his boundaries and interests are .... You know what positions he 
will and won't accept.' However it could be a problem when this was not the 
case, for example where advisers could not get access to talk over issues with 
the minister. In these cases the senior adviser often was their point of reference. 
It was important to the functioning of the whole system that advisers knew the 
limits of their delegation. They had to know when they could agree to 
something and when they had to consult the minister. They had a fine sense of 
the parameters of their negotiating brief. This was important for their own 
survival- they would be very reluctant to go out on a limb that was not 
supported by their minister. 
Ministers delegated, but were always the principals. They saw no distinction 
between what their advisers did for them and what they themselves did. 
Ministers in the study felt confident in advisers' operating as their agents and 
had a high degree of trust, saying 'any action they took would be in line with 
discussions we'd had' (Silver); 'I knew what they were doing most of the time 
even though I was busy' (Brown); and 'I wouldn't let someone go and do 
something if I didn't have trust or confidence in their ability to do it' (Orange). 
Underpinning the system was the fact that if negotiations broke down, an issue 
could always be taken to ministers, either bilaterally or to cabinet. Advisers 
would say 'let's agree to disagree and let our principals sort it out' (A26). 
Major problems occurred on the rare occasions when delegation was not 
working properly. Minister Red recounted a time when one of her advisers 
was not reflecting her position in negotiations with other staff. (She was 
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Advisers in this study expressed some common perceptions about what was 
'done' and 'not done' in working with other advisers. These can seen as 
informal 'rules' about how they should operate as a group, and thus as the 
'culture' of the community (Redo and Wildavsky 1974). These 'rules' were very 
important in enabling advisers to operate as a mechanism of coordination 
within the executive. were key understandings underpinning 
interaction. (Of course they were not always adhered 
The first was keep talking. Relationships must remain amicable, even when you 
disagreed, when you or respect the adviser, and even when 
av;~VLU.L'I:'A V crucial If you have a then you've got 
being able to sit down with people [from a vv>~rnTH.Y 
easily and comfortably. . .. If you have disagreements over issues you 
don't let that spill over into some sort of personal conflict. And it always helps 
to have another issue that you can agree on very quickly together. I think it's 
absolutely crucial that you keep the relationships open and operating. 
Adviser 6 felt that if two ministers had a relationship it was vital 
advisers a good one: 
A good relationship between advisers can be used to get around a bad 
relationship between two ministers. It's a way of keeping the lines of 
communication open and carrying on doing business. 
their 
To be an effective adviser, you had to be able to work with the minister's 
opponents. Adviser 18 recalled a case where he had to work with several 
hostile ministers' offices about a submission his minister was putting forward. 
This was a process of careful consultation. For the minister to have any chance 
of succeeding in cabinet, the adviser had to be able to sit down with advisers 
from hostile offices, find out their positions and deal with them. He explained 
the process: 
It was just consultation, consultation, consultation. That's taken three months, 
but it was worthwhile .... We got them down to one remaining issue, from one 
department, we solved all the other departments' problems, not because we 
had to compromise anything but because we had to make dear to people why 
their concerns were not real concerns. You sort it out one on one usually. Talk 
to them about their minister's concerns ... and say 'this is why it's not a 
problem for X. This is why it's not a problem for Y' .... What you're trying to do 
is to take away the substance of their criticisms so they're just left with a 
straight out emotional response that 'this is something that has come from 
[portfolio A] so automatically I as the Minister for [portfolio B] have to oppose 
it'. 
Third, advisers said it was important to 'play it straight' in policy fights, 
especially at Budget time, or at least to be seen to play it straight. This meant 
doing what you agreed to, and not taking outside of the ministry the fights 
going on between advisers, by leaking to interest groups, Caucus or the media. 
Ministers had to be seen as team players, so if such tactics were thought 
necessary, it was important 'not to leave your fingerprints on anything' (Al5). 
Lastly, while advisers were expected to fight for their minister's interests and 
agenda, it was seen as vital that they also take a whole of government perspective. 
This was expressed as being able to see 'what's best for everyone' (A24). An 
important part of this was accep~g as authoritative the rulings of powerful 
advisers and ministers. Some advisers were notorious for not doing this, and 
for pursuing sectional interests above the interests of the government as a 
whole. Adviser 27 expressed the 'correct' view: 
You have to know when you've lost and it's time to roll over. That is very 
important. Some minister's offices just don't know when the point has come to 
give up. They pretty soon get a label in the key offices and that label says 
"pest". I try never to reach that point, because it makes you ineffective as an 
adviser. Once the Prime Minister's office have decided I try and deliver it for 
them, because I believe in a corporate approach to government. I believe we 
should behave like public servants should with us - we have a right to put the 
argument, but we should know when to stop and accept the decision. 
The power structure amongst advisers 
The third factor which enabled advisers' networking to function as a 
coordination mechanism within the executive was the power structure which 
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underlay advisers' relationships. As Painter argues in his work on 
coordination, power and control are at the heart of coordination in government: 
Coordination, like any other power game, is a matter of attempting to exercise, 
not simply assuming, control (1987:11). 
Advisers in this study were asked about their perceptions of the pattern of 
influence amongst advisers in the ministerial wing, to detect whether there was 
a commonly understood power structure between advisers which shaped their 
interactions and served as a mechanism of coordination? 
Respondents were asked: 'who are the most influential advisers in Parliament 
House?' Because the interviews were qualitative and open ended, this question 
was followed by a general discussion of the pattern of influence amongst 
advisers. Respondents were always asked to explain what they meant by 
'influential'; what it was that these individuals were able to do that 
demonstrated their influence. They were also asked to explain what they saw 
as the source of the power of the advisers they named as influential. There 
were 25 usable data sets. 
Advisers found it easy to talk about the patterns of power and influence 
amongst their peers. It was often something they had thought about because of 
the nature of the environment in which they worked. They were very 
conscious of the relative weight and influence of individuals they dealt with, 
because so much of their work revolved around contest with others. 
There have been criticisms of the reputational method of studying power, with 
the idea that elitist methods will tend to yield elitist results (see Muller and 
Heady 1996:138). Polsby's (1961, 1980) criticisms of the reputational method 
were that the scope of influence was not explicitly defined (so that nominators 
were asked to name the most influential people in the system as a whole); that 
nominators were assumed to agree on the meaning of terms such as influence 
and power; that there was no reason to assume that the nominators would be 
knowledgeable about who the influentials were; and that it was arbitrary to ask 
each nominator to supply ten names of influential people (see Muller and 
Heady 1996:139). 
In this study, both the scope of influence and the meaning of the term 
'influential' was discussed with each respondent. Those with both a narrow 
and a broad scope of influence were named, and the use of the term 'influential' 
7 This is based on Kessel's (1984) exploration of an influence structure amongst White House 
staff, discussed earlier. 
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was made explicit by each respondent (advisers generally expressed common 
understandings in their use of the term, which will be discussed later). The 
small size, coherence and physical proximity of the group and their frequent 
contact with each other are all reasons why I suggest that the advisers did have 
enough knowledge about the behaviour of other advisers to make valid 
assessments of relative influence. They were people who were very conscious 
on a day to day basis of weighing power and seeing it demonstrated in decision 
making processes. Advisers were also able to nominate as many 'influentials' 
as they wished to. 
Because respondents were not randomly selected or spread evenly across all 
portfolios, the results do not provide a comprehensive map of all influential 
individuals within the ministerial wing at the time of the interviews. Rather the 
study aimed to detect a pattern of influence amongst advisers, and to explore 
whether there was a common perception of an underlying influence structure. 
The study explores advisers' influence within the advisers' group rather than their 
influence per se. Interviewees were quick to point out that an adviser's 
influence within their own sphere was difficult for others to detect. It 
depended on how influential they were with their own minister, and how 
responsive the department was to their directions. Thus an important element 
of an adviser's influence was embedded in their relationship with their minister 
and the department, and was often hidden to others. It was made clear in 
interviews that the research sought to uncover an underlying influence 
structure amongst advisers; thus the question referred to their perception of 
the pattern of influence in the interactions between ministerial offices. 
Perceptions of power within the ministerial wing 
There was a high level of agreement amongst advisers about the pattern of 
power within the ministerial wing. They described a core influence structure in 
which there were two groups of influential people: those who were influential 
in political strategy; and those who were influential in terms of policy (with a 
small degree of overlap between the two groups). Outside this highly 
concentrated group of powerful advisers, there was a spread of influential 
individuals 'dotted around the place', whose influence was defined in relation to 
the core influence group. There was also an important power differential 
between advisers in senior and junior minister's offices within the same 
portfolio. 
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Political strategists 
A group of seven advisers were nominated as influential on political strategy 
for the government as a whole. They were important in shaping the political 
agenda, 'getting our message out publicly' and managing the media for the 
government. These were (in order of the number of nominations each 
received): 
Table 8.2: Influential advisers: Political strategists (1995-6) 
name position no of % 
nominations 
Russell (PMO - Principal adviser) 25 100% 
Cox (TO - Principal adviser) 21 84% 
Watson (PMO - Speechwriter/consultant) 19 76% 
O'Callaghan (FMO -Senior adviser Parliamentary) 17 68% 
Bowtell (PMO - Senior adviser Political) 15 60% 
Bowan (PMO - Senior adviser Political) 13 52% 
Epstein (Director - Ministerial Media Group) 6 24% 
n=25 PMO = Prime Minister's office; TO = Treasurer's office; FMO = Finance minister's office 
This group comprised key individuals in the Prime Minister's office (Don 
Russell and Don Watson, 'the two people closest to the PM', and the Prime 
Minister's two political advisers, Bill Bowtell and John Bowan). It also included 
key political advisers in the Treasurer's office (David Cox) and the Finance 
minister's office Oohn O'Callaghan), as well as the Director of the Ministerial 
Media Group (David Epstein). Those who named Epstein saw him as a 
powerful figure, 'important in terms of the message you want to communicate' 
(A26), and in Watson's (2002) account he appears to be centrally involved in 
political strategy. That only 24% nominated him may indicate not all advisers 
were aware of his role and influence.s 
Adviser 2 described this group as 'a coterie- very, very powerful. They devise 
the question time strategy and create the politics of the day'. Adviser 1 
described them as: 
a conscious group of people who are a real tight core and they run the show in 
the interests of the Labor government. They are very bright people and 
formidable people .... They see themselves as political warriors, in the Labor 
party for the long haul. 
8 To place these individuals in context, a list of the advisers who worked in the Prime Minister's 
office, Finance minister's office and Treasurer's office is at Appendix 2. 
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While most advisers described their influence as being limited to political 
strategy? some felt that this could also have implications for the policy sphere, 
as Adviser 25 explained: 
They are not that important in getting policy decisions taken but ... very 
important in getting tactical or strategic decisions taken which can often be 
crucial in getting policy decisions taken, if you know what I mean. 
Don Russell was nominated by all the respondents and was clearly seen as the 
most influential person in relation to other advisers. This was partly because of 
his position as head of the Prime Minister's office, but also because of his very 
dose, trusting relationship with the Prime Minister. According to Watson, 
Keating and Russell decided 'jointly what to say, what not to say, what the tone 
and volume should be' (2002:215), and Keating praised Russell's 'splendid 
political mind' (2002:231). Watson said that Russell: 
had the menace to win with the bureaucracy and with the ministers; the ability 
to handle several portfolios; the depth of corporate knowledge running back 
into the Hawke government; ... [an] intimate, mutually reinforcing relationship 
with Keating ... [and an] unequalled capacity to influence the Prime Minister .... 
He was the one reliable conduit into Keating's mind. Where he went there 
went one's own influence (2002:385-6). 
David Cox was also considered extremely influential. According to Adviser 40, 
he and Russell were 'the two bright stars who dazzled you' and were 
'exceptional' compared to other advisers. 
Policy influentials 
There were 11 people perceived as most influential within the advisers' group 
on policy. These were (in order of the number of nominations): 
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Table 8.3: Influential advisers: Policy (1995-6} 
name position policy sphere no of % 
nominations 
Russell PMO Principal adviser all areas 25 100% 
Cox TO Principal adviser economic 21 84% 
O'Loughlin PMO Senior adviser social policy social 20 80% 
Simes PMO Senior adviser economic economic 19 76% 
Chapman PMO Consultant economic/social 12 48% 
Gyngell PMO Senior adviser international affairs international 12 48% 
Hickman FMO Principal adviser economic 12 48% 
Mostyn PMO Senior adviser communications communications 11 44% 
O'Neill PMO Senior adviser environment environment 11 44% 
Angley FMO Consultant economic/social 10 40% 
Livese:t TO Consultant economic/social 10 40% 
n=25 PMO = Prime Minister's office; TO = Treasurer's office; FMC = Finance minister's office 
These advisers were exclusively located in the Prime Minister's office, 
Treasurer's office and Finance minister's office, and included all of the Prime 
Minister's senior policy advisers. The Prime Minister's office was clearly very 
influential on policy. However there were differences in the scope of influence. 
Some of the Prime Minister's specialist advisers, such as Alan Gyngell, Sam 
Mostyn and Mark O'Neill, appeared to have a more limited scope of influence, 
though within their specialist policy areas they were considered very powerful. 
Mary Ann O'Loughlin's position on social policy was considered decisive. 
According to one key adviser this was because Keating was never as interested 
in social policy as other areas, 'so he very much left it to her, because he trusted 
her judgement' (A39). Ric Simes, Barbara Livesey and John Angley were 
influential because of their key roles in the Budget process. Don Russell, David 
Cox and Syd Hickman were said to have the broadest scope of influence in their 
input to economic policy generally. 
Putting Tables 8.2 and 8.3 together, there were 16 people nominated as most 
influential in adviser interactions (as Russell and Cox appeared in both lists). 
Considering the total number of ministerial advisers was around 172, this 
represents a highly concentrated influence structure. 9 The dominance of the 
Prime Minister's staff was evident in advisers' comments. For example when 
9 Ministerial Directory October 1995. The number varied over time. For a definition of the 
group see Chapter One page 10. 
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asked which advisers were most influential in Parliament House, Adviser 41 
replied: 
Unquestionably each of the senior advisers in the Prime Minister's office. 
Unquestionably. There can be no doubt about it. And following that the 
advisers in the office for the Minister for Finance who control the purse strings. 
But only to the extent I think that one needed them in order to get through to 
their minister. I don't know whether they were individually powerful .... But 
in terms of policy development easily the most important people are the people 
in the Prime Minister's office. 
Other influential individuals 
As well as the core group which were nominated repeatedly, there was a small 
group of advisers who were mentioned several times. While most of the core 
advisers were nominated between 10 and 25 times, three advisers were 
nominated two or three times Oack Lake 3; Ashley Mason 2; Gary Quinlan 2). 
They were all senior advisers to senior economic ministers (the Minister for 
Primary Industry and Energy; the Minister for Industrial Relations and 
Transport; and the Minister for Industry Science and Technology). They were 
also all advisers of long standing, whose experience, reputations and networks 
were significant. In addition, 11 individuals were nominated once.lO 
General pattern of influence amongst advisers 
The pattern of influence amongst advisers described by respondents is thus a 
compact 'inner circle' of powerful advisers, based on the offices of the Prime 
Minister, Treasurer and Finance Minister. Other advisers were placed around 
the inner circle, but not in any hierarchy. Adviser 1 described the pattern in the 
following way: 
There is an inner circle. ... Then you have another round of advisers who are 
doing a lot of the policy work, implementing a lot of the ideas that are coming 
from the inner circle. . .. It vibrates out from the centre. 
Interactions were focused on the inner circle, and other advisers were judged in 
relation to their influence on the inner group, rather than on interactions with 
each other. Adviser 23 explained: 
10 There may have been other influential individuals who were not listed for the reasons 
explained earlier relating to the number and spread of respondents. Responses are indicative 
only of the perceived pattern of influence. 
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It's actually hard to compare the influence of different advisers apart from the 
Prime Minister's office. Many advisers are not competing with each other for 
influence. They're all in separate boxes .... But I think your relative power in 
relation to Finance is important. 
The meaning of influence 
Advisers tended to be consistent in their understanding of what it meant to be 
'influential' amongst the adviser group. It had three aspects. 
The power to support, obstruct, and veto 
Many described advisers as influential because it was necessary to gain their 
support for policy proposals, and because they could obstruct or veto proposals 
they did not support. This particularly applied to the inner circle of policy 
influentials. Adviser 4 described influence as having 'the power to make 
decisions and stop things'. Adviser 1 described influence as being able to 
determine 'what gets up and what doesn't': 
You could count on one hand the people that make a difference. If you have all 
those five people on side the issue will get up. ... The power in the ministerial 
wing is really in the PM's office, the Treasurer's office, the Finance minister's 
office .... Coordinating the budget process for the portfolio this year ... was a 
real insight into how things actually work. There is an inner circle, ... a very 
small group of people who actually do determine what gets up and what 
doesn't- and they are advisers. 
Adviser 19 explained that Barbara Livesey was influential because: 'to get 
something up I have to convince her and she has the power to obstruct you and 
to veto what you're doing.' 
Who wins and gets their way 
The second aspect to being influential was being able to 'win' and 'get your 
way', as Adviser 15 explained: 
When I name them as powerful, I mean they can get their way. The powerful 
advisers are who wins and gets their way .... A lot of decisions are made 
between ministers, corporately. The advisers who are the powerful players are 
those who can get the corporation to move the way they want, who can get the 
big ship to tum one way. 
This meaning applied to both those in the inner circle and to those individuals 
who were powerful in relation to the inner circle. For example Adviser 15 saw 
Gary Quinlan as influential because 'he gets things up when he wants to.' 
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Access and involvement in key decisions 
The third aspect to advisers' understanding of influence was demonstrated in 
involvement in key decisions and access to decision makers. This particularly 
applied to advisers outside the three central offices. For example Adviser 17 
said Ashley Mason was influential because: 'he is very much involved in 
negotiating the Accord. He gets into the Prime Minister's office, he has 
guaranteed access. He gets his phone calls returned.' Adviser 40 said David 
Cox had 'extraordinary' access: 'He can walk in anywhere and that makes him 
very influential'. 
Power structures: senior and junior minister's offices 
There was also an important difference in influence between advisers within a 
portfolio. Senior ministers' staff had power in the relationship. Junior Minister 
Green said about his staff: 'They recognised the senior adviser of the portfolio 
minister as their senior.' Adviser 5, who had worked for both senior and junior 
ministers over a ten year period, commented that when he worked for a senior 
minister: 'When I would go and see the junior minister's staff or the 
parliamentary secretary's adviser I would feel like "aren't I a nice guy coming 
around to see you like this?".' Whereas when he worked for a junior minister 
and went to see the senior minister's senior adviser, 'I was more cap in hand, 
wanting something.' An adviser to a senior minister felt his office was 'in a 
position of power towards [the junior ministers' staff] which is similar to our 
relationship with the PM's office. Ultimately we call the shots' (A27). 
Several advisers to senior ministers reported incidents when they had 
prevented junior ministers taking decisions or actions by 'bouncing' the junior 
minister's staff. One said: 'I told them "Your minister should do it this way 
instead" and they followed that' (A23). Another stated: 'It was a blatant use of 
power I just said "no we're not doing that" ' (A41). The relationship between 
staff could be used to try to keep a junior minister in line. A senior adviser to a 
junior minister recalled the senior minister's senior adviser saying to him: 'if 
you can't control your minister what on earth are you there for?' (A37). But 
while they were dearly powerful in relation to the junior minister's staff, they 
were not more influential than junior ministers, as Junior Minister Green 
stressed: 
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There was one occasion where an adviser to the [senior] minister ... was 
immature, he was arrogant and he was stupid. And I said to the minister, 'Put 
him on a bloody rein. Don't you allow him ever to bloody dare to presume to 
tell me what to do. Don't ever let him think that he can get away with that. I 
simply won't tolerate it.' ... And that's all there was to it. It was over. I said 'You 
and I have related very well. If you want that damaged, you let that fellow 
have a free hand. If you don't want that damaged, you put him on a bloody 
rein and tell him to get back into his kennel.' 
Sources of power 
Advisers were asked what they saw as the sources of power of those advisers 
they nominated as influential. In Kessel's study of the influence structure 
amongst White House staff he found those nominated as powerful advisers 
were able to exercise power over other staff because they were held in respect; 
regarded as expert; because they were in a position to exercise sanctions; or 
because they had a legitimate right to supervise the work of those who reported 
to them (1984:240). 
Advisers in this study nominated position and personal qualities as being the 
sources of power of the most influential advisers. Position was by far the most 
important factor, but the two came together as these advisers explained: 'People 
are influential because of the combination of where they are and the sort of 
people they are' (A18); 'Partly their position and also their competence. It's the 
two coming together' (A20). 
Position 
The pattern of advisers' influence reflected ministerial authority. This related 
not only to who the adviser worked for but also their position within that office. 
Adviser 28 stressed the primacy of position: 'It's all positional. The most 
powerful adviser is the PM's principal adviser - whoever that happens to be.' 
Adviser 1 said: 'It's not so much who they are, but who they work for. . .. I think 
it is the position and you attach status and intelligence to people according to 
their position.' A Prime Ministerial adviser agreed that: 
It's the position that gives you influence without a doubt .... The Prime 
Minister's the most important person in cabinet. . .. If Paul Keating is convinced 
about something he is a hard person to toss .... It's really [more] about him than 
about us (A38). 
The most influential advisers spoke for, and had the potential to influence the 
views of, the most powerful ministers in cabinet. Adviser 7 felt the Prime 
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Minister's office and Treasurer's office were 'extremely influential, mainly 
because the Prime Minister and the Treasurer can never lose in cabinet. '11 
An important mediating factor however was the quality of the relationship the 
adviser had with their powerful patron. Adviser 17 stressed that: 'I don't think 
any adviser has the peak of power without a strong personal relationship and 
influence and credibility with their minister.' For example it was said that Don 
Russell was far more powerful than others who had worked as Principal 
Adviser to Keating, because of the extraordinarily close relationship he and 
Keating had. By contrast it was said that no advisers in senior Minister Blue's 
office were very powerful amongst advisers, because he 'thinks he knows more 
than anybody on anything' (and thus they did not have much influence on his 
views). 
Personal qualities 
The personal qualities which affected advisers' influence encompassed their 
expertise or competence; their networks; and their style in exercising power. 
Expertise and competence were cited as a source of power amongst advisers. 
Don Russell's enormous influence was linked to the fact he had policy expertise 
as well as political nous. Some commented on the 'genuine intellectual 
horsepower' of one influential adviser. Adviser 20, a member of the inner 
circle, said that 'in terms of your influence as an adviser, quality does count. If 
you're not up to it people will ignore you and you won't be invited to the 
meeting.' 
Experience as an adviser and extensive networks could also be a source of 
influence in adviser interactions. Adviser 22 felt that: 'the more contacts you've 
got, the more effective and powerful you are.' One long time adviser saw 
influence as based on 'the people you're linked to and the capacity to get 
around and network' (A15). Adviser 18 nominated several advisers as 
influential 'because they've been around for a long time, and everybody knows 
them. They have been in quite a few portfolios, are experienced, have a broad 
view of government relations.' 
Finally some felt that advisers could be empowered by a judicious personal 
style. For Adviser 4, this meant they did not behave harshly unless necessary: 
11 Former minister John Kerin has suggested that the Prime Minister 'always effectively has 
about ten votes in cabinet' (1996:20). 
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By personal style I mean they could achieve things without a blood bath. Take 
A44 for example. He had the potential to become one of the key advisers, 
because of his position, but he didn't. Why? His nickname says it all: Big Foot. 
He was arrogant, harsh. It's about knowing when to crush and when to laugh. 
It's about knowing when to let someone have a win. It's the style with which 
you inflict a loss. Take A53- she was a vogue adviser. She had a great style, 
personal charisma, friendliness. She didn't rub things in, she took things in her 
stride. Whereas A44 was nasty. 
By contrast Adviser 15 felt that ruthlessness was important to being influential: 
Take A51. He gets his own way all the time by rat fucking everyone. I've been 
a greatadmirerofhis for some time now! [laughs]. To win and get your way 
you need both a policy bent and a strategic political rat fucking bent. 
Yet he also agreed that: 'often the most powerful are those who only use it 
when they have to'. One of the most influential economic advisers admitted to 
cultivating a 'hard man' style, which was useful because of the special role his 
office had in maintaining fiscal discipline: 
A lot of them think I'm a bit of a bastard, so they don't approach me. I tend to 
take a pretty hard line on things. This can be useful to the advisers in the office 
to have me in the background. They can threaten other offices with me. If 
they're having difficulty with someone they can suggest they talk to me (A20). 
Reputational analysis thus reveals that there was a commonly understood 
power structure amongst advisers at this time, consisting of an 'inner circle' of 
influential advisers drawn from the three central offices as well as a series of 
influential individuals whose power was defined in relation to this group. This 
perception can be seen as 'kinship' in Heclo and Wildavsky's (1974) terms; that 
is, a shared understanding of 'who matters most? and how are they related?' 
There was also found to be a 'culture' of rules that told them how to act towards 
each other (1974:14). It was the 'kinship' and 'culture' amongst advisers, as well 
as high levels of delegation by ministers, which enabled their networking to 
operate as a coordination mechanism. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter used qualitative interviews and reputational analysis to illustrate 
two points. First, advisers interact through informal relationships and develop 
networks with other advisers which are essential to the performance of their 
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work. Second, this networking between advisers functioned as a coordination 
mechanism for three reasons: because ministers delegated sufficient authority 
to advisers to make their interactions meaningful; because there were informal 
rules which ensured interaction was functional; and because there was an 
underlying power structure amongst advisers which allowed some staff to 
exert authority in these interactions. 
It is important to stress that while the underlying power structure amongst 
advisers may have been clear, how power was exercised was not simple. There 
were strong conflicts between individuals in the Prime Minister's office, with 
different forces winning out at different times, and also conflicts between 
advisers in the Prime Minister's office and the Treasurer's office. Ministers had 
cross-cutting power relationships which affected advisers' interactions. Prime 
Ministerial advisers were also keen to stress that they were dependent in 
important ways on the work of line advisers. One Prime Ministerial adviser, 
Adviser 38, commented that: 
I am influential, but sometimes I think the more interesting question is who 
influences me? And they were the good ministers, the good advisers in 
ministers' offices who did exactly that. 
The next chapter shows adviser networking in operation, examining how 
advisers worked together in policy coordination. It focuses on the role of 
advisers in the three central offices, particularly the Prime Minister's office. It 
examines a case where there was a breakdown in adviser networking which 
caused major problems for the Keating government. 
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'Trying to make the whole thing run well': 
The role of the centre in policy coordination 
Having explored the structures and practices underlying advisers' networking, 
this chapter examines how advisers worked together in policy coordination, 
with a particular focus on the role of advisers in the three central offices. These 
advisers played important coordination roles surrounding the formal decision 
making processes within the executive. The chapter first describes how adviser 
networking was used to coordinate policy within the ministry. It looks in detail 
at the work of central office advisers in the Budget process. It then discusses 
the special role of advisers in the Prime Minister's office. Finally it analyses a 
case where advisers failed to coordinate, and then worked to repair the damage 
this caused, to illustrate the critical nature of this work and some of its 
vulnerabilities. 
ADVISERS' WORK IN POLICY COORDINATION 
Ministerial offices were the locus of much policy debate within the executive, 
with advisers acting as the agents of ministers. While they were political 
debates, the content and outcomes were all about policy: how much money 
was spent or saved, whether ministers could pursue new agendas and if so, 
when and how. The work of advisers in policy coordination had three 
elements: facilitating cabinet decision making, resolving policy conflict and 
pulling together new policy. 
Facilitating cabinet decision making 
Adviser networking was critical to the effective operation of cabinet. It 
facilitated cabinet decision making in two ways: by assisting ministers to make 
decisions in cabinet; and by enabling decision making to occur outside of 
cabinet. 
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Decision making in cabinet 
Communication between advisers before cabinet meetings was vital in 
clarifying and refining the issues to be discussed, identifying areas of 
disagreement and in preparing ministers for cabinet discussions. This made 
cabinet's discussions more focused. Several advisers commented that 90% of 
issues going to cabinet were already agreed upon before they were formally 
considered by cabinet. This left fewer contentious matters for cabinet to deal 
with, which reduced both the conflict in cabinet and its workload. That 
advisers conducted much of this business saved ministers' time and kept them 
out of the 'minutiae' and petty conflict that could harm their relationships 
(Orange). It was often very detailed and time-consuming work. 
Adviser networking was important in preparing cabinet ministers for cabinet 
meetings. Advisers played a vital role in reading all the incoming cabinet 
documents, selecting those the minister would be most likely to have an interest 
in, researching those proposals by speaking to others, and providing advice 
about whether support was warranted. Often one person in the office was 
assigned this role. This was a service line departments did not provide for 
ministers. Minister Brown, whose many portfolios had included Finance, 
remarked: 
Your office is crucial in enabling you to play an effective role in cabinet. There's 
so much paper coming through you simply have to have people around you 
who can give you advice on at least all those areas where you have an interest. 
Many issues as a cabinet minister you have minimal interest in and you can let 
them go by. Except as Finance Minister, where the cabinet is absolutely your 
forum and you have to be across everything.l 
He described what he expected his staff to do in helping him prepare for 
cabinet meetings: 
1 Ministers varied in how seriously they took their cabinet role. Some ministers did not give it 
high priority and did not wish their staff to spend much time on this task. They considered 
themselves able to participate as discussion occurred without much briefing (Blue). Others 
wanted detailed briefs from their advisers and relied heavily on these in cabinet (Black). Their 
style related to the nature of their portfolio and their workload as well as their personality and 
interests. 
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I expected them to look at the cabinet submissions and ... to write me a note on 
it saying 'I think this or that about this issue. I'm going to argue with them or 
agree with them or it's just a non-issue.' Often their comments in writing I 
would have no chance to discuss with them because there was just such a 
welter of issues around. So I had to stagger into cabinet with all these 
documents, some of which you had read and some of which you hadn't had 
time to read, no matter how diligent you were. You'd look it up and see 'what 
does this adviser say about this?' There was usually a note from them, 
particularly on anything important. 
Adviser 18 had responsibility for briefing his line minister for cabinet. Part of 
preparing a note involved talking to other advisers about their ministers' 
submissions. He explained: 
I can read a cabinet submission, and have a pretty good idea of what I think 
they're after. But it's quite often worthwhile to ring them up and say 'Look, 
after reading through, this is what I think you're after. But is that true?' Quite 
often they'll say 'No. This is what we're really after. This is how it's come 
about. This is the background to it.' 
An equally important part of his brief to the minister was what he found out 
about the views of other cabinet ministers, in particular what position the Prime 
Minister and Finance minister were likely to take. This was important to know 
because: 'all ministers will factor in, if they're going to say the same as 
somebody else, what that means for relationships and alliances.' It was vital to 
know the Prime Minister's position before the meeting because of Keating's 
style in cabinet- a 'propensity to lead from the front' (Blewett 1999:268) -which 
Minister Brown described: 
Keating was more inclined to state his position early, which had the effect of 
chopping off debate. Some ministers were not inclined to vent their 
disagreement with the Prime Minister. Things they would have said weren't 
said .... I tended to think Keating should have let discussion run on a bit first 
before coming in, but probably Hawke let it run too far. I think Keating came 
into the ring far too quickly in general. I should say that on some issues 
Keating let things run on unbelievably, especially on difficult issues. So it wasn't 
always the case that Keating would be in there, but if he had a point of view he 
expressed it. 
Public Servant 5, a finance official who was centrally involved in the Budget 
process, saw this 'pre-digestion' of cabinet matters amongst advisers as critical 
to effective decision making, because 'you can't run these things cold': 
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It's important that everyone knows where everyone is coming from, that there's 
not too many surprises when you get to the table, or else there's just no 
decisions. We can do a bit of that by keeping aware of what's going on, but the 
ministers' offices play a really critical role in that area. When they didn't, that's 
when things tended not to go very well. ... Decisions were not made on the 
basis of a full understanding of what's going on. People were talking at odds. 
Advisers then talk after the event when everyone has settled down and they go 
through and realise where the mistake is and they go fix it. But it is very rare 
that that would occur. Generally advisers performed that role well, so those 
mistakes didn't happen. John Angley [FMO] was fabulous at that. 
Ministers taking a proposal to cabinet relied on staff to explain the proposal to 
other advisers, sound out the likely views of other ministers and attempt to 
persuade them, through their staff, to support it. Trading may occur on the 
basis of these discussions. At the very least the minister would know the 
reception he or she was likely to receive in the cabinet room, enabling 
arguments to be marshalled and tactics honed. Adviser 4 described her role in 
pre-cabinet networking: 
My job would be to assess the obstacles you faced within the ministry and with 
particular staffers in particular offices. You would get a clear idea of your 
objective in the battle and assess who you needed to negotiate with yourself 
and when you would actually have to word the minister up and organise a 
meeting between ministers. This didn't happen often - mostly things were 
negotiated out by advisers. 
Public Servant 1 described the work of line advisers before cabinet as finding 
out the real agendas, 'stitching up things', and trying to 'soften up' ministers, 
often by 'trying to split them away from their department's views'. Advisers 
felt the quality of their networking affected outcomes in cabinet. Adviser 15 
described how in one of the major policy statements, his portfolio delivered 
$800 million in savings, $350 million of which was spent by another minister. 
He felt that 'really effective networking may have got us more of the money'. 
Adviser 19 recalled some cabinet submissions 'that I should have massaged 
better' which 'got knocked off'. 
Because the position of advisers in the three central offices on any matter was 
influential, finding this out and lobbying them was crucial to a minister's 
success in cabinet. Adviser 27 described how he lobbied advisers in the three 
central offices before cabinet: 
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If there is something I want to get up, I'd go and talk to them about it, I'd argue 
it out with them and try and win the argument. I'd go back and try again. I'd 
come at it from a number of different ways. I'd try to form strategic alliances. 
I'd try and find a strategic lever to push. I'd twist arms if necessary .... 
Sometimes I'd win. 
These advisers could respond in different ways, but only occasionally said 'yes', 
according to Adviser 4 : 
Sometimes they'd say 'piss off- it'll have to be sorted out in cabinet.' Sometimes 
they'd say 'I'll get back to you when I find out a little more about it'. Sometimes 
they'd then come back with some of what you want. Occasionally they'd come 
back and say 'yes' but more often they would offer a compromise position and 
you'd either accept it or not. 
Thus adviser networking before cabinet had two useful functions for decision 
making in cabinet. First it was important in the flow of information in the 
ministry, ensuring there was adequate consultation and clarifying ministers' 
intentions. Second, advisers' discussions played the role of what former 
Treasurer and Finance Minister Brown called 'thrashing out' issues: 
My advisers would talk to staffers about those issues and try to understand 
them better and argue things through with them and test propositions out with 
them .... To try and thrash out an issue. 
These discussions also refined the issues of dispute, what one Prime Ministerial 
adviser referred to as 'boiling things down to their essentials' (A36). Public 
Servant 5, a senior Finance official, saw this as vital to ensuring cabinet worked 
effectively: 
The objective is to get ministers to be making big decisions not little decisions. 
You want to get all the crap off the table so that they're actually saying 'Do we 
want to achieve this objective?' You don't want them to start talking about how 
we're going to do it. Which is a waste of their time .... That is sorted out 
between departments and between advisers beforehand. That's what happened 
all the time and that is what is desirable. Our system is built around getting 
most of the rubbish off the table. 
It was expected that this negotiation and debate amongst advisers would 
resolve issues as much as possible before they came to cabinet. Adviser 36, 
from the Prime Minister's office, said that often 'nine out of ten issues are 
decided, but on one out of ten there is still some talking necessary'. Another 
Prime Ministerial adviser, Adviser 38, saw it as important to have these fights 
outside of cabinet, in the 'argy-bargy' between ministers' offices: 
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There is quite a bit of that argy-bargy between ministers' offices to resolve 
something and then you get the tick of the ministers .... So when they [go] to 
cabinet the fight has been had already .... We already had the big argument and 
knocked this off, we didn't do that, and put this forward. 
She saw this as part of Keating's style in managing relationships within the 
ministry, saying: 
It's true that a lot of things were decided outside of cabinet and ... even where 
things went to cabinet often the decision was made beforehand by getting the 
ministers together. That's just the way Paul liked to work. 
This process recalls Heclo and Wildavsky's image of ministerial conflict as 'like 
the collision of mammoth icebergs': 'Before the tips impinge, the grinding and 
crunching has already been well underway below the surface' (1974:79). This 
'grinding and crunching' occurred at two levels: between departments and 
between ministerial offices. Departments and advisers worked together to win 
these debates, bargaining at different levels. Advisers could find out 
· information from other ministerial offices which helped departments in their 
battles, and vice versa. Adviser 4 recalled how the battle was waged at two 
levels: 
Often your department would alert you that their department was going to 
block you- you'd get tipped off early to get to them .... You'd go around to see 
them unannounced if possible, before they've been briefed by their department, 
so you'd catch them when they weren't fully across it. It was important to get 
to them before their position had hardened around their department's advice. 
Departments which were not close to their ministerial offices were vulnerable 
to adviser level lobbying. Adviser 23 said: 'It is not uncommon to find an office 
with a different view to its department - that gives you leverage.' 
At times conflict between ministers was managed entirely outside of cabinet. 
Some Prime Ministerial advisers saw it as their role to settle arguments before 
cabinet met, so that there were no 'fights' in cabinet. One Prime Ministerial 
adviser, Adviser 10, saw this as her role in working on a major cabinet 
submission: 
My job was to make the cabinet process as uncontroversial as possible. Last 
time they went to cabinet there had been a lot of conflict about the issue within 
cabinet. So my role was to ensure it was an uncontroversial cabinet item. I 
made sure all the major portfolios and stakeholders were consulted and 
understood what we were doing well before hand. 
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Advisers .,.."'.,.'"'.,..,.""', 
to several ministers were other 
person or by Usually if an agreement had been reached there 
was no need for ministers speak. They might talk if there were 
outstanding issues not be resolved by advisers. However they 
always signed letters authorising what had been agreed. 
Where ministers did meet decide matters informally outside of cabinet, 
advisers also played an important preliminary role, finding what these 
hoc meetings were "'"'-''"' ...... and what the views of other ministers were. This was 
critical, according to one key minister, Minister Brown: 
Can I say it is really, really important to have a senior adviser who is on the ball 
politically in those small group meetings. Often he could find out things before 
hand which helped you, so you knew what you were walking into. Often, you 
weren't sure what was happening! [laughs] Not that you would be entirely 
without thoughts on the issue yourself but you're not sure where anybody else 
is coming from, particularly the Prime Minister. To find out what his thinking 
is beforehand is really quite important. It is really important as a minister to 
know what's in the minds of your fellow ministers before you actually hear 
them say it .... So you have to have somebody on staff who is able to find that 
out. 
Resolving policy conflict 
Advisers' networking was also used to resolve policy conflict in the executive. 
Staff worked to develop consensus on issues on which there were conflicting 
views amongst ministers. Often issues were lifted up from the bureaucratic 
level to be resolved by staffers. Adviser 24 recalled a group of four advisers 
representing four portfolios sitting down over a coffee and resolving a joint 
approach which had been preceded by months of fighting between 
departments. As noted in Chapter Eight, public servants reported that it was 
easier for advisers to break the log jams that at times developed between 
departments, because they had a clearer sense of the whole of government 
perspective on an issue and the political authority to strike compromises. 
Resolving the government's position on complex, multi-player policy issues 
could be very time-consuming and was often done informally, through 
dialogue and negotiation between advisers. Minister Grey recounted his 
advisers' role in facilitating a major policy change in his portfolio that was 
politically controversial and involved much conflict between ministers: 
The advisers played a big role behind the scenes, talking to other senior 
advisers .... They were involved in lots of negotiations with Healtl;t and Finance 
on funding issues. There were big meetings with Industrial Relations because 
the unions weren't happy with what we were doing .... They attended lots of 
meetings with ... other minister's offices and would come back and tell me 
where we were at .... The advisers would go through all the avenues to resolve 
the problems before involving me. At times as a last resort problems would be 
resolved minister to minister. 
Sometimes on difficult issues consensus was ground out through meetings of 
groups of advisers, chaired by someone from the Prime Minister's office. This 
process was critical in forcing ministers to take a whole of government 
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perspective and in managing conflict within the ministry. The Prime Minister's 
advisers had considerable authority to make deals where there were policy 
disputes outside of cabinet. One Prime Ministerial adviser explained: 
I guess on a lot of things you're saying 'OK I've got the authority to work out 
this deal and I understand what the PM would agree with or what he wouldn't 
agree with or what he'd care about. Let's resolve the issues' (A38}. 
Another adviser from the Prime Minister's office, Adviser 10, described herself 
as 'an arbiter': 
You are the one who makes the call as to where the balance is struck. You need 
an ability to negotiate and balance packages in the context of competing 
interests. This is very important .... [Last week] two ministers put up a joint 
proposal but were coming from very different perspectives. It was my role to 
try to negotiate some way through so that the Prime Minister knew what was 
good policy. 
Prime Ministerial advisers were not only arbiters but also enforcers of 
consensus, as another Prime Ministerial adviser explained: 
The Prime Minister's office often becomes a third player in a dispute, trying to 
resolve some question of policy. . .. At some particular point you have to 
change your role and then tell them that they have to accept what's happened 
(A36). 
Pulling together new policy 
The final policy coordination role advisers had was pulling together new 
policy, where policy packages involved a number of portfolios. This involved 
brokering consensus and enforcing a whole of government approach. The 
Prime Minister's advisers played a key role in coordinating and steering the 
development of these policy packages, to ensure they delivered both policy 
coherence and political advantage. 
This involved deciding when and how different packages of new policy would 
occur. A line adviser explained that: 
Because they have the levers on all the big government strategy, they'll usually 
give you a sense of if you can proceed with an agenda, how, what language 
should be used, what to link it to and when you can start to get moving on it 
(AOl). 
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He said to the various involved 'Give me your 
h'''\cr,<>i"no~'il" I need to work out uuLu,5 , 
announce, how we're 
off because if you want to 
how are you to do 
coordination 
statements 
According to one Adviser who used 
groups develop several major policy packages, process had two 
functions: was a deliberate strategy to try to influence IDC, but also to 
make sure the ministers' offices could keep their ministers aware of what was 
happening'. For these complex exercises, it was her job to ensure the process 
was effective setting priorities, also managing conflict between 
ministers and driving consensus by everyone feeling satisfied they had 'had 
their say'. She explained how important this was to delivering political 
agreement: 
Very soon ... they were going to have to jump on an issue. And it wasn't any 
good coming at the end of the day and simply going "have you thought about 
this?". Because they were such big issues of government we were dealing with, 
it had to be that people felt happy with the processes and felt they'd had their 
say, and there weren't surprises .... And at the ministerial office level that we'd 
thrashed things out enough so that we felt that we could advise our ministers 
that we were pretty happy with what was happening. It does tend to cut down 
on the big stand-offs and the brawls right at the end. The taking up of the 
gunfighting position. We did that quite a lot. 
The policy coordination role described in this section can be seen as important 
in facilitating the decisions of the ministry, both inside and outside of cabinet, 
and in helping to manage conflict within the political executive. It also enabled 
political management of major policy development exercises which crossed a 
number of portfolios. This is work that ministers do not have time to do 
themselves but it is vital to the effective operation of the government. It is a 
role now recognised as one of the main functions of advisers, by ministers, 
advisers and public servants. It is an important element of the functioning of 
the 'gearbox' of executive coordination (Campbell1998), which a government 
needs to engage effectively if it is to have the capacity to govern. 
THE WORK OF ADVISERS IN THE THREE CENTRAL OFFICES 
The preceding description of advisers' policy coordination work confirms the 
enormous power of staff in the three central offices in relation to other 
ministerial advisers. Adviser 34, who moved from a spending minister's office 
to the Treasurer's office, was struck by the realisation that: 'within the ministers' 
offices, the grouping of the Prime Minister's, Treasurer's and Finance Minister's 
offices are much more in control of decision making than I realised'. 
The power of advisers in the three central offices stemmed from the power of 
their ministers within the government, and from the power of the departments 
they worked with. 
These advisers briefed the most powerful ministers. They were the last to 
speak to those ministers before they entered the meetings where important 
decisions were made. They were keen to stress that their ministers were 
extremely capable and experienced (some having been in cabinet for 13 years) 
and that they came to their own views on all matters. Still, it was significant to 
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be the people providing those ministers with information, opinion and 
argument. Junior Minister Purple felt this made them at times more powerful 
than some ministers: 
Of course they're powerful. Do you not think they can zap some little wet-
behind-the-ears adviser who doesn't have the networks? Of course they can! 
Those powerful advisers are probably at times more powerful than some 
ministers. Cabinet documents don't go to all ministers. If you can advise your 
very senior minister when s/he goes to cabinet 'Listen support this' and that 
minister says 'Yeah righto'- of course they're powerful. But sometimes you 
may be able to beat them. 
Another source of their influence was the fact that these advisers could unleash 
or restrain the power of the coordinating departments (Prime Minister and 
Cabinet; Treasury and Finance). They had the power to confirm, modify or 
negate the advice provided by the three most powerful departments. Long 
periods of fiscal restraint during the Labor years had empowered these 
departments, and they ran strong agendas which aimed to tightly control 
spending (Campbell and Halligan 1992). Their intransigence (especially 
Treasury and Finance) gave these advisers an important role and significant 
influence. It was often up to them to devise compromise solutions or to 'think 
creatively' about how to reconcile the budgetary and political problems arising 
from policy proposals, while their departments held their lines. Adviser 34, an 
adviser to the Treasurer, explained how she did this at Budget time: 
A department will put up a proposal and Treasury will advise "No" and I'd 
find a compromise way through. It's one of the things I enjoyed most about my 
role. In my briefing to the minister I would come up with a "possible way of 
dealing with this portfolio". We can accept these and reject those; we can ask 
them to develop a package with these elements. This is the creative or lateral 
work. ... In the programs I looked after the advice Treasury gave was fairly 
predictable which meant I had a bigger role in crafting options which suited his 
thinking. 
Finally, advisers in the central offices were powerful because they worked 
closely together and if they could all agree, then their position would be almost 
'overwhelming'. Adviser 39, from the Prime Minister's office, commented: 
Usually by the time things get to cabinet there's been a filtering of issues and 
refinement of positions. And there is generally agreement between the Prime 
Minister's office and the Treasurer's office and the Finance Minister's office, 
and if that's the case it's the end of the game really. 
Adviser 31, who worked for the Finance Minister, stressed that usually it would 
be 'sorted' so those ministers never 'clashed' in cabinet. 
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The Budget 
Advisers to the Prime Minister, the Treasurer and the Finance Minister had 
special roles in the Budget process, a time when ministerial conflict was 
particularly intense and the need for executive coordination was particularly 
acute. These roles were largely played out in the informal processes which 
surrounded the formal stages of the Budget. There were four stages in the 
Budget process in the Keating years: Troika, Trilaterals, Expenditure Review 
Committee and Budget Cabinet. The Expenditure Review Committee of 
cabinet (ERC) was established in 1983 to vet government expenditure and 
advise cabinet on spending priorities (Hawke 1996:176). It operated as the main 
engine of the Budget process (Campbell and Halligan 1992:136-144). Yet much 
crucial work was done before ERC actually met, in the Troika and Trilaterals. 
These meetings can be seen as part of the 'ERC process'.2 
A group of six advisers (two each from the Prime Minister's office, the 
Treasurer's office and Finance Minister's office) had important roles in 
managing the ERC process. They not only prepared their ministers for 
meetings and attended the meetings, they also played key roles in informal 
negotiations with other advisers outside those meetings. Public Servant 5, a 
Finance official who was centrally involved in the Budget process, said that 
'only ministers are important in the Trilaterals and ERC meetings themselves, 
but advisers play a critical role in the run up to the meetings and after the 
meetings'. 
Troika 
Key advisers were involved from the earliest stage of the government's Budget 
deliberations: Troika. Troika meetings involved the Prime Minister, Treasurer 
and Finance minister, as well as advisers to each of these ministers and a 
cabinet note taker. Troika decided the target for the Budget bottom line and the 
general parameters and key themes of the Budget. There were also informal 
Troika meetings where the three ministers met, with one adviser each and no 
notetakers. An adviser to the Treasurer said these informal meetings were very 
influential in deciding the 'game plan': 
2 The ERC process was also used for developing major policy statements outside of Budget 
time such as the Innovation Statement and Creative Nation. 
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It is these meetings -which I attend -which make the influential decisions 
on the government's priorities .... You decide whether you're going to spend 
money on two or three key areas or whether you'll do a range of smaller things 
across a wider perspective (A34). 
At times advisers could participate actively in Troika meetings as Adviser 38, 
an adviser to the Prime Minister, explained: 
The Prime Minister is there with a million proposals in front of him and there's 
no way he is going to know the details of every single one of them. And they'd 
be saying 'well let's knock this off and he'd say 'I don't know' and I'd say 'we 
shouldn't do that because of blah, blah, blah'. He's looking to me and I used to 
find when it got down to that that I'm fighting with other ministers. 
However advisers were always clearly subordinate. An adviser to the Finance 
minister described as 'nerve racking' a period when he often had to attend 
Troika without his minister; he felt he 'was skating on thin ice' (A40).3 
Trilaterals 
After the parameters of the Budget had been set by Troika, portfolio ministers 
were grilled about their submissions (containing new policy proposals and 
offsetting savings) at the Trilaterals. Trilateral meetings involved the Treasurer, 
the Finance minister and each portfolio minister, one by one. PM&C staff 
would record decisions of the meetings. The Finance minister had one or two 
staff with him and someone from the department. The Treasurer also had staff 
present. 
Only ministers were important in the Trilateral meetings, but advisers had 
done crucial work before the meetings. Six advisers from the three central 
offices (two from each office) had done a preliminary cull of submissions. One 
adviser involved in culling described the process: 
The preliminary culling process in the Budget involves going through all the 
various proposals and saying which are economically sensible and which are 
not, culling and adding things which we thought should be pursued .... That 
was always done without reference to our ministers. But it was not just 
"out"/"in". There were five categories I think ... "clearly out/ clearly in"; 
"probably out/probably in" and so on. There were shades of grey. The three 
ministers weren't involved in that process. Because it was so detailed they 
were happy to delegate (A21). 
3 It was a pre-election Budget and his minister held a marginal seat and was frequently 'on the 
road somewhere' on weekends when a lot of the early Budget work was done. 
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This culling formed the basis of the grilling ministers faced at the Trilaterals, 
which decided what ministers could or could not bring forward to ERC, what 
additional savings proposals they had to work on and bring forward, and what 
the bottom line of their portfolio submission was to be. In this way by the time 
ministers fronted ERC much work had already been done to shape ministers' 
portfolio submissions. Trilateral meetings could be fairly 'brutal', as an adviser 
to the Finance minister who was centrally involved recalled: 
Generally ministers would go out fairly bruised. At times they'd get some 
things through, at times they'd get their submissions thrown out completely 
and be told to come back with something entirely different .... In the last couple 
of Budgets some of my advice in the Trilaterals would be to reject that 
submission entirely as a junk submission- they're miles out of the ball park, 
there's nothing either politically or economically sensible in that submission, 
there's no argument for supporting what they have done, get rid of it! ... After 
they'd been to the Trilaterals the stamp would be all over them before they 
came back again (A31). 
Critical discussions occurred amongst advisers in central and line offices after 
the Trilaterals. This concerned what was able to be brought forward to the ERC 
and what reception proposals were likely to get in ERC.4 Adviser 34, who 
worked for the Treasurer, reported that advisers rang her constantly before 
their minister's appearance at ERC wanting to talk about their submissions: 
They want an indication of the Treasurer's likely position on their spending or 
an idea of how much we will ask them to save. My standard response was 'we 
don't have money to spend in these areas at all'. . .. I'd always be harder than I 
knew we'd be at the end of the day. It's all about game playing. . .. These 
conversations can be decisive because at times advisers would go back and tell 
their ministers that this was the Treasury office view and then the proposal 
would be changed or dropped. 
These conversations were also useful for her, to assess which proposals line 
ministers were genuine about and which ones were 'departmental shopping 
lists'. Adviser 32, who had worked for the Finance minister, said: 
You would have a look at a department's list of new policies and go and talk to 
the adviser and say, "now you're not serious about the bottom 15 are you?" 
And they would say "oh well, I am serious down to the bottom 10". And then 
you would report to the minister that he might get away with knocking off the 
bottom 15. 
4 Lobbying also occurred at a ministerial level. ERC member Neal Blewett recalls colleagues 
'beating a path to [his] door to make their claims' (1999:105). 
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fu these discussions the advisers who attended ERC had 'a lot of clout', as 
Adviser 31 recalled: 'You'd see them exercise it. People would come in and say: 
"We've got to get this up" and they'd say: "That's crap, you're not going to get it 
up. It's not going in".' Adviser 40, who worked for the Finance Minister, felt 
that he and the Treasurer's adviser 'really shaped a lot of the agenda of the ERC 
by cutting things off before they got there, by turning up together to negotiate 
with ministers, saying "we'll accept this or that" or "we don't want that going 
in".' Adviser 34 said she would tell other advisers 'no, you can't bring that 
forward', but always with the Treasurer's 'blessing'. Adviser 40 described the 
tone of these negotiations: 
It was all pretty ruthless really .... We did some temble things to people .... We 
were rarely open with other advisers .... We'd go back and renegotiate deals .... 
We reserved the right to continually change the rules. 
Before ERC the three central offices would also have generally agreed on a 
common approach, which was then 'pretty powerful', an adviser to the 
Treasurer explained: 
ERC 
I usually developed joint positions with the Finance Minister's office and Prime 
Minister's office before ERC meetings .... I think I have the ability to have a lot 
of influence on the outcomes of the ERC because I can work with the three 
offices and develop agreed positions, which are then pretty powerful (A34). 
fu the first Keating government the ERC comprised the Prime Minister, 
Treasurer, Finance Minister and six senior ministers.s Its decisions were 'de 
facto cabinet decisions' (Walsh 1995: 103).6 The Treasurer chaired ERC 
meetings. Portfolio ministers appeared one by one before the committee. ERC 
members generally did not have staff present; only the Treasurer and Finance 
minister did. While there was always someone from the Prime Minister's office 
present, Keating himself rarely attended ERC. This was different to Hawke 
who had chaired ERC? Minister Brown, who had been in ERC for 13 years, 
recounted: 
5 The senior ministers were Richardson, Beazley, Blewett, Button, Howe and Evans (Blewett 
1999:78}. Its membership and size varied over the Keating period. 
6 According to former Finance Minister Walsh, ministers 'hardly ever' exercised their right to 
appeal its decisions to full cabinet (1995:103}. 
7 Though towards the end of his period as PM, Hawke sent his economic adviser as a 
'surrogate': 'his brief was to keep me informed of the ERC's daily deliberations on the 
understanding that no binding decisions would be taken by the committee on any sensitive 
issue without my intervention, either to endorse a tentative position or to overrule it' (Hawke 
1996:387}. 
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Keating especially kept away .... He left a lot to the Treasurer. He would come 
in for some issues, usually towards the end of the process when there were 
extremely difficult issues to be resolved. . .. But he always had someone from 
his office in ERC to keep across what was happening. Sometimes they would 
play a role in discussions. At times we would ask if they had anything they 
wanted to say on this issue. 
The fact that Keating rarely attended ERC made it difficult for his advisers, as 
Adviser 38 explained: 
It was a very hard job that we did at ERC because ... [if you disagreed with 
something] the most you can say is "I think I'd like to talk the Prime Minister 
about that further". Because he wasn't there. And you can't claim too much .... 
The most we could do was often to get them to say they agreed in principle but 
they deferred it until further discussions with the Prime Minister. 
According to Edwards (1996), Hawke's chairing of ERC 'buttressed' his 
influence over the Budget and prevented ministers from seeking to have ERC 
decisions overturned (1996:251). Keating's absence at ERC appeared to both 
weaken his influence over the Budget (Watson 2002:401-3) and also to 
encourage ministers and their staff to lobby the Prime Minister's office about 
ERC decisions. According to advisers in the study this dynamic greatly 
irritated staff of the key economic ministers. It caused tension between them 
and staff in the Prime Minister's office, whom they described as 'the point of 
least resistance' (A40).8 
The influence of advisers in the Prime Minister's office, Treasurer's office and 
Finance minister's office in the Budget process was significant, but it was 
always exercised on behalf of their ministers, and was always subordinate to 
that of ministers. A former Finance minister and Treasurer, Minister Brown, 
said that: 'they had a role that was important, but at the end of the day the shots 
were called by the ministers.' Adviser 40, who worked for the Finance minister, 
stressed that what he did in his minister's name always came before ministers 
themselves at some stage in the process. In his negotiations with other 
ministers' offices, he reported occasionally being told to 'get stuffed' by 
ministers who succeeded in 'bullying their way through' against the wishes of 
advisers in the central offices. However in general these advisers acted with 
8 Blewett suggests it was to reduce the influence of Keating and his office that the ERC 
process was so 'reformed': 'The place is an administrative shambles, with Paul acting 
independently in every sphere but without the physical stamina ... to carry things through. Thus 
enormous powers accrue to his office and departments are by-passed not merely by the PM but 
also by his staff. We [Dawkins and Blewett] agreed that we must get Keating out of the ERC 
process completely, with Dawkins taking charge and he and Willis keeping the PM informed' 
(1999: 151,160). 
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much authority in negotiating with other advisers, because they were 
transmitting the views and instructions of the most powerful ministers in the 
process. 
The work of these advisers was vital to the effective functioning of the Budget 
process, as Adviser 40, from the Finance minister's office, explained: 
We had our own role and they let us go at that. We were seen as the dogs that 
went and bit people, and got things running and made sure the ERC 
functioned .... We were the ones that ran the processes. 
They helped facilitate the process of setting priorities and securing political 
I 
agreement, by transmitting information and reinforcing the power of key 
ministers. Their role was also important in managing conflict during these 
times of intense ministerial combat. Former Finance Minister and Treasurer, 
Minister Brown, stressed the value of advisers' negotiations before ministers 
met in this sense: 
It's very difficult and demeaning for ministers to get it all blown away in ERC. 
It's embarrassing. It's better that they don't do that, so you try and get them to 
withdraw on the basis it's not going to get up and they won't suffer a big defeat. 
THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE 
The Prime Minister's office had a pre-eminent role in the policy and political 
coordination which occurred amongst ministerial advisers. Under Keating, the 
Prime Minister's staff were divided into three groups: an 
Administrative/Coordinating group, an Advising group and the Press Office. 
This is the same structure that existed under Hawke. Out of 30 staff in 
Keating's office, there were between 10 and 12 senior advisers with policy and 
political responsibilities. 9 
Much of the writing about the role of the Prime Minister's office notes its role in 
strategic leadership and overall management of the government, in maintaining 
coherence, and as a 'gearbox' for the Prime Minister's relations with other 
ministers (Weller 2000; Hollway 1996; Walter 1986, 1992; Campbell and 
Halligan 1992:66-71). Yet how it performs this coordination work in its 
relationships with other ministerial offices has rarely been explored. 
9 The number varied over time. The office structure in April1995 is listed in Appendix 2. 
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The Prime Minister's office under Keatinglo 
There were several features of Keating's own style which increased the 
importance of the Prime Minister's office. First, power was more centralised 
within the ministry than had been the case under Hawke. Keating expected his 
office to have 'a finger in every pie' (A36), as Adviser 38 explained: 
Paul Keating as Prime Minister, given his personality and his very strong 
views, did run more of a central Prime Ministership I think. And so ... our 
responsibilities were quite significant in trying to make the whole thing run 
well. 
Second, policy coordination was an important part of the role of the senior 
advisers, as Keating himself was so 'committed to policy' (A39). Adviser 39 felt 
that the Prime Minister's office 'dominated the policy process. And generally 
the government was a very centralised place when it came to policy.' 
Third, Keating focused on a small number of 'big picture' policy issues and 
delegated control of policy outside this agenda largely to his advisers. They 
operated with very high levels of delegation and considerable autonomy. 
Public Servant 8, a senior PM&C officer, confirmed the autonomy and power of 
the Prime Minister's advisers under Keating: 
We had daily interaction with the Prime Minister's advisers, but more often 
than not you knew the briefs you wrote to the Prime Minister never went 
beyond the Prime Minister's advisers and they would brief him orally. From a 
PM&C perspective, you rarely saw the Prime Minister. Under Keating, the 
advisers were the Prime Minister - and they had a very strong role in directing 
ministers. 
Because the Prime Minister was so busy, his advisers had far less access to him 
than did their counterparts in ministers' offices. They had less time to brief 
him. Adviser 36 explained that what might have been a one hour discussion 
with a minister 'might be a one minute discussion with the Prime Minister'. 
Another adviser described the limited time she had for briefing the Prime 
Minister before cabinet: 
10 Unless stated, all quotations in this section are from Prime Ministerial advisers. 
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I had three that went cabinet last my office on 
''The first item is fine. On second one be aware that 
this and this forward," He asked "But is the~-""'~"'"'"'"' 
that this minister may want to add some comments. That's rn have a 
chance to tell him and all he to know. If I know the PM&C "'"'""r•cr 
one I 
this is not my view and doesn't take account 
Prime Minister ran his 
if I went to him every 
... whereas other Prime Ministers 
awconom:ycamefrom ~cter:st~rruJ~g 
resolved and over, or he'd want to do 
and so to kick off an "'b''H""''"'" at the end which 
go back and say 'look we've done some terrific work and so let's 
it in the and he'd go 'yes all .... The is because of the 
certain Prime Minister he is. 
were 
was a skill; as was 
you have to act in effect totally ... There is a degree 
of trust to you and responsibility. And the trick in this business is to 
know at which you must see the Prime Minister and get a direction or 
talk it through with him. 
Access Minister was limited 
'could easily go a couple of weeks 
competitive. Adviser 
seeing him': 
said she 
You are making big policy calls and often making them alone .... Often you 
can't get to him to talk about it so you just have to assume that you are making 
the right calls .... What you say is very much based on a knowledge of where 
the idea came from, the background to the issue and the positions of the key 
players, which you must always be on top of. 
Adviser 38 recalled her advice to someone new 
frustrating but necessary it was to operate 
Minister: 
office, to illustrate 
involving the Prime 
I said to him 'Look my advice to you is you will start the of the 
that if I to Paul about the world 
the 
to a 
office on something, with 
worth pursuing. 
Adviser 38: she has decided something, it will happen.' Junior Minister 
stressed 'how impossible it was the PM's office was against 
had authority demand that line ministers 
consult with them, or with ministers, in developing policy proposals. 
as 
Where they did not feel they were properly consulted/ they had the power to 
stop things going to cabinet: 
We can handle that very clearly by saying we won't put it onto the cabinet 
agenda. We can just say "we're not doing it". And the other thing we can say is 
"we don't like these ideas". That just buys you time as well .... It's a silly way to 
play the game when the ultimate power lies elsewhere. You would say for 
example, ... "it's not getting onto cabinet until the next time when we want to 
see the proposals up front". It's very easy for us to get the Prime Minister to 
sign a letter that says you have to talk to your ministerial colleagues about this, 
you can't just bring it forward. There are all those things you can do. And 
there's also demanding to see things, demanding to have conversations with 
people which you can do (A38). 
Where the Prime Minister took a strong interest in a policy area, the role of the 
senior policy adviser could be much stronger, and included directing the work 
of the line minister's office and having a decisive say on policy issues. One 
senior policy adviser was in this situation, where she said that 'a lot of the 
agenda is being run out of this office' (A10). 
How senior policy advisers in the Prime Minister's office exercised their power 
had much to do with their judgements of staff in other ministerial offices. An 
adviser's reputation and the quality of their relationship with the Prime 
Minister's office were important factors in the level of control exercised at the 
centre, as Adviser 38 explained: 
How I decide what to do has a lot to do with my relationships with other 
ministerial offices. . .. Where ministers are good, of which there were many, 
then I'm pretty keen on letting the minister run the agenda and therefore just 
making sure I understand what's going on .... Where the minister is not very 
good, then the role becomes one of trying to bolster that minister and the policy 
side up a bit. So there is a responsibility to keep in touch with the other 
ministers' offices ... and to take account of where the strengths and weaknesses 
are. And if there are strengths to get the hell out of the way. 
Her judgements about policies were influenced by her judgements of the 
abilities and approach of the advisers who pushed them: 
I think you get to know very clearly - because you work so closely together 
with people - who the good people were. So I was extremely influenced by 
people who had very good judgement, very good policy nous, were reliable. I 
always did listen to people who I genuinely believed cared one, about their 
minister but two, about the government. There's a lot of people in minister's 
offices who care one, about themselves, two, about their ministers and three, 
not about anything else .... Whereas other people would put ideas up to me and 
I'd know it had come with a very good brain behind it, a very good intention to 
do good work for their minister and the government, and with a great sense of 
responsibility. 
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Public Servant 6 stressed how important an adviser's relationship with the 
Prime Minister's office was to the department in this sense: 'A relationship with 
the [senior] policy adviser in the Prime Minister's office is incredibly important. 
Life is very hard if your adviser isn't respected by that person.' It was also 
crucial for ministers, as Minister Purple explained: 
[My senior adviser's] relationship with the PM's office was unbelievably crucial. 
Being a junior minister with [portfolio A] and [portfolio B] -if I didn't have 
someone who knew that office and could work that office - God! Because if a 
junior minister hounds the PM too much forget it. You only go to a PM if you 
really need something and you want it and then you've got to get it. 
Yet there were also limitations on, and counterpoints to, the power of the Prime 
Minister's office. There were often strong conflicts between advisers within the 
office (Watson 2002). At times the Prime Minister's office was in conflict with 
the Treasurer's office and it did not always win fights with Treasury (Watson 
2002:670).11 Ministers could choose to fight them, and could sometimes win. 
Some ministers had cross-cutting powers. Minister Gold, a factional leader, 
said: 'their ability to fight me was extremely limited by the fact that no Prime 
Minister really wanted to push me off side.' Adviser 38 stressed her own 
dependence on others, 'some very strong people in departments and ministers' 
offices'. Adviser 39 felt that he had less power when cabinet was involved: 
If I had passionately wanted something I could probably have got it. But that 
would have to be in processes that don't go to cabinet. I think we had less 
influence in things that go to cabinet where more formal processes take over. 
However the key issue relating to the role of the Prime Minister's office at this 
time is not power but responsibility. The reforms to cabinet in the Labor period 
delivered a critical responsibility to advisers in the Prime Minister's office, 
responsibility for resolving policy issues outside of cabinet, arbitrating disputes 
and managing conflict between ministers. Much of this was done at one step 
removed from the ministers themselves, by negotiating with their advisers. 
These developments placed considerable responsibility in the hands of 
individual advisers in the Prime Minister's office. 
The final section of this chapter outlines a short case study in which it could be 
argued that a Prime Ministerial adviser failed to perform his coordination role 
adequately, resulting in a major breakdown in government. A second Prime 
Ministerial adviser (his replacement) then played a strong role in coordinating 
11 Watson recalls that on the Innovation Statement the Treasurer was 'intransigent' : 'It was like 
Napoleon surrendering to his accountant. Treasury set rules and the Prime Minister felt he had 
no choice but to obey them' (2002:670). 
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two 
new licences. exE~m<pte~a 85 forest 'coupes' 
(management areas a .vo;;.u .... o;;u .. was a non-cabinet 
minister, junior to the Minister for and Energy, and under 
legislation had the power to make this decision himself. However he was also 
required under legislation to take into consideration the Environment 
Minister's advice on the environmental impact the decision. 
The management of forests and the granting of woodchip licences were issues 
that touched on a deep ideological divide both within the community and 
within the government. Within the community there was strong and 
passionate conflict between timber workers and companies and environmental 
groups over the issue. The politics of the decision needed to be managed 
carefully. Within the ministry it was also an issue of major conflict, which 
required consultation and arbitration 
using the Prime Minister's authority. 
the centre, either through cabinet or 
In the extensive media coverage that followed Beddall's decision it was referred 
to as 'the forest debacle', 'a legal, administrative and political mess' and an 
example of 'sloppiness' and 'policy ineptitude' (Emerson 1995; Greenlees 1995a, 
1995b ). It resulted in a threatened revolt by caucus, five threatened and one 
actual resignation from the ALP by backbenchers,l2 massive demonstrations by 
the environment movement, and, several weeks later, a two day blockade of 
Parliament House by logging companies and timber workers. It resulted in a 
split within the government which took considerable time to heal. 
The decision making process was so mishandled that when the Prime Minister 
intervened in late January 1995 and increased the number of coupes to be saved 
to 509 this was attacked by green activists as a 'disaster'. This number was far 
higher than had ever been preserved before (the previous year 16 were 
excluded) and the Prime Minister admitted that if the original decision had 
been 509, it would have been hailed by green groups as a victory (Greenlees 
1995b). 
Advisers played an important role in both the creation of the problem and the 
solving of the problem. The following analysis is based on interviews with 
some advisers and public servants who were directly involved in what 
happened, on newspaper reports and other accounts (Watson 2002), and on 
comments by other advisers and ministers in the course of their interviews.13 
Background to the decision 
An important aspect to the decision was that cabinet was not involved in the 
decision making process. While it was entirely the role of the Resources 
Minister to make the decision, in previous years the decision had been 
discussed in cabinet, where the Environment Minister advocated saving 
various coupes and there was vigorous and detailed debate. However cabinet 
did not want to deal with the matter in 1994, according to one public servant: 
12 Tasmanian Senator John Devereux resigned from the ALP on 21 December 1994. 
13 Their quotes are not attributed to ensure confidentiality. Because some of the key players 
were not able to be interviewed the analysis should be seen as drawing general conclusions 
from the case, rather than making definitive statements about the detail of the case itself. 
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Where the bun-fights came in cabinet [in previous years] were where cabinet 
ministers were forced to look at very detailed maps of compartments of forests, 
and make decisions, and there was a general feeling that this is not an effective 
use of cabinet's time and that the cabinet is not equipped to make those 
decisions, and that if you've got a situation in cabinet where the Environment 
Minister is saying black is black and the other minister is saying black is white, 
then how in the hell can cabinet make that decision? ... That was a pretty strong 
feeling right throughout the government, that this is not a decision that should 
go to cabinet in 1994. 
What was different about the 1994 decision was that it was deliberately sent 
outside of cabinet, and the Resources Minister was required to formally consult 
with the Environment Minister in making the decision. This was what gave the 
Environment Minister, Senator John Faulkner, the opportunity to submit to the 
Resources Minister a list of coupes to be preserved. It also created an 
expectation that his views would be considered in the decision process and an 
expectation within the environment movement that he might have some impact 
on the decision.l4 
A decision made outside of cabinet 
The role cabinet had previously played in mediating the conflict between the 
two ministers and deciding where the balance was struck was not formally 
given to anyone. There was no formal role for the Prime Minister to oversee the 
decision making process (this requirement was instituted after the 1994 
decision). Informally though it was understood that it was the responsibility of 
the Prime Minister's environment adviser, Adviser 56, to monitor the decision 
process. 
The two ministers not only represented polarised policy positions. Each had 
mobilised their political constituencies and had much at stake in the decision in 
terms of their own credibility. The ministers had a poor relationship. It would 
14 Because he was to be formally consulted, the Environment Minister commissioned studies to 
provide him with information about which coupes were likely to have high conservation value 
and should be temporarily set aside from logging. Many of these studies were conducted by 
peak environmental lobby groups. This information was put together with advice from his 
department and 1300 coupes were nominated to be set aside until their environmental impact 
had been assessed. Thus the decision to preserve only 85 coupes fell significantly short of the 
expectations of the environment movement. 
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be true to say that relations had broken down between them; they were 'at 
war'.l5 
There was no mechanism for developing a whole of government view on the 
matter. The Environment minister argued that the decision should be seen in a 
broader context of government policy, as closely related to the National Forest 
Policy, a structural adjustment package for the timber industry and a general 
industry strategy. These wider policy considerations would have involved 
several ministers in developing a coordinated response. However in the 
informal processes leading up to the decision no one forced the issue to be seen 
as part of a broader policy response.16 
One of the major problems in the process was a lack of communication between 
the ministers and their offices in the lead up to the decision. One staffer called 
it 'a failure of advising'. A public servant described the problem as 'a huge 
failure in communication between ministers': 
Ministers weren't talking to each other - they were only writing to one another -
and the ministers' advisers were not talking to one another .... I basically put it 
down to a failure of communication. A failure of action by the bureaucrats to 
bring people together and a failure of communication between ministers and 
their advisers. All round, right through the system, no one was really talking to 
one another. 
Another person involved felt that: 
The only reason that it gained the momentum that it did, went on for as long as 
it did, and had the passion that it did, was the absence of any relationship and 
the absence of any ability to deal between the two ministers. The reason that 
coordination did not occur was because ministers did not talk to one another. 
The important role that advisers can play within government of keeping the 
channels of communication open, especially in times of policy dispute, was 
clearly not played here. The unwritten rule amongst staffers to keep talking 
when ministers were not, was not adhered to. Why? One participant explained 
that: 'Ministers did not want their staff to talk to one another .... If ministers are 
directing advisers not to deal with staff in another minister's office then it is 
15 The stakes were higher than in previous years because Faulkner was a new Environment 
Minister and the conservation movement took this opportunity to make a concerted push on the 
issue of forests. Faulkner had also signalled publicly that he was prepared to assert his rights 
under the provisions of the Forest Industry Strategy to recommend temporary protection of 
areas of high conservation value. According to one participant, all involved were 'playing harder 
ball'. 
16 The structural adjustment package and industry strategy ultimately formed an important part 
of the resolution of the problem in 1995. 
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We didn't 
we lobbied the PM's 
.. ,., .... .,.,,Lv• heiwE~en ministers' vu''"'"''"' that is an 
to talk 
was a Vln'Onr•r area 
advisers 
we told them that we weren't consulted. Sometimes the response was 
'leave it up to me, I'm it through'. In view Prime Minister's 
adviser was negligent. I tried to talk to him and warn him but he wasn't 
interested. I'd hunt him out and he'd say it was too difficult, he was sick of the 
conflict. When I went down to see him he would say: 'go away and sort it out 
yourself!' He refused to play a coordinating role .... The PM's office didn't take 
control and that was the only way the issue could be worked through in 
government and in the bureaucracy outside of cabinet - by firm control by the 
PM's office. 
Without the Prime Minister's office being engaged the issue, PM&C were 
powerless to coordinate, a PM&C officer explained: 
Our role was pretty much at that stage one of ringing alarm bells and saying 
'this doesn't look like it's going very well and we think there are some problems 
emerging' .... We were very worried that it was going to blow up. We had 
difficulty in convincing the Prime Minister's adviser that it was a major issue 
requiring the Prime Minister's focus. His judgment at the time was that it 
wasn't. ... The Prime Minister's office is critical because we can coordinate all 
we like down here but unless we actually carry the authority of the Prime 
Minister to do it, departments and ministers tend to ignore you. 
Ministers too commented that this case was one where the Prime Minister's 
office had not played the role expected of it. Minister Blue saw it as indicating 
'an absolute absence of coordination': 
It really should have been at a very early stage closely overseen with heads 
bashed together and the Prime Minister's staff absolutely on top of the 
differences between the environment people and the resources people .... A lot 
of that stuff shouldn't have been allowed to build up, they should have been 
dragged back and supervised. 
Former Prime Ministerial adviser Don Watson felt it was 'remarkable' that 'no 
one called the warring parties together and demanded a political compromise' 
(2002:537). Some advisers suggested that Adviser 56 'took his eye off the ball' 
because he was tired and burnt out from working as an adviser for a long time 
and because he was busy with other complex and important problems.17 
Watson also suggests the matter was not raised with Keating as it was the end 
of the year and he was 'determined to escape all but his inescapable duties' 
(2002:450). 
Some public servants were keen to stress the atypical nature of this case. They 
felt that the Prime Minister's advisers were usually very good at playing the 
policy coordination role required of them, as one very experienced public 
servant stressed: 
17 He was the only one of Hawke's advisers to stay on when Keating became Prime Minister 
and before that had worked for Richardson when he was Environment Minister. He also had 
responsibility for sport and aboriginal affairs and had been involved in the lengthy Mabo 
negotiations. One long time adviser suggested that it was actually the head of the Prime 
Minister's office who should have taken charge of the situation. He also commented that in this 
period (when Don Russell was not heading the office) communication with Keating and within 
the office was generally poor. 
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The role of the Prime Minister's office in [policy coordination] in my experience 
has been superb. 1his is an example of a monumental failure and it's atypical. 
Absolutely atypical. PMO staff ... are marvellous people .... Look it doesn't 
happen with these guys .... They played very very strong roles and I mean it 
makes the failures all the more remarkable. The staff at the Prime Minister's 
office are people of the absolute highest calibre. 1his is instructive as a lesson 
in failure. I can't think of too many others. 
In addition to the lack of communication between advisers and the passivity of 
the Prime Minister's office, there might be a third element to the case. The 
Prime Minister's advisers may have lacked the authority to control the 
situation. According to newspaper reports, the informal nature of the adviser's 
role left him exposed: the Resources Minister did not recognise the authority of 
the Prime Minister's adviser to influence his decision. The 'spin' which 
followed the decision suggested this may have been the case: 
Mr Beddall ... is believed to have insisted to colleagues that he notified the 
Prime Minister's office of his decision before it was announced. However 
sources said last night that Mr Keating's office was given only the bare details 
of the decision after the licences had been signed, thereby making them legally 
enforceable (Gordon, Humphries and McLean 1994:1).18 
Strong coordination roles to 'fix' the problem 
After the December 1994 decision, the Prime Minister was directly involved 
until the end of January 1995 in changing the number of coupes to be 
preserved, and deferring the granting of the two new woodchip export licences. 
After this, his new environment adviser Adviser 48 took responsibility for 
coordinating a broad government response to the problem of the future 
management of the licence process, the restructuring of the timber industry and 
the preservation of forests.19 There was strong central control over the process, 
with a Task Force established in July 1995 involving 20-25 public servants from 
PM&C and the Departments of Environment, Sport and Territories and 
Primary, Industry and Energy, coordinated by PM&C. 
A whole of government approach was ground out at a department level by 
PM&C and at a ministerial level by the Prime Minister's office. Those 
18 Indeed, Beddall's approach as a minister was seen by some as a key factor. It was said he 
identified himself strongly with the logging industry and was determined to use his powers to 
deliver benefits for it, with no intention of accommodating the government's broader interests. 
One adviser said Beddall judged his success by how 'hairy chested and macho' he could be, 
and saw accommodation as equal to failure. 
19 Adviser 56 had left for another job. 
269 
interviewed described the role of the Prime Minister's adviser as 'paramount'. 
He ensured communication occurred between offices by convening regular 
meetings of the relevant ministerial advisers. There were up to six offices 
involved over time. 
As the issues were drawn back into cabinet in 1995, Adviser 48 played a key 
role in resolving conflicts before cabinet, as a PM&C officer explained: 
He forced the advisers to come together the same way we forced the 
departments to come together .... He was the one that made the whole process 
work up there .... It was smooth sailing from then on. We had the process for 
getting whole of government official views and a process for getting whole of 
government ministerial views and from that point on every time it went to 
cabinet we had the two ministers going in with an agreed view, or if it wasn't 
agreed there would be a Minister for Environment, Minister for Primary 
Industries view and then ... compromise options. Cabinet went extremely 
smoothly after that. ... But if it hadn't been for Adviser 48 I wonder whether or 
not all that would have come together. He was, to my mind, absolutely critical 
in the whole process - it wouldn't have worked without him. 
An adviser involved in the process felt the coordination and leadership role of 
the Prime Minister's adviser was crucial to what was achieved: 
We wouldn't have achieved what we did achieve without the PM's office taking 
a central role. Advisers met at all key stages and were critical in projecting and 
reinforcing the whole of government approach .... Adviser 48 really was a 
decision maker in that he'd arbitrate between different interests in the adviser 
group .... So that by the time the package got to cabinet there were very few 
sticking points. It was virtually signed, sealed and delivered. The consensus in 
government was very much ground out by the advisers, though the 
departments did a lot of the detailed work. ... It was an example of the 
bureaucracy working well together and the advisers working well together. 
A public servant described how Adviser 48 brokered decisions outside of 
cabinet, by working with the advisers: 
Ministers might be finding it difficult to come to a decision, and so we could 
just ring up Adviser 48 and he would go 'Right, I'll sort it out' -and he'd get 
back to you a few hours later and say 'Well, this is the decision' or 'we've 
changed it this way or that way'. 
Another public servant saw him as strongly directing from the centre, using the 
Prime Minister's authority: 
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We would put up a subject for the decision of the Prime Minister, Adviser 48 
would talk to his colleagues and other ministerial advisers, maybe talk to 
ministers and then go to Keating and say 'these are the views around the table, I 
think we should do this' ... and Keating would either agree or disagree. Then 
he was able to go out and say to Faulkner and Beddall 'that's the decision'. 
The personal skills of the Prime Minister's adviser were important to the 
success of the process. One public servant described him as 'a very astute 
operator': 
He was very careful ... because he always knew that ministers could just as 
easily walk in to see the Prime Minister and shaft him. He would judge and 
take decisions on the minor issues that didn't need to bother the PM, but where 
he knew it was a major one or where one or another minister might be seen as a 
winner or a loser, he would make sure that the PM was behind him, and he was 
extremely effective in doing that. I don't think I've met a more capable and 
competent ministerial adviser than Adviser 48. He really is a class act. 
The Prime Minister's adviser can be seen as playing a very effective role in 
coordinating within government to develop a long term strategy to 'fix' the 
problem of woodchip export licences. He was crucial in ensuring there was 
communication within the ministry (by convening meetings of advisers) and in 
arbitrating between competing interests in informal processes outside of 
cabinet. While cabinet was brought back into the process and its authority on 
the matter reasserted, there were no longer the damaging 'brawls' in cabinet 
which had occurred before 1994. The Prime Minister's office took on the role of 
resolving conflict and forging consensus before matters reached cabinet, using 
the Prime Minister's authority. 
The original mishandling of the issue was dramatic and also unusual. The 
Prime Minister's advisers usually performed their coordination roles more 
effectively. Advisers usually adhered to the key rule of networking, to keep 
talking. Yet the case reveals the vulnerability of a system of coordination built 
on informal interactions, in which enormous responsibility was placed in the 
hands of individuals. It also suggests adviser networking is more effective 
where it operates alongside cabinet processes, rather than as a substitute for 
cabinet decision making. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has argued that through their informal relationships and 
networks, ministerial advisers provided an arena for policy coordination, one 
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which was vital to the effective operation of cabinet. Reforms to the operation 
of cabinet in the Labor period led to a growth of the role of advisers as 
executive level negotiators. Their work had three elements: facilitating cabinet 
decision making, resolving policy conflict and pulling together new policy. The 
three central ministerial offices (the Prime Minister's office, the Treasurer's 
office and the Finance minister's office) played special coordination roles, with 
the Prime Minister's office clearly pre-eminent. This work assisted ministers in 
priority setting and political management, as well as in forging consensus and 
managing conflict within the ministry. 
There were important benefits to ministers in advisers performing these roles. 
Ministers' time is limited, and by acting as their agents, advisers enabled them 
to focus on higher level issues and reduced cabinet's workload. They also 
reduced direct conflict between ministers. However something important may 
be lost when ministers rarely deal directly with each other. Vulnerabilities also 
arise when responsibility for executive coordination is placed in the hands of 
individuals, outside the formal coordinating structure of cabinet. 
Having analysed the role played by advisers in the Keating years in Chapters 
Four to Nine, the thesis now concludes by discussing the broader implications 
of advisers performing this role in Australian government. 
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Co~c1'1:1sioi1 
Partisans at the centre of government 
This study addressed the question: 'what was the role and significance of 
ministerial advisers in the Keating government?' It showed advisers in the 
Keating years to be an important part of the central machinery of government, 
located at the intersection of linkages between policy actors, at the heart of 
decision making and policy making in Australia. Their central location, and the 
major development in their role, made them significant players in the structure 
and practice of government at this time. This chapter explores the significance 
of the role revealed in this research. It argues advisers' work has fundamental 
implications for governance in Australia and for the operation of our political 
institutions. 
MORE THAN 'SPIN' AND 'MINDING': THE WORK OF 
ADVISERS 
One of the problems of debating the significance of advisers in our political 
system is that their role is difficult to capture and has not been fully articulated. 
The thesis provides a conceptual framework to understand the work advisers 
did in the Keating years. The role of advisers had five elements, which directly 
related to the problems of political control faced by modem executives. These 
were personal support, political support, communication, steering policy and 
executive coordination. By performing these functions advisers helped 
ministers to direct government and to cope with the demands of their jobs. 
Advisers' communication work was important in helping ministers to deal with 
a demanding media-oriented political environment and to manage the multiple 
relationships inside and outside of government which are a feature of modem 
governance. Their work in steering policy could be crucial in helping ministers 
to direct the work of departments and to devise and deliver policy agendas. 
The coordination work advisers did through their networking was essential to 
the effective operation of the ministry and of cabinet. Their communication and 
coordination work had become core expectations of the role at this time; their 
steering policy work was more contested and variable. 
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An important feature of this thesis is its emphasis on variation in the behaviour 
of advisers. Too often commentators make broad generalisations about the 
work of advisers, not based on empirical research. This study demonstrates the 
complexity and contingency of advisers' behaviour. It is more accurate to refer 
to different subsets of advisers. The thesis provides a new way of 
distinguishing between advisers, based on how they performed their role. 
The most important role difference was between advisers in the three central 
offices (Prime Minister's office, Treasurer's office and Finance minister's office) 
and those in 'line' offices. Advisers in the three central offices had special roles 
in the debates and negotiations staff engaged in on behalf of their ministers. 
They were crucial in developing whole of government positions, in forging 
consensus and resolving policy conflict, and in managing cross-portfolio policy 
development. As well as the special role of the Prime Minister's office, the 
thesis reveals the role and influence of the Treasurer's office and Finance 
minister's office, often neglected in previous research (Weller 2000, Walter 
1986). 
Line advisers in the study were categorised as 'very active', 'active' or 
'passive/reactive', based on their behaviour in steering policy. The thesis 
focuses mainly on the work of two of these types ('active' and 'very active'). It 
describes the most active version of the role at the time -the boundaries of what 
was considered acceptable for advisers to do. Some advisers did not behave in 
this way, and were still mainly concerned with 'spin' and 'minding', often 
minimally involved in policy making. The factors which caused advisers to 
play a more active or passive role in steering policy were complex, and 
included the minister's approach and needs; and the adviser's policy 
competence and role conception. This complexity highlights the dangers of 
generalising about the work of advisers. 
Advisers must now be recognised as potentially important policy actors. It is 
no longer adequate to exclude them from analyses of policy roles and 
processes. By articulating the policy roles advisers played at this time, the 
thesis provides a basis for inserting them into policy theory. It is also not 
adequate to locate advisers solely in the 'political sphere' of government, and 
outside of the 'policy sphere' (Davis 1997, Bridgman and Davis 1998). The 
thesis reveals some Keating advisers were powerful policy actors, with their 
own distinctive policy roles which extended well beyond injecting a 'political' 
perspective into policy advice. 
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It is important to note that the study does not assert that advisers were more 
important in government and policy making than either ministers or public 
servants. In fact, what emerged from most interviews was the view that 
ministers were by far the most important players. 
One of the most interesting and least studied elements of the role of advisers is 
the work advisers do together. The thesis explored the structures and practices 
underlying the networking that advisers did and found that a highly-
concentrated power structure and expected ways of behaving underpinned 
these interactions. That these relationships operated effectively was vital to the 
harmony and success of the government as a whole. 
The thesis now turns to a discussion of the implications of the findings for 
wider questions of governance. It considers the significance of the role of 
ministerial advisers in the Keating years for political-bureaucratic relations in 
Australia; for the development of Australian political institutions; and for the 
capacity of the executive. 
MINISTERIAL ADVISERS AND POLITICAL-BUREAUCRATIC 
RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA 
The relationship between ministerial advisers and departments has become 
very important in Australian politics. That it operates well is vital to effective 
government. However it is an inherently difficult relationship as it is the point 
at which the political and administrative worlds collide, where the struggle for 
political control is played out daily. 
Advisers had gained considerable administrative authority in their work with 
departments in the Keating period. Their role as gatekeepers in the flow of 
documents to the minister, and as surrogates for the minister in communicating 
with the department, provided much leverage in their relationships with public 
servants. This exchange relationship enabled some advisers to demand a high 
level of involvement in departmental activities. This had a potentially positive 
outcome for departments, in greater engagement in and understanding of the 
portfolio by ministers and advisers. It could be useful for departments when 
advisers acted as the surrogates of ministers, but there could also be problems if 
the adviser was not an effective, or accepted, surrogate. For some advisers, 
being accepted as authoritative by the department was an ongoing struggle; 
their authority was unstable and had to be constantly reaffirmed. They needed 
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characterised 
servants 
advisers. 
ministers has changed; it is now u.~, ........ , .... " ..... 
this has increased the scope 
presence 
(in that advisers 
are more and can cover a wider range issues to some depth), the 
presence of advisers as gatekeepers surrogates frustrates some senior 
public servants. Ministers, however, welcome this as a way of managing 
communication with the department of filtering the barrage of information 
and demands they receive. Yet in one case this study, it meant a department 
had little direct contact with the minister. Public servants claimed the 
relationship was conducted entirely by her advisers and she communicated 
only in writing with the department. 
Some have suggested the growing role of advisers has resulted a reduction in 
the role of senior public servants (Fitzgerald Campbell Halligan 1992; 
1 This a normative view and can be seen as a way making the role of advisers acceptable. 
supervising, f'111""111Pnnn 
involved work times. 
servants was to force them to engage with political actors and political agendas. 
They face strong pressures to responsive to particularly 
when advisers were able to use their own policy skills, and their links other 
political actors, to develop policy themselves or to challenge the department's 
control of information. 
Rather than seeing the growing role of advisers as resulting in a power shift 
from the bureaucracy to ministers, this thesis suggests that the work of 'very 
active' and 'active' advisers served to strengthen or bolster ministers in their 
dealings with departments. Public servants the study not appear to 
passively complying political direction. They were strongly present the 
(1996) is the exc1epti1)n 
relationship, to the immense frustration of advisers at times. There was 
evidence of strong and robust engagement between advisers and public 
servants, some of whom worked closely together in jointly developing policy, 
grappling with the tension at the heart of their relationships. While advisers 
could be frustrated by their struggles to assert ministerial direction, they also 
recognised that passivity or simple 'obedience' by public servants would not 
help them to achieve their objectives. 
Adviser 35, a long time senior public servant who was working as an adviser at 
the time of the study, bemoaned the fact that in his view, so much of the 'policy 
stimulus' now had to come from the ministerial arena. He felt that advisers 
were increasingly filling a gap because of an 'abrogation of responsibility' by 
departments; he said: 'They've taken their bat and ball and gone home.' The 
growing role of ministerial advisers is a positive development if it produces 
vigorous engagement between the political executive and the bureaucracy in 
policy making. However public servants (and ministers) need to be strongly 
present in the relationship for this to occur. 
A blurring of the roles of public servant and ministerial adviser was evident in 
the study, both in the shared nature of much policy activity and also in the 
recruitment of public servants as ministerial advisers. This is not a major 
problem in relation to shared policy roles, because while advisers and public 
servants work together on policy, there is a well-understood distinction in their 
work as partisans and non-partisans (as is strongly argued by Dunn (1997)). 
The blurring of roles is more serious when public servants are employed as 
ministerial advisers. The partisan public servant has been a feature of the 
Australian ministerial office since it emerged in 1972. Half of the advisers in 
this study came from the public service, and all except two were partisan. 3 It is 
important to note in this discussion that public servants were on leave from the 
public service while working as ministerial advisers (through the operation of 
the MOP(S) Act). They were never a public servant and a ministerial adviser at 
the same time. Thus the term 'partisan public servant' or the phrase 'public 
servants in ministerial offices' refers to advisers, performing partisan work, 
who have come from a department and are entitled to return to it. 
The presence of public servants in ministers' offices is positive in that they often 
bring policy competence and experience in government to the job, as well as 
some understanding of public administration and public service ethics. They 
3 See Appendix 3. 
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are often highly valued by ministers, who see their knowledge and skills, when 
combined with partisanship, as particularly useful in directing government and 
influencing policy. In fact Prime Minister John Howard recently referred to 
partisan public servants as 'in many ways the ideal ministerial adviser' 
G Howard 2001). There are also benefits for public servants in experiencing the 
world of ministers. 
Their presence in ministerial offices is evidence of the increasingly technical 
nature of the job of adviser. It also shows the MOP(S) Act has been an effective 
mechanism enabling public servants to move between ministerial offices and 
positions in departments. The fact that 67% of the 'long term advisers' in this 
study were public servants, indicates how effective the Act has been for 
facilitating long term advisory careers. It is now possible for public servants to 
express a long term attachment to a party by working as a government or 
Opposition ministerial staffer. 
However the role of the partisan public servant in minister's offices is a point of 
tension because it has no basis in Westminster political culture. Being non-
partisan is at the core of the identity of the public servant in our political 
system. Indeed, in the UK a 'partisan public servant' would be considered a 
definitional impossibility. 4 
There are difficulties at two levels. Being a partisan public servant in a 
minister's office could be difficult in that doing what was required by the 
minister might 'burn bridges' in the department, and result in considerable 
damage to one's career and reputation. It also creates difficulties for the public 
service, since most of these advisers return to the public service with known 
associations with one party in government. The degree of interpenetration of 
the political and bureaucratic worlds is evident in the fact that three of the ten 
senior public servants interviewed had worked as ministerial advisers before 
returning to senior positions in the public service. 
For the individuals in these 'hybrid' roles there was no role confusion and they 
appeared to have no difficulty reverting to a non-partisan role - willing to serve 
a different government - on their return to departments. However they could 
be viewed with suspicion by others in the public service and in government. 
They could suffer career damage, or need to spend some time in 'Coventry', if 
4 In the sense there is a strong view that it is inappropriate for civil servants to work in political 
roles in ministerial offices, or for political advisers to be appointed as civil servants. 
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ministerial advisers. 
an easy 
The 
political institution providing 
to ministers in France. Most members of the cabinets 
are public servants and there is a high level interchange between 
the upper public service and the cabinets (Gaborit and Mourner 1987:104). 
There is considerable debate in France about the significance of the fact most 
members of cabinets are public servants, with two main themes relevant to 
Australia. One view argues this is part of a general depoliticisation or 
technocratisation of the state in France (Searls 1981:165-166; Gaborit and 
Mourner 1987:92,97). The second view is that the number of public servants 
cabinets indicates a politicisation the administration (Gaborit and Mourner 
1987:92,97). 
5 One adviser reported being often, and 
returned to the department (A 18 ). 
6 This was partly because it was a time 
he 
contraction in the public service. 
This analysis 
is anecdotaL based on the personal experiences an 
important issue its own right. 
The evolution of the role of the ministerial office over the Labor period 
represents institutional development the Australian political system. In the 
Hawke-Keating years the Australian ministerial office developed four 
public service is not traditionally neutral in France. public servants can be 
and there are mechanisms for partisan servants while 
opponents are in government. 
has 
advisers 
advisers 
making policy 
traditionally played a small 
·-""'''ATrH:>n 1991:238; Page Young 
anxiety 
partisan 
processes 
Sloman 1982:91). 
It is only the Prime Minister's office that there are significant numbers 
partisan policy advisers (in the Prime Minister's Policy Unit). While this may 
be changing with the rapid increase in the number of 'special advisers' under 
Blair, the distinction between partisan and policy roles is still normatively 
important in the UK (Clifford 2000). 
In Canada ministerial offices are highly partisan, but have traditionally had a 
limited policy role (Bakvis Savoie 1983; Aucoin 1986; Campbell 1983; 
Hockin 1991; Campbell and Wilson 1995:166). The Prime Minister's office has 
some policy capacity in the form of a small policy unit (Peters and Savoie 
Campbell1998). However this has never been as significant or effective as the 
F.,..,.,..,..."" Minister's policy UK (Campbell Wilson 
Campbell argues Canada lacks a strong tradition of 'party-political policy 
advice' in the Prime Minister's office, which has hampered the ability of its 
governments to 'sustain a viable level of partisan responsiveness' (1998:150). 
Thus the fact that many advisers in this study were both partisan and policy-
focused is distinctive compared to the UK and Canada. 
Fourth, partisan public servants in ministerial offices are a special feature of the 
Australian model. They are not a feature in the UK, and do not seem to have 
been promoted in the Canadian model (which has emphasised non-public 
servants as advisers (Hockin 1991)).8 However it is important to stress that 
Australian ministerial offices in the Keating period were generally marked by a 
mix of types of staff, with a range of backgrounds and combinations of political 
and policy expertise. 
There has been much recent debate about the appropriate role of ministerial 
advisers in the UK (House of Commons Select Committee on Public 
Administration Sixth Report (1998), Fourth Report (2001), Seventh Report 
(2001)). Those who have called for increasing the partisan assistance for British 
ministers have often looked to France for a model and rejected its system of 
partisan public servants in cabinets ministeriels, because the openly partisan 
nature of the French public service is alien to the Westminster tradition. 9 
Perhaps it is time that reformers in the UK looked to the Australian model, 
which effectively combines partisan policy advisers to ministers, many of 
whom were public servants, with a non-partisan public service. The 
combination of these two sources of advice appeared to work well in helping 
ministers to govern in the Keating period. 
The evolution of the ministerial office over the Labor period can be seen as a 
pragmatic response to the problems of governance. The ministerial office in the 
Keating years was part of an effective, and distinctively Australian, structuring 
of partisan and non-partisan advice to government, one which both reinforced 
and challenged elements of Westminster political culture. 
PARTISAN CAP A CITY WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE 
Many contemporary writers believe that one of the urgent problems of modem 
governance is a loss of capacity and coordination at the centre of government, 
8 With some notable exceptions under Mulroney (Campbell and Wilson 1995:166). 
9 Campbell and Wilson note that these discussions usually end with the conclusion that: 'this 
might well be true for Mars, but would it work on Earth?' (1995:70). 
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referred to as 'hollowing out of the state', and a 'weakness at the centre' (Weller, 
Bakvis and Rhodes 1997; Rhodes 2000d; Smith 1999). This view sees the 
executive as ill-equipped to deal with modem government, which is 
characterised by overlapping networks, fragmented policy structures and 
multiple policy actors. Others argue there is a 'crisis of executive leadership' in 
advanced liberal democracies, as the task of governing effectively, particularly 
achieving policy competence, has become more and more difficult (Campbell 
1998). 
The development of the role of ministerial adviser over the Labor period can be 
seen as strengthening the partisan element in government, and delivering much 
extra capacity to ministers in their quest to manage and steer government. This 
thesis has shown the important work that advisers could perform in helping 
ministers to manage the relationship between the government and the 
bureaucracy; and relationships within the ministry. These are the two 
'gearboxes' which Campbell argues a government must effectively manage to 
achieve political control (1998). Advisers in the thesis could greatly increase 
ministers' ability to engage departments. Through their role as executive 
negotiators, advisers helped the ministry to coordinate. Their informal 
interaction operated as a vital adjunct to the cabinet system in the Keating 
years. While they can be seen as contributing to a de-institutionalisation of the 
cabinet system by making possible informal resolution of issues outside of 
cabinet, at the same time they worked to strengthen the cabinet system by 
supporting its operations. 
A third requirement for political control is that partisans can devise, develop 
and deliver policy agendas. Through their interstitial location and access to 
information and relationships, 'very active' and 'active' advisers in the thesis 
were at times crucial in helping ministers to achieve policy innovation. 
In studies of the Labor period the Hawke and Keating governments are seen as 
having two major achievements in managing government: an ability to create 
effective working relationships with the bureaucracy; and internal cohesion and 
direction provided by an inner core of ministers (the 'engine house' of the ERC) 
(Campbell and Halligan 1992; Gruen and Grattan 1993; Campbell1998). They 
are described as successful in attaining policy competence - an effective a 
balance between responsive and neutral competence (Campbell1998:159) -and 
as being 'good at gearboxes'. One factor in these achievements is undoubtedly 
the growth and development in the role of the ministerial office over the Labor 
period. In the Keating years some advisers played key roles in helping 
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ministers to work with the bureaucracy, to develop partisan policy agendas, 
and to determine political direction within the ministry. While not all ministers 
sought to influence policy and not all advisers played the role at its most active, 
the evolution of the ministerial office over the Labor period made it a 
potentially very powerful tool in helping ministers to govern. Its evolution 
provided 'an institutional capacity for effective governance' (Moe 1993). 
Yet the development has brought with it some important vulnerabilities. These 
relate to the dilution of the relationship between ministers and departments; 
and a decrease in direct contact between ministers. There is danger in the 
increasing reliance on the informal interaction of advisers to negotiate matters 
on behalf of ministers outside of cabinet. Cabinet may lose control of issues 
which are decided outside its formal structures, as occurred in the woodchip 
licence decision described in Chapter Nine. This example also shows that the 
system is vulnerable to failure if advisers do not behave according to accepted 
norms. Much responsibility is placed in the hands of individuals. 
There is also a loss of transparency in government when much important 
government 'puzzling' over policy occurs within an informal arena where file 
notes are rarely kept. Such a system relies for its integrity on strong 
relationships between delegating ministers and their advisers, and good 
communication between advisers and public servants. While this thesis does 
not explore the issue of the accountability of advisers, ministers were clear and 
even forceful in their view that advisers were highly accountable to them, and 
through ministers to the Parliament and the public. For such a system to 
function, ministers need to enact the chain of accountability that they so clearly 
believe in, by taking responsibility for the actions of their staff. 
The thesis ends on the issue which drove the emergence of ministerial advisers 
in the 1970s in Australia- the desire by governments for political control. 
Throughout this study the enormous strength of the bureaucracy and the 
bureaucratic agenda was evident. There were many robust encounters between 
public servants and advisers. The thesis disputes the contention that 'firm 
political control' was achieved by the Hawke and Keating Labor governments 
(Campbell and Halligan (1992:204), Halligan and Power (1992:78)). Measuring 
political control is an impossibility, and even defining it (whether this is at the 
level of a specific policy issue, or a portfolio level, or a cabinet level) is difficult. 
In its evolution over the Labor period the ministerial office became a more 
effective tool in the battle for political control. But while advisers could deliver 
capacity, they did not deliver control. The presence of advisers put ministers 
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'in the game' -making a struggle for political control possible- rather than 
guaranteeing its outcome. 
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A.ppe::n..di~ 1 
Referencing system 
Advisers interviewed 
names abbreviations 
Adviser 1 A01 
Adviser2 A02 
Adviser3 A03 
Adviser4 A04 
AdviserS A05 
Adviser6 A06 
Adviser7 A07 
AdviserS A08 
Adviser9 A09 
Adviser10 A10 
Adviser 11 All 
Adviser 12 A12 
Adviser 13 A13 
Adviser 14 A14 
Adviser15 A15 
Adviser16 A16 
Adviser17 A17 
Adviser 18 A18 
Adviser19 A19 
Adviser20 A20 
Adviser21 A21 
Adviser22 A22 
Adviser23 A23 
Adviser24 A24 
Adviser25 A25 
Adviser26 A26 
Adviser27 A27 
Adviser28 A28 
Adviser29 A29 
Adviser30 A30 
Adviser31 A31 
Adviser32 A32 
Adviser33 A33 
Adviser34 A34 
Adviser35 A35 
Adviser36 A36 
Adviser37 A37 
Adviser38 A38 
Adviser39 A39 
Adviser40 A40 
Adviser41 A41 
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Advisers referred to only 
names 
Adviser44 
Adviser47 
Adviser48 
Adviser 50 
Adviser 51 
Adviser 53 
Adviser 54 
Adviser 56 
Ministers interviewed 
names 
Minister Orange 
Minister White 
Minister Purple 
Minister Green 
Minister Black 
Minister Grey 
Minister Crimson 
Minister Silver 
Minister Red 
Minister Gold 
Minister Brown 
Minister Yellow 
Minister Blue 
Ministers referred to only 
names 
Minister Pink 
Minister Violet 
Minister Bronze 
Minister Scarlet 
Minister Turquoise 
Minister Lilac 
Minister Amber 
Minister Olive 
Minister Ivory 
abbreviations 
A44 
A47 
A48 
A50 
A51 
A53 
A54 
A56 
abbreviations 
Orange 
White 
Purple 
Green 
Black 
Grey 
Crimson 
Silver 
Red 
Gold 
Brown 
Yellow 
Blue 
abbreviations 
Pink 
Violet 
Bronze 
Scarlet 
Turquoise 
Lilac 
Amber 
Olive 
Ivory 
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names 
Public Servant 1 POl 
Public Servant P02 
Public Servant 
Public Servant 4 
Public Servant POS 
Servant 
Public Servant P07 
Public Servant P08 
Public Servant 9 P09 
Public Servant 10 PlO 
A.ppe~di~2 
The Prime Minister's office, Treasurer's 
office and Finance minister's office 
This appendix provides the names of those people counted as advisers in the 
Prime Minister's office, Finance Minister's office and Treasurer's office in April 
1995, when the study began. Two important changes occurred later in 1995. In 
June, the Finance minister, Kim Beazley, became Deputy Prime Minister when 
Brian Howe stepped down, and at this time his Senior Adviser was upgraded 
to Principal Adviser and he gained more staff. Later in 1995 Don Russell 
returned to head the Prime Minister's office, and John Bowan changed from 
Principal Adviser to Senior Adviser Political. 
Advisers in the Finance minister's office April1995 
Senior Adviser 
Senior Adviser Parliamentary 
Economic Consultant 
Consultant 
Adviser 
Adviser 
Adviser 
Assistant Adviser 
Media Adviser 
Assistant Parliamentary Liaison Officer 
Personal secretary 
Secretary 
Secretary 
Source: Ministerial Directory April 1995. 
Syd Hickman [later Principal Adviser] 
John O'Callaghan 
Owen Covick 
John Angley 
Lucinda Holdforth 
Michael Megaw 
Ed Dermer 
Denise Taunton 
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Advisers in the Prime Minister's office April 1995 
Principal Adviser 
Speechwriter/Consultant 
Policy Advising Group 
Senior Adviser(Political) 
Senior Adviser (International affairs) 
Senior Adviser (Economic) 
Consultant 
Senior Adviser (Aboriginal affairs, environment 
and sport) 
Senior Adviser (Social policy) 
Senior Adviser (Communications) 
Adviser 
Press Office 
Senior Media Adviser 
Media Adviser 
Media Adviser 
Personal Secretary 
Personal Secretary 
Administrative/Coordinating Group 
Senior Adviser (Government Business) 
Senior Personal Adviser 
Senior Adviser (cabinet/parliament} 
Personal Adviser 
Assistant Adviser (Office administration) 
Assistant to Mrs Keating 
Personal Secretary to the PM 
Personal Secretary/Appointments 
Personal Secretary 
Personal Secretary 
Personal Secretary 
Personal Secretary 
Personal Secretary 
Personal Assistant to the PM 
Receptionist 
Source: Ministerial Directory April 1995 
John Bowan [later Don Russell] 
Don Watson 
Bill Bowtell 
Allan Gyngell 
Ric Simes 
Dr Bruce Chapman 
Simon Balderstone [later Mark O'Neill] 
Mary Ann O'Loughlin 
Sam Mostyn 
Michael Fullilove 
Conall O'Connell 
Peter Robinson 
Clare Nairn 
Advisers in the Treasurer's office April1995 
Principal Adviser 
Senior Adviser 
Consultant Social policy 
Adviser 
Adviser 
Adviser 
Assistant Adviser 
DLO 
Media Adviser 
Media Assistant 
Personal secretary 
Secretary 
David Cox 
Jim Wright 
Barbara Livesey 
Fran McMullen 
Mandy O'Brien 
Paul Grimes 
Colleen Sykes 
DLO = Departmental liaison officer 
Source: Ministerial Directory April 1995. 
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A.ppe:n..di~ a 
Biographical data and types of 
advisers in the study 
Description of the sample group of advisers 
There were several strong features of the group. The advisers in the sample 
were mostly male (71 %) and overwhelmingly in their 30s and 40s (90%). Their 
average age was 38 years and four months. 
Age of advisers in the study 
20s 30s 40s 50s 
no 4 17 18 0 
% 10% 44% 46% 0% 
NB: n= 39 as two did not disclose this information. 
Most were current or former Labor party members (62.5%). They were all 
highly educated, with 100% having one degree and 47% having more than one. 
The most common degree was the BA, and the most common specialist degrees 
were economics and law.1 Most had attended only government schools (64%). 
Schools attended by advisers in the study 
Government only Catholic only Independent only Government and 
Independent 
no 23 11 0 2 
% 64% 30.5% 0% 5.5% 
NB: n = 36 as 5 did not disclose this information 
Around half were currently public servants (56%). Public servants and non 
public servants were spread in similar proportions across all positions. 
Experience as an adviser 
The average period of employment as an adviser was 3.5 years. However the 
range of experience was great - from four months to more than ten years. 
1 Twenty four advisers had a BA; seven had B Econ and five had BA/LLB or LLB. 
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Years as an adviser 
years <1y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 6y 7y By 9y 10y 
no of advisers 1 9 11 5 4 6 2 0 0 2 
% 2 22 27 12 10 15 2 5 0 0 
n=41 
Half of the advisers in the study were relatively new and had two years or less 
experience (51.2%). This is unsurprising since when interviews began, in April 
1995, the second Keating government was exactly two years old. A sizeable 
group had 3-5 years experience. Most advisers interviewed had only worked 
for one minister (58%) and in one or two portfolios (80%). However a small 
group had had more wide ranging experience: five of the sample had worked 
for three or four ministers; and eight advisers had worked in three or four 
portfolios. 
Number of ministers worked for 
1 2 3 4 
no 24 12 3 2 
% 58.5% 29% 7.5% 5% 
n=41 
Number of portfolios worked in 
1 2 3 4 
no 19 14 6 2 
% 46% 34% 15% 5% 
n=41 
However there was a core of relatively very experienced advisers within 
minister's offices at the time of the interviews. Fifteen of the sample group 
(37%) can be classed as 'long term' advisers, defined as having worked as an 
adviser for four or more years. Some of these advisers contributed a wealth of 
experience to the sample and could be influential individuals in their policy 
areas. As many as 29% of the sample (12 subjects) had advised ministers on 
one policy area for between three and six years. The group of long term 
advisers will be discussed in detail later. 
Career background 
The advisers interviewed had a wide range of backgrounds and many had 
multiple former careers. Seventy per cent had a public service background (as 
5 
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2 However only 12 of the 23 current public servants listed their background as solely 'public 
service'. Career combinations included: community sector/public service; private sector/public 
service; academia/public service; teaching/public service; and journalism/public service. Six 
public servants (26%) had also worked in parliamentary positions such as Parliamentary liaison 
Officer and Departmental Liaison Officer and in the parliamentary library. 
3 Former trade union officials did not feature highly in earlier studies: 3% of advisers had 
worked for unions under Whitlam and none under Fraser (Forward 1977:163). Walter gives no 
comparable figures for the Hawke 
Career backgrounds of advisers in the study 
Career background 
public service positions: 
Commonwealth public servant 
state public servant 
private sector positions: 
finance sector I economist 
consultant 
lawyer (private sector) 
adviser positions: 
no of advisers 
27 
2 
3 
2 
2 
adviser to another federal ALP minister 17 
adviser to a state ALP minister 5 
party positions: 
other: 
electorate officer 1 
trade union 0 
party bureaucracy 0 
community sector 
academic 
activist 
lawyer 
teacher 
journalist 
doctor 
soldier 
7 
5 
5 
4 
3 
1 
1 
1 
n=41. The number of careers listed exceeds 41 as some listed multiple former careers. 
Around half of the sample group were policy specialists (51%), defined as 
advisers who, before taking their present job, had been working in a similar 
policy area to that on which they were now advising. 
Partisanship 
There are great difficulties in measuring partisanship, as it is complex and has 
many aspects. Being or having been a party member is the clearest measure of 
partisanship, but it is also a minimum measure. Apart from party membership, 
partisanship can be seen in attitude and behaviour and presents as a range 
rather than a clear set of categories. 
Of the respondents who were not party members, the vast majority identified 
themselves as either 'party supporters' or 'party sympathisers'. Most ministers 
were comfortable with that level of commitment to the party amongst advisers. 
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13 12 
non 10 6 
n=41 
a defined as those who were 
b defined as those who were current members of the Australian Public :-.~n~~r~"' under 
the Act 
public 
partisans sense they were or 
""'"'rn;n."''""' (56.5%). The non public servants tended to more 
public servants: 71% were members. 
Looking at non public servants, there was a major distinction between 
those who were party members and those who were not party members. The 
party members were highly partisan in their attitudes and approach, whereas 
the non party members displayed lower attachment to the party. The party 
4 It was important to include those who were former members because there were many 
reasons for people being 'in and out' of the moving cities, being too busy, and frustration 
at ACT branch politics. (One stated 'going to branch meetings in the ACT would drive any 
normal person completely mad'.) Having joined the at any stage showed a higher level of 
commitment than those who had never joined the party. 
members consisted of three activists, two academics, one private sector 
consultant and six people who had been recruited though party channels and 
often had responsibility for important party political work in their offices (such 
as liaising with the party organisation, back benchers, factions and local 
branches). 
By contrast the non public servants who were not party members were all 
policy specialists and displayed low levels of attachment to the Labor party. 
Two were academics, two were activists, one was a specialist lawyer and one 
was a specialist journalist. Often these people had very strong attachments to 
certain policy agendas, which they pursued vigorously, and these agendas 
coincided with the government's policy agendas. Their attachment to the party 
flowed from their attachment to its policies. However they did not have a 
direct attachment to the party beyond this. They had all been advisers for less 
than two and a half years. 
Public servants 
The partisanship of the public servants was more complex than the distinction 
between party members and non party members suggests .. The party members 
had strong and often long standing attachments to the party. Yet amongst 
those who were not party members, there were only two who took a 
consciously non partisan approach, and distanced themselves from party 
political work. These two acted as if they had been 'seconded' to the minister's 
office.5 One described his job as 'a pseudo-departmental position in the office'. 
Though they took a critical approach to the department's work and pursued the 
minister's interests, these two advisers saw themselves ultimately as 
departmental officers. 
However there were few differences between the other eight non party 
members and the 13 party members. All were partisan in their approach and 
attached to the party and its ideology. All of these 21 public servants said that 
they would never have worked for the Coalition as an adviser. Several of both 
groups had long term attachments to the party and had worked as Labor 
advisers for many years. Indeed, two of the non party members went on to 
work as advisers for the Labor party in Opposition after 1996. A non party 
member was one of the inner group of political strategists who planned 
5 in the traditional sense that public servants were seconded to ministerial offices prior to 1972. 
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channels, because of 
others 
as 
experience 
6 
the party. 
'party hack'; 
were public servants, who worked as advisers many years. 
Though not originally in such roles, over time they had developed 
political skills and dose relationships with ministers that enabled them to do 
this work. One of these advisers was unusual in that he was not a party 
member, but he worked as senior adviser for a very senior minister, had a 
dose personal relationship with It was his personality, his position and 
his relationship which had created this highly political role for him. 
6 There could have been good reasons for them not joining the party. One stated that he did 
not join the for fear of retribution in his career as a public servant; he said he had seen 
others suffer Labor in the past. 
This type is important because it reveals that only a minority of the adviser 
sample had specific party political responsibilities, and that it would be wrong 
to make assumptions about who these people were. 
2. Long term or 'professional' advisers 
While most advisers worked for relatively short periods before resuming their 
main careers elsewhere, there was an important cohort of advisers of long 
standing who had worked for ministers for four or more years. Fifteen (or 37%) 
of the sample were classed as long term advisers. It is not clear what 
proportion they represented of the entire group of advisers working at this 
time. Yet it indicates that there was a core of relatively very experienced 
advisers within minister's offices at the time of the interviews. 
Their average period as an adviser was six years. Some had had continuous 
experience as advisers over many years (for 10 years in some cases) while 
others had been in and out of adviser jobs over a long period. Three of the 
sample interviewed in 1995-96 had worked in the ministerial offices of the first 
Hawke government in 1983. Three more had first been employed as advisers in 
1985. Ten had worked continuously as advisers and five had had breaks 
between periods of employment with ministers. They had moved in and out of 
adviser jobs, combining it with work in the public service, the private sector 
and academia. 
The subgroup of long term advisers was older than the total sample group and 
more likely to be public servants and party members. Their average age was 
40 years 10 months. All except one worked for senior ministers at the time of 
the interview. However 60% had also worked for junior ministers at some 
stage in their careers. Long term advisers had usually worked for more than 
one minister, in more than one portfolio. 
The fact that two-thirds were public servants is significant - it suggests that the 
security provided by the MOP(S) Act had made long term careers as advisers 
possible or practical. 
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members 
male 
average age 
worked 
worked in 
a 
b n =41 
c n=14 
d n=39 
minister 
38 years 
or more years 
were at 
is important not ease a long term career as an 
it 
adviser. Advisers study stressed the difficulties of the long hours and 
family life sacrifices involved in the job, factors which usually led to 
'burnout' after two or three years. They also commented on the difficulty 
maintaining a long term relationship with a minister. It was a minority of 
the sample who desired, or made, long term careers as advisers. 
3. public servants 
Another significant type which emerges the sample is the partisan public 
servant. As discussed earlier, partisanship is difficult to measure, and at its 
minimum is indicated by party membership. That the majority of the public 
servant advisers in the sample were or had been party members (56.5%) is 
servants 
The majority 
their policy expertise, as specialists or generalists. eight advisers 
felt they were recruited other reasons). Fifty-one per cent sample 
were policy specialists- defined as those who, before taking their present job, 
had been working a similar policy area to that on which they were now 
advising. These policy specialists were public servants, activists and academics 
with deep knowledge of specific policy issues. Some had had many years' 
experience working on the policy issues on which they were now advising the 
minister. 
7 The proportion of public servant advisers classified as 'political' in earlier studies were: 41% 
Hawke; 10% Fraser and 36% Whitlam (derived Walter 1986:1 Party membership was 
only one criterion in this 
8 Walter does not for the 1983 sample. 
Generalists could also bring considerable policy expertise to ministerial offices. 
Many generalists were practitioners experienced in the processes of policy 
making, either as public servants (not from their minister's department) or as 
long term advisers. 
That there were a considerable number of advisers in the sample who brought 
policy expertise to their jobs indicates the increasingly technical nature of the 
adviser position. Many ministers were looking for technical skills, relating to 
specific policy areas or to policy making more generally, when recruiting their 
advisers. While there was often a mix of skills in an office, policy skills were 
dearly valued by many ministers in recruiting staff at this time. 
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